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Abstract 
The intention of this enquiry was to assess the status of cyber-security in the metropolitan 
municipalities in South Africa. The focus on this level of local government was driven by 
the fact that metropolitan municipalities are the economic hubs with a variety of industr ia l 
facilities and are the places with high population densities. The metropolitan municipalit ies 
have adopted information infrastructures to support the daily administrative processes and, 
equally important, to support the delivery of essential services such as the distribution of 
electricity and clean water to the local citizens and communities. Entrenched in the adoption 
of information infrastructures are the cyber ills which if left unattended could have 
devastating consequences on people and industrial facilities. Failures or interruptions to 
information infrastructures have cascading effects due to interconnectedness of these 
infrastructures. 
The study used the Constructivist Grounded Theory Methodology to explore the activit ies 
that are performed by the metropolitan municipalities with the intention to determine what 
needs to be in place to safeguard their information infrastructures from cyber ills. Cyber-
security is a serious concern in all types of businesses that are largely supported by 
information infrastructures in pursuit of the business objectives. Information infrastructures 
are susceptible to cyber-security threats, which if left unattended can shut the municipa lity 
operations down with disastrous consequences.  
A substantive theory of integrated development cyber-security emerged from the 
Constructivist Grounded Theory Methodology processes of data collecting through 
comprehensive interviews, initial coding, focused coding, memoing, and theoretical coding. 
A municipal cyber-security conceptual framework was developed from the integrated 
development cyber-security theory constructs of integrated development cyber-security 
which are the core category, cyber-security governance category, cyber-security technica l 
operations category, and human issues in cyber-security category. The conceptual 
framework was used to formulate the cyber-security status assessment survey questionna ire 
that was adopted as an instrument to assess the cyber-security status in the metropolitan 
municipalities.  
The cyber-security status assessment instrument was deployed in metropolitan 
municipalities, wherein data was collected and statistically analysed to test and confirm its 
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validity. The assessment results were analysed and showed the as is posture of cyber-
security, the gaps in the current implemented cyber-security controls were identified together 
with the risks associated with those gaps, corrective actions to address the identified 
deficiencies were identified and recommended/communicated to the management of 
relevant municipalities. 
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CHAPTER 1  
RESEARCH INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 has eleven sections. The sections covered are outlined in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: Structure of Chapter 1 
 Topic Overview 
1.1 Chapter introduction Provides outline of the chapter. 
1.2 Research background Provides research context.  
1.3 Research problem  What are issues that warrant this inquiry? 
1.4 Research question Precisely what the inquiry is about. 
1.5  Research objectives What are the intentions of this investigation? 
1.6 Research rationale Provides justification to execute this inquiry. 
1.7 Theoretical framework Synopsis of how this enquiry was conducted. 
1.8 Research scope Presents boundaries of this research. 
1.9 Terminology used  Explanations of important concepts used. 
1.10 Thesis outline Provides road map of the thesis. 
1.11 Chapter summary  Presents highlights of the areas discussed.  
 
1.2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND  
The South African Government published the National Cyber-Security Policy Framework 
(NCPF) in September 2015. The NCPF highlights the foremost considerations in protecting 
national cyberspace; on the other hand, it highlights the fact that there is no cyber-security 
implementation plan for the country. The study sought to make advances towards cyber-
security implementation in the local sphere of government, specifically metropolitan 
municipalities. The NCPF includes statistics that list South Africa amongst the top three 
countries in the world that are targeted for phishing purposes (Mahlobo, 2015). The NCPF 
outlines broad policy guidelines on cyber-security in the country and it requires government 
to develop detailed cyber-security policies and strategies. In his speech for the Departmenta l 
Budget Vote 2016/17, South African State Security Agency Minister, David Mahlobo, 
highlighted the fact that the most cyber-attacks are now perpetrated by automated 
programmes which can run constantly with the intention of exploiting opportunities in 
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various levels of government (Mahlobo, 2016). The Minister also stressed the fact that 
various structures that deal with cyber-security issues in the country have been established; 
however, these structures are inadequate in addressing cyber-security matters holistica l ly 
(Mahlobo, 2015). 
The country’s current version of the National Development Plan (NDP) envisages that the 
ecosystem of services, applications, digital networks and devices will be integrated firmly 
into the social and economic fabric of the country (NPC, 2012). Amongst the major role 
players in the economy of the country, are the metropolitan municipalities. The risk that is 
associated with the implementation of digital and information and communica t ion 
technology (ICT) is colossal and may impede or derail the attainment of the country’s vision 
as per the NDP. Technological risks are becoming a serious problem for South Africa, 
particularly the escalation in large scale cyber-attacks together with an interruption of 
Critical Information Infrastructures (CIIs) (IRMSA, 2015). Critical cyber infrastruc ture 
interruptions to their intended functions can swiftly lead to disturbance in the real world such 
as water supply disruption, travel delays, electricity power supplies, financial difficulties, or 
even loss of human life. CII protection (CIIP) is an essential component of cyber-security 
because it is written or mentioned in relation to cyber-security in most National Cyber-
security Strategies (GFCE, 2016). 
The Internet Security Threat Report (Symantec, 2016a) highlights that vulnerabilities in 
industrial control systems (ICS) are likely to increase since these are connected to the 
Internet for remote control and monitoring (Symantec, 2016a). An example of an ICS is a 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The reliance on CII has 
increasingly exposed the various government levels to threats that are inherent in the 
cyberspace. The local government sphere is the service delivery machine for the national 
government. The sophistication of threats to CIIs is real and emergent; hence crimina l 
activity and service disruptions are becoming common (Hathaway, 2015). The real 
demonstration of the sophistication of threats in the cyberspace is the 2010 Stuxnet virus 
where CIIs such as ICS were attacked. South Africa urgently needs to act on the 
implementation of cyber-security strategies (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2015) as it cannot 
continue to drag its feet in protecting its cyberspace. Organisations’ security and protection 
against cyber-ills remain major challenges (Dlamini & Modise, 2013). 
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1.3. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The increasing reliance of various levels of the South African government on CII has 
exposed government to considerable risk (Mohideen, 2016). Many cities around the world 
are aspiring to become smart cities, meaning that they want to enhance their usage of 
networked, digital technologies to address issues relating to improving service delivery and 
governance, creating more resilient critical infrastructure (CI), enhancing quality of life, 
growing the local economy, and more (Kitchin, 2016). The acceptable Smart City status is 
the one where a city uses digital technologies to enhance municipal performance and well-
being, uses technology for reduction of costs, and to effectively and actively engage with its 
citizens (in.KNOW.vation, 2015). In South Africa, cyber-security research is critical because 
of the volatility and dynamic nature of the Internet (Grobler, Van Vuuren, & Leenen, 2012). 
Municipal CIIs are subject to a colossal variety of risks posed by cyberspace threats such as 
malware, intrusions of various kinds, distributed denial of service, hacking, viruses, spam, 
eavesdropping, and phishing.  
Protecting CII is an area of concern worldwide since most countries use various critical 
systems which rely heavily on the Internet. Disruptions of the underlying information 
infrastructure, in turn, disrupt the proper functioning of these critical systems. The incidents 
in Estonia in 2007 that resulted in a series of distributed denial-of-service attacks were 
launched against several CIIs such that there were disruptions in government services and 
other critical systems, and disruptions in terms of access to financial institutions, bruta lly 
impacting on the nation’s ability to function. In Georgia in 2008, there was also a cyber-
attack on the CII which resulted in an inability of Georgian officials to connect with the 
outside world. These types of cyber-attacks present evidence on the inability of critical 
systems to function appropriately. Safeguarding CII is an issue of importance to every level 
of government. The increased complexity and connectivity of critical infrastructure systems 
are exploited by cyber-security threats, placing the government operations at risk (NIST, 
2014). Local government have been left out in conversations on cybersecurity, and is 
abundantly apparent from the recent attacks by the SamSam ransomware attack that brought 
city services in Atlanta to a halt in March 2018 (Falco et al., 2018)  
Local governments are increasingly reliant on cyber-enabled technologies for various day-
to-day municipal functions; underpinning these technologies should be resiliency, 
redundancy, and close scrutiny in order to circumvent harmful interferences to the service 
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delivery mandate. The economic, security, health, safety, citizens’ well-being, and effective 
functioning of all spheres of government, and, to some extent, even the survival of the 
industrialised private sector, rely heavily upon interconnected critical systems that are owned 
or operated by metropolitan municipalities. Due to the essential role to the country’s security 
and economic operations, amongst others, the protection, stability, and reliability of 
interconnecting information infrastructures are no longer an option, but mandatory for 
various spheres of government. Local government’s CII includes information infrastructures 
that support essential components that are vital to a national economy. CIIs mostly perform 
their functions through the support of ICT and ICS connectivity; and there is increased 
potential of cyber-vulnerabilities and risk exposures. Failure of these interconnected systems 
and assets could result in economic and social unrest (Dennis, Jones, Kildare, & Barclay, 
2014).  
Due to the lack of a framework to assist metropolitan municipalities to assess the munic ipa l 
cyber-security status, the national remedial package and debate could be ineffective if it 
remains merely at the level of theoretical abstraction. There is a lack of cyber-security-
related research in the country except the cyber-security awareness type of research (Grobler 
et al., 2012). This situation could be exacerbated the by late promulgation in cyber-security 
policy in South Africa. Most efforts, as guided by the NCPF, are focused on promoting 
awareness which on its own is appropriate, however, obviously not sufficient. The research 
into this area is a timely necessity as cyber-threats are pandemic and no network 
interconnected system is automatically immune from them.  
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The NCPF focuses on national government, while other spheres of government are left out. 
Currently, there are no guidelines on sector-specific initiatives on how metropolitan 
municipalities should assess cyber-security status with the aim of cultivating the 
safeguarding of information infrastructures against cyber-security threats. The core research 
question that this study attempted to address is: What is the cyber-security status in South 
African metropolitan municipalities? The researcher mainly wanted to explore how 
metropolitan municipalities are protecting their municipal information infrastructures 
against cyber-security risks. The following sub-questions were formulated to provide 
solutions to the core question. 
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a. How are metropolitan municipalities in South Africa protecting their information 
infrastructures against cyber-security threats? 
Metropolitan municipalities are at the local government level which is the sphere of 
government that is closer to people on the ground. Some of the day-to-day essential 
services such as water and electricity are delivered to the citizens. The day-to-day 
functional administration of these institutions are also supported by information 
infrastructures. In this enquiry the researcher wanted to determine the practices 
employed by these government institutions in safeguarding their information 
infrastructures against the risks posed by the cyber environment.  
b. What methodologies are currently available to assess the cyber-security status in 
the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa? 
Information infrastructures have been extensively utilised by metropolitan 
municipalities (at a local government level) to provide essential services to the citizens. 
To continuously provide these essential services, they (metropolitan municipalit ies) 
need to safeguard these information infrastructure assets against cyber-security threats. 
Once information infrastructure protection mechanisms have been implemented, then 
continuous assessment of their operational effectiveness becomes essential. Cyber-
security assessment is conducted with the aim to cultivate cyber-security, and 
subsequently the protection of information infrastructure assets.  
c. How are metropolitan municipalities in South Africa inculcating the culture of 
cyber-security?  
Due to dependency of these government institutions on information infrastructures, it 
is expected that the protection of information infrastructure assets is at an acceptable 
level. To preserve the information infrastructure protection, these government 
institutions are executing pertinent processes to achieve the acceptable level of cyber-
security. To maintain an acceptable level of cyber-security requires a culture that 
promotes the protection of information infrastructure assets. Cyber-security culture is 
one of the important components that provides and sustains an enabling environment 
for the protection of information infrastructure assets.  
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d. What theoretical framework supports cyber-security implementation in the 
metropolitan municipalities in South Africa? 
The cyber-security phenomenon is fairly new compared to the related information 
security phenomenon. Due to the criticality of cyber-security, the researcher 
considered it imperative to seek explanations about cyber-security implementation in 
the metropolitan municipalities. The researcher wanted to determine what these 
government institutions do to implement cyber-security, and why they do what they 
do to safeguard the information infrastructures against cyber-risks.  
e. How can metropolitan municipalities in South Africa successfully assess their 
cyber-security status? 
An instrument or tool is required to conduct an assessment of cyber-security status. 
The assessment tool must produce assessment results that guide management in the 
decision-making process. Due to the sensitive nature of cyber-security, successful 
assessment of its status within these government institutions is believed would 
cultivate information infrastructure protection against cyber-threats.  
Cyberspace ills have the potential to shut down the operations of the metropolitan 
municipalities in the country, and, therefore, a risk management approach towards protecting 
the cyberspace is considered as one of the tools for securing the interconnected CII upon 
which the local governments rely so heavily for their day-to-day business operations. The 
country’s CII and networks are exposed to unprecedented cyber-attack levels (IRMSA, 
2015). 
1.5. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The digitisation of government operations and associated service delivery mechanisms 
offers many opportunities, but risks of disruption of essential processes for production, 
logistics and services also increase. Assessing the status of cyber-security in the metropolitan 
municipalities is envisaged to enhance cyber-threats awareness, cyber-related information 
and knowledge sharing, and joining forces to protect and improve responsiveness of 
information infrastructures. The study aimed to enhance the protection, resilience, and 
reliability of metropolitan municipalities’ information infrastructure assets. The ever-
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increasing innovation in cyberspace necessitates better approaches and procedures to 
understand, monitor and safeguard information infrastructures against cyber-security threats. 
The study’s core objective was particularly in determining the cyber-security status in South 
African metropolitan municipalities. To achieve the research core objective, the following 
sub-objectives were identified. 
a. To explore the practices that metropolitan municipalities in South Africa have 
implemented to protect their information infrastructures against cyber-security 
threats 
It is important to understand the posture of cyber-security before any enhancement 
mechanisms can be effected. The ConGTM study as presented in Chapter 4 was 
conducted to achieve this research objective. 
b. To explore the methodologies currently employed to assess the cyber-security 
status in the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa 
The researcher aimed to explore the practices currently adopted with the intention of 
assessing the cyber-security status in metropolitan municipalities in the country. The 
intention to assess the status of cyber-security culture included:  
(i) understanding the “as is” situation in order to draft the road map of getting 
into the desired destination to successfully protect the information 
infrastructure assets; 
(ii) changing or enhancing the existing culture of cyber-security within the 
institution; and 
(iii) maintaining the current practices employed to protect information 
infrastructure against cyber-threats. 
This research objective was achieved through the use of the ConGTM processes as 
presented in Chapter 4. The practices are presented in the form of focused codes that 
are pertinent to addressing this research objective.  
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c. To understand the processes that are employed to provide an enabling 
environment to develop, implement, and sustain cyber-security culture in 
metropolitan municipalities in South Africa 
Identifying the processes employed to make the environment conducive for the 
information infrastructure protection is important. A conducive environment is made 
possible amongst other domains by the appropriate culture. These processes are 
explained also in Chapter 4. 
d. To develop a theory that explains cyber-security implementation in the 
metropolitan municipalities in South Africa 
A substantive theory was developed to achieve this research objective and it is 
discussed in Chapter 5. The emerged substantive theory presents the rationale for 
cyber-security implementation in metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. This 
substantive theory integrated ideas and hypotheses that account for cyber-security 
implementation in the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. 
e. To develop an instrument to successfully assess cyber-security status in 
metropolitan municipalities in South Africa 
The conceptual framework that was developed is presented in Chapter 6 forms the 
foundation in the development of a cyber-security assessment tool in metropolitan 
municipalities in South Africa. The conceptual framework was developed from the  
ConGTM processes discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. A cyber-security 
assessment instrument that was developed is presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 
empirically applies the developed cyber-security assessment tool to assess the status 
of cyber-security in the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa.  
1.6. RESEARCH RATIONALE 
The government- integrated information infrastructures’ evolution has created new, 
exploitable, cyber-security vulnerabilities and this necessitates a heightened sense of 
urgency for the safeguarding of information infrastructures against cyber-threats. Cyber-
security controls such as ICT service continuity, security management and user access are 
the areas that need attention when it comes to the status of controls in South African 
municipalities (AGSA, 2014). The country has become dependent on the Internet to govern 
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and conduct its day-to-day government business functions (Mahlobo, 2015). A national 
understanding at the level of municipalities is necessary for strengthening and advancing the 
NCPF objectives and this research will, hopefully, contribute towards such an objective. The 
study focused on empirical evidence to assess cyber-security capacity at metropolitan 
municipal level of local government in the country. The research has followed a call by the 
National Minister of State Security (through the NCPF) that there is no cyber-security 
implementation plan for the country, and, as such, it is the aim of this study to contribute 
towards a cyber-security implementation plan.  
Municipalities are the level of government that have the most direct impact on the day-to-
day lives of South African citizens through the provision of services such as refuse removal, 
electricity, water, and sanitation, amongst others. ICT is one of the enablers towards the  
implementation of NDP and supports government’s efforts to uplift its citizens. This research 
is intended to support the government initiatives at metropolitan levels to implement and 
operationalise the NCPF. This study recognises the NCPF intentions; and at the heart of this 
research is the intention to advance the protection of the country’s information 
infrastructures that are found in the sphere of local government, particularly in metropolitan 
municipalities. The NCPF outlines broad policy guidelines on cyber-security in the country 
and it requires government to develop detailed cyber-security policies and strategies and this 
research was envisaged to close this gap. A further aim of the study is to broaden and to 
strengthen the knowledge base in the cyber-security field. Cyber-attacks on information 
infrastructures can have devastating consequences for human lives and the environment. It 
is vital that efforts are continuously made to enhance the protection and resilience of such 
infrastructures.  
The significance of the study is its central thrust on theory development to be applied to 
guide metropolitan municipalities in addressing the cyber-security challenges. The current 
NCPF addresses cyber-security at national government level only, leaving local government 
unattended and by extension vulnerable. This study was prompted by the realisation of the 
fact that there is no coordinated approach to dealing with cyber-security in South African 
local government environments. For this reason, it could be argued that this research comes 
at an opportune time, given the extent and likelihood of cyber-related risks on the provision 
of essential services that the metropolitan municipalities deliver to the citizens. Hopefully, 
the municipalities may use the cyber-security framework developed from this study, 
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preferably on a continuous basis (preferably annually) to assess capacity and implement 
recommended measures to enhance information infrastructure cyber-security. The 
developed cyber-security framework can also be adapted to and used by other types of 
municipalities in the country.  
1.7. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The research process for this study comprised two phases, namely Phase I and Phase II. The 
study made use of mixed methods research which included the qualitative and the 
quantitative approaches, respectively. The two primary goals of the study were to develop 
the applicable theory and subsequently to formulate a conceptual framework that describes 
the phenomena, and secondly, to verify the conceptual framework that explains the 
phenomena. A mixed method research was adopted to achieve conclusive findings of the 
study. Firstly, through a qualitative approach, semi-structured interviews were used to 
collect data, and subsequently ConGTM of creating open codes, focused codes, and 
theoretical coding was employed to analyse the data. Secondly, quantitative data, using a 
structured survey questionnaire, was collected and analysed by means of statistical analysis. 
The adoption of the mixed method approach in this research improved the rigour and 
explanation of the research results, as both studies confirmed the same research finding, 
thereby bringing to the fore conclusive findings to the study outcome.  
Phase I of the study was the qualitative study that employed the ConGTM. Due to the lack 
of existing theory regarding cyber-security capacity assessment at metropolitan 
municipalities, ConGTM was regarded as the best fit for this study. ConGTM offers a 
qualitative analysis to develop a new theory that is based on collected empirical data. The 
grounded theory defining characteristics include reliance on empirical data, conceptual 
abstraction, openness to emerging ideas, and critical analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.7). 
The process of developing theory is the basic tenet of grounded theory. Avoidance of using 
pre-formulated hypotheses and preconceived theories are other characteristics of GTM. The 
application of GTM is evident in the work of Charmaz (2006), Allan (2007), Urquhart 
(2007), Urquhart, Lehmann, and Myers (2010), and Urquhart and Fernandez (2013). 
In implementing the grounded theory, several approaches can be pursued including the 
following: 
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(a) Glaserian Grounded Theory was named after the one of the originators, Barney Glaser. 
This approach requires the postponement of the literature review process until 
completion of data analysis and theory generation (Glaser & Strauss, The discovery of 
grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research, 1967). This was considered as not 
appropriate for this study since the University’s research protocol requires a 
preliminary literature review before the research proposal can be approved. This 
approach also operates from the viewpoint that during the research process the 
researcher should keep a critical distance from the study in order not to introduce bias 
and preconceived ideas. This viewpoint was not in line with the researcher’s 
philosophy of being the active participant in the research. 
(b) Straussian Grounded Theory was named after Anselm Strauss, who worked with 
Corbin to argue that the GTM as a tool of research should evolve, and they recognised 
the bias that may creep in from preconceptions of the researcher (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), when it comes to researcher 
objectivity, they take the middle ground. The researcher, according to them, cannot 
start an inquiry without pre-conceptions of some sort; they, however posited that the 
inquirer be as objective as possible during data collection. The view of this strand is 
that the researcher is not the active participant. The data collection and analysis 
processes follow a stringent set of steps which in a way limits researcher creativity as 
an active participant. 
(c) Charmaz’s Constructivist Grounded Theory was named after Kathy Charmaz (2006), 
according to whom, both Glaser and Strauss are positivists who treat the researcher as 
an observer who is distant when collecting data (Charmaz, 2006). During collection 
and analysis of data, the constructivist grounded theory approach subscribes to the 
belief that the interviewees and researcher jointly co-construct meaning and hence the 
researcher of this study opted to follow this perspective in executing this enquiry. The 
researcher’s view was to take into consideration that metropolitan municipalities are 
social entities. Charmaz (2008) posited that “A social constructionist approach to 
grounded theory allows us to address why questions while preserving the complexity 
of social life. Grounded theory not only is a method for understanding research 
participants’ social constructions but also is a method that researchers construct 
throughout inquiry” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 397).  
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The adoption of ConGTM in this investigation was based on the work of Lehmann (2010), 
who argued that grounded theory (GT) is an appropriate research method in information 
systems (IS) because the IS field interacts with people, technology, data, and procedures 
which are varied components. GT was the best fit because of the core to this investigat ion, 
which was to assess cyber-security capacity at metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. 
GT is an applicable research method for IS because of its systematic and rigorous approach 
to research (Allan, 2007).  
The study did not make use of predefined theoretical frameworks as a starting point; instead, 
the study followed an inductive approach to explore this research area from a fresh 
perspective. The initial data for this study was collected through in-depth interviews 
conducted to examine activities that are performed by role players in cyber-security 
processes within the municipalities. Phase II was a quantitative study that employed a survey 
questionnaire with structured questions. In Phase I, the enquiry used semi-structured 
interviews to explore how individuals described the phenomenon, and used the findings from 
this phase to develop statements that were employed to formulate structured questions to 
collect data quantitatively. The objective of adopting this design was to generalise qualitat ive 
findings to a larger sample. The rationale for utilising this design included: instruments are 
not available to assess the status of cyber-security in metropolitan municipalities; the 
variables for the instrument are not known yet; and lack of theory or model to serve as a 










Figure 1.1: Research methodology model 
Phase I 
 Qualitative method 
 Grounded theory methodology 
 Conduct data analysis on the context 
of cyber-security status by using the 
grounded theory Methodology 
Phase II 
 Quantitative method 
 Survey questionnaire 
 Conduct statistical analysis on cyber-
security framework 
Intention 
 To assess the cyber-security status in 
a larger sample 
Intentions  
 To explore the phenomena 
 To classify and build the 
elements of the phenomena 
 To create a conceptual 
framework to assess the status 
of the phenomena 
 Discussions of study results 
 Development of cyber-
security capacity assessment 
framework 
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1.8. RESEARCH SCOPE 
This research focused on information infrastructures that are owned by metropolitan 
municipalities in the country. Information infrastructure covers information and 
communication technology (ICT), and process control systems (PCS) and networks which 
form an important link in the chain of guaranteed supply of essential services to the citizens  
of the country. It is imperative that metropolitan municipalities are in control of the process 
automation environment particularly because PCS are largely dependent on ICT to function 








Figure 1.2: Research scope 
 
1.9. TERMINOLOGY USED  
This research adopted an understanding of various concepts as defined and discussed in the 
following sections. 
1.9.1. Cyber-security 
NCPF describes cyber-security as the practice of securing networks that constitute 
cyberspace against intrusions, to maintain information confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability; detecting intrusions, responding to and recovering from them. ITU (2008, p. 2) 
provides a broader definition as it explains cyber-security as a 
“collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, 
risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and 
Information & communication technology infrastructure 
PCS PCS ICT PCS/ICT 
Energy Sector Water Sector Municipal 
Administration 
… 
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technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization 
and user's assets” (ITU, 2008). 
In the context of this enquiry, cyber-security was viewed as defined above. Also, the NCPF 
has adopted the same definition from ITU. 
1.9.2. Information infrastructure 
According to the South African cybercrimes and cybersecurity bill published in the 
Government Gazette No. 40487 of 9 December 2016, information infrastructure means “any 
data, computer program, computer data storage medium, computer system or any part 
thereof or any building, structure, facility, system or equipment associated therewith or part 
or portion thereof or incidental thereto” (RSA, 2016, p. 41). This enquiry adopted this 
definition of information infrastructure. The focus of the study was on information 
infrastructure, that its operational functionality which is the responsibility of metropolitan 
municipalities in the country.  
1.9.3. Critical information infrastructure 
In this enquiry, infrastructures refer to man-made systems that operate interdependently to 
generate and dispense vital goods (such as water, energy, and data) and services (such as 
banking, transportation, and healthcare). NCPF views infrastructure as critical if its inability 
or damage has a major impact on government administration, health, safety and security, 
economic and social well-being of the citizens. NCPF acknowledges the need to safeguard 
CII in order to achieve the continued provision of essential services and support security, 
economic prosperity and social well-being. Technology and related information has become 
a central part of the CI. A number of the municipal essential services are gradually becoming 
dependent on IT. 
1.9.4. Assessing cyber-security status 
To assess means “to make a judgement about the nature or quality of something” (Oxford 
Dictionary, 2006). This enquiry sought to determine whether the level of cyber-security 
status in the municipalities is adequate to provide a quality (successful) safeguard to 
information infrastructures. Cyber-security status that is at an acceptable level is defined as 
one that delivers sufficient safeguard to an organisation’s information infrastructure. It is 
essential that the cyber-security status assessment instrument is credible to yield results upon 
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which management can base their decisions. The process of assessing cyber-security status 
in an organisation cultivates cyber-security and subsequently promotes information 
infrastructure protection.  
1.10. THESIS OUTLINE 
This research thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 2 presents background literature that 
the researcher reviewed for this enquiry. Chapter 3 discusses the research method that was 
followed in executing this study. Constructivist Grounded Theory Methodology was the 
chosen method to conduct this research. Chapter 4 presents the research study site and data 
analysis for the qualitative part of the enquiry. EThekwini Municipality was conveniently 
chosen as the study site. Chapter 5 discusses the emergent theory wherein theory variables 
are discussed. Chapter 6 presents the development of the municipal cyber-security 
framework. Chapter 7 discusses the development of and empirically tests the munic ipa l 
cyber-security assessment tool. Chapter 8 deals with the process for assessing the cyber-
security status. Lastly, Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter of the study which includes the 
contribution of the research, its limitations, and makes suggestions for future research.  
1.11. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter 1 mainly discussed the context of the inquiry. A high-level view of the position of 
the country on cyber-security was provided. Furthermore, the research problem of the study 
was contextualised; the need to safeguard the municipal information infrastructure was 
presented; and the research question was posed as follows: How can metropolitan 
municipalities in the country successfully assess cyber-security capacity? In addition, the 
research objectives were discussed; the rational to conduct this enquiry was provided; the 
methodology to execute the study was discussed, including as discussion of GTM and 
ConGTM which was chosen as the methodology to follow to conduct the research; and the 
scope of the enquiry was presented with the research focus and boundaries being discussed. 
Finally, the chapter provided definitions of key concepts that have been used in the research 
and lastly, the thesis outline was presented. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the extant literature in the area under study. In academic research, 
reviewing current literature seeks to highlight the conceptual background. In the final part 
of the research, the literature review guides the research findings and discussions. Charmaz 
(2006, p. 165) argued that the literature review helps in identifying gaps in current research 
works, and adds context to the study. The researcher approached the literature review with 
a critical mind. The literature review assisted the researcher to identify a gap in the area of 
interest which was then used to develop the research questions. The researcher did not have 
a preconceived theory in mind nor any pre-formulated judgement about the phenomenon 
being investigated before embarking on this enquiry. 
There are 11 sections discussed in this chapter. Table 2.1 presents the chapter outline.  
Table 2.1: Structure of Chapter 2 
 Topic Overview 
2.1 Chapter introduction Provides context to the chapter. 
2.2 Various views on cyber-
security 
What is happening in the sphere of cyber-security? 
2.3 International organisations on 
cyber-security 
What are international views on cyber-security? 
2.4 RSA NCPF What is the position of the RSA on Cyber-security? 
2.5 CII Impact of cyber-security on CII. 
2.6 Attack on critical infrastructure : 
Stuxnet Worm 
Effect of cyber on PCS. 
2.7 Differences between IT security 
and cyber-security 
Cyber-security is beyond IT security. 
2.8 Current cyber-security research 
perspectives 
RSA cyber-security research perspectives. 
2.9 Cyber-security statistics in 
South Africa 
What has Africa been exposed to? 
2.10 Local government legisla t ive 
framework in South Africa 
Why focus on metropolitan municipalities? 
2.11 Chapter summary Provides highlights dealt with in the chapter. 
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The prevailing South African NCPF highlights certain considerations in protecting national 
cyberspace. However, some of the critical information infrastructures are found within the 
jurisdiction of local governments in various municipalities. A national understanding at the 
level of municipalities is necessary for strengthening and advancing the NCPF objectives. 
This research recognises the aims of NCPF and the core intention of this study was to 
enhance protection of critical information infrastructure at a local government level. The 
local sphere of government is the service delivery machine for the national government. Due 
to the lack of a framework for assessing municipal cyber-security capacity, the national 
remedial package and debate could be ineffective, if it remains merely at the level of 
theoretical abstraction. 
2.2. VARIOUS VIEWS ON CYBER-SECURITY  
All levels of government exist mainly to safeguard property and the lives of the citizens, to 
facilitate commerce and to maintain social order. Cyber-security is a national security matter 
due to the illegal use of cyberspace that could result in devastating consequences for national 
security functions (Wamala, 2011). Some nations across the world have published their 
national cyber-security strategies and policy frameworks, amongst which are the United 
Kingdom (UK), Uganda (UGA), Spain (ESP), South Africa (ZAF), New Zealand (NZL), the 
Netherlands (NLD), Romania (ROU), Luxembourg (LUX), Lithuania (LTU), Japan (JPN), 
India (IND), Germany (DEU), France (FRA), Estonia (EST), Czech Republic (CZE), 
Canada (CAN), and Australia (AUS) (Luiijf, Besseling, & De Graaf, 2013). All these nations 
have defined cyber-security in different ways, thus there is no synchronised, common 
definition on cyber-security across the nations. 
Table 2.2: Definitions of cyber-security by various nations 
 Country Definition 
1 ZAF [involves] the risk management approaches, assurance, policies, 
safeguards, best practices, training, tools, actions, and technologies used 
to secure the cyberspace, organisational assets and users 
2 UGA is the safeguarding of information systems and information from 
illegitimate access, disruption, use, modification, disclosure or 
destruction 
(references to information security) 
3 ROU is a set of measures to ascertain information authenticity, integr ity, 
confidentiality, non-repudiation and availability, protecting the 
cyberspace, [and both] public and private resources 
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 Country Definition 
4 NZL is the practice of protecting cyberspace and related components against 
attacks, maintaining information availability, confidentiality and 
integrity, detecting cyber-attacks that occur and recovering from such 
malicious incidents  
5 NLD is to protect ICT from the dangers of abuse, destruction or disruption 
6 IND is the safeguarding of information systems, networks and information 
with relevant technological measures against abuse, destruction or 
disruption 
7 GBR is the safeguarding of national interests in the utilisation of cyberspace, 
and the wider national security policy pursuit 
8 FRA is the protecting of cyberspace from events that may compromise 
information and systems integrity, confidentiality, availability and other 
related services that are offered by IT systems 
9 DEU is the achieving of a necessary situation in protecting IT in which 
cyberspace risks are reduced to the minimum acceptable [level] 
10 CAN is the mitigation of risks resulting from cyber-attacks, implementation of 
adequate response level from cyber-incidents, such as the illegitimate use, 
access, manipulation, disruption or destruction of electronic information 
and related infrastructure 
11 AUS are information-protecting mechanisms that preserve information 
integrity, confidentiality and availability that is stored, processed and 
transmitted by electronic or related means 
Source: Luiijf, E., Besseling, K., & De Graaf, P. (2013). Nineteen national cyber security 
strategies. International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, vol. 9, numbers 1-2, p. 6. 
What is common to most of these definitions is the issue of the threat posed by cyber-attacks 
on CIIs. CIIs are cyber-based systems that are critical for the daily functioning of the 
government at various levels and for the country’s economy (Ralston, Graham, & Hieb, 
2007). Cyber-security definitions vary and the term is used broadly (Craigen, Diakun-
Thibault, & Purse, 2014).  
2.3. INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS ON CYBER-SECURITY 
2.3.1. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a non-profit organisation that 
develops and publishes standards of virtually every possible type, including cyber-security. 
ISO which was founded in 1946 is supported by 159 countries and is the leading issuing 
body for international standards (Disterer, 2013). The standards ISO 27000 to ISO 27002 
were developed in cooperation with the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC), 
Page | 19  
which is a leading global issuer of international standards in the electronics and electronic -
related technologies sector 
ISO 27032 (ISO/IEC, 2012) is the cyber-security standard that is recognised globally and 
was designed to address the lack of communication between cyberspace users and providers 
(Dennis et al., 2014). According to the ISO/IEC 27032 (ISO/IEC, 2012), the standard was 
designed to address the reality that  
Devices and connected networks that support cyberspace have multiple owners 
– each with their own business, operational and regulatory concerns. Not only 
do the different users and providers share little or no input, but each has a 
different focus when dealing with security. Such a fragmented state opens up 
vulnerabilities in cyberspace. ISO/IEC 27032 will provide an overarching, 
collaborative, multi-stakeholder solution to reduce these risks.  
This framework provides guidance on four domains, namely information security, internet 
security, network security and critical information infrastructure (ISO/IEC, 2012).  
2.3.2. International Telecommunication Union (ITU)  
The United Nations has a specialised agency responsible for ICT across member states called 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). ITU has recognised the criticality of 
cyber-security and the possible adverse consequences of any inefficiency. As a result, the 
Union constructed the Global Cyber-Security Agenda (GCA) Strategy Guide (ITU, 2015). 
The GCA is a framework prescribed for utilisation by all interested countries and is 
independent of international barriers. The guide aims to design, implement and provide 
strategies on cyber-security across different sectors. The GCA framework provides a holist ic 
development, implementation and coordination of a vigorous global cyber-security culture 
(ITU, 2015). The Ends-Ways-Means strategy was used to address the issue of cyber-security 
(Dennis et al., 2014). As the basis for cyber-security strategies, ITU recommends that 
countries apply national values, since countries have varied needs, capabilities and threats. 
The ITU (2015) recommendations are based on: 
a. the perception that risks and their mitigations are influenced by national interest and 
culture; and 
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b. a country’s relevant stakeholders on cyber-security, such as private and public sectors 
and the judiciary are likely to support the strategy since it is rooted in the national 
interests and values.  
2.3.3. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an internationa l 
forum where governments across the globe work together to attend to issues concerning 
economic, environmental, and social challenges globally. The OECD is a neutral setting 
where member states collaborate, seek to formulate solutions for common challenges, 
formulate best industry practice and function to coordinate international and domestic 
policies (OECD, 2015). ICT and the Internet are critical for social and economic 
development; hence they are part of critical infrastructure. On the other hand, cyber-security 
policy formulation is in its infancy (OECD, 2015). The organisation takes cognisance of the 
fact that governments are hugely dependent on digital infrastructure to execute fundamenta l 
service-delivery functions. Threats to cyberspace are surfacing rapidly and the cyber-
attackers appear to be better organised as they conceal their tracks. The high extent of 
sophistication, such as that of Stuxnet, is clear confirmation that governments are faced with 
a daunting task of protecting critical information infrastructure. Governments need to adopt 
an integrated and comprehensive approach when addressing cyber-security policy issues, 
particularly taking into consideration the essential impact of the Internet and related 
technology on the modern economy (OECD, 2015). Facets of cyber-security need to be 
addressed holistically, covering government-wide applications and also encompassing the 
social, economic, legal, educational, technical, law-enforcement, diplomatic, intelligence 
and military-related aspects. Support from strong leadership at the head of government level 
(OECD, 2015) is required so that cyber-security will be recognised as a critical government 
priority. According to the OECD (2015), most cyber-security strategies share the following 
key conceptions:  
a. Improved government coordination at policy and operational levels. Cyber-security 
policy formulation, as a national government priority, can be implemented by being 
assigned within the government. It is important to note that no single vertical agency 
can have a sufficiently wide authority to manage all facets of cyber-security; also, no 
single agency can claim comprehensive understanding of cyber-security. This point 
emphasises the importance of coordination amongst relevant stakeholders.  
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b. Strengthened public–private cooperation is essential. Cyberspace is operated and 
owned by the private sector, to a large degree, and these users play an important role 
in the secure use of cyberspace.  
2.3.4. The European Network of Information Security Agency (ENISA) 
To address cyber-security threats, the European Union member states came together and 
formed the European Network of Information Security Agency (ENISA) which provides 
guidance on the formulation of a national cyber-security strategy. Key performance 
indicators are provided for each cyber-security strategy component. Through the ENISA 
Guidebook, a country’s policy makers are guided by the practical recommendations for 
controlling the development and improvement process on national the cyber-security status 
and security affairs within the country (ENISA, 2015). 
 
2.3.5. The African Union Convention on Cyber Crime and Personal Data 
Protection 
In June 2014, the heads of member states of the African Union adopted the African Union 
Convention on Cyber Crime and Personal Data Protection. South Africa is an affiliated 
member state. This convention aims to harmonise the laws of African member states on 
electronic commerce, data protection, cyber-security governance and cybercrime control 
(Orji, 2018). The Convention also defines the objectives for the information society in Africa 
and seeks to strengthen existing ICT laws in member states. The convention mainly covers 
four areas which are the security of e-commerce, legal aspects, personal data protection, and 
cybersecurity (Ball, 2017). With regard to e-commerce, South Africa has the Electronic 
Communication, and Transactions (ECT) Act of 2002. For personal data protection, the 
country has Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act of 2013.  
 
The Convention has prescribed broad obligations for member states to establish national 
cyber-security policies as well as legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks for cyber-
security governance and cybercrimes control. The Convention, in this regard, requires 
member states to implement obligations that include: establishing a national cyber-security 
framework; promoting a culture of cyber-security; establishing national cyber-security 
governance structures; protecting critical information infrastructure; establishing cybercrime 
Page | 22  
offences and procedural measures; and, promoting international cooperation and legal 
harmonisation. 
 
Member states are required to establish a national cyber-security framework that comprises 
a national cyber-security policy and a national cyber-security strategy. A member state’s 
national cyber-security policy is required to recognise the importance of national Critical 
Information Infrastructure (CII), and identify related risks using the all-hazards approach, 
while also outlining how the objectives of such a policy are to be achieved. The “all-hazards” 
approach to CII protection entails the protection of such infrastructure from all forms of 
threats, whether they originate from deliberate attacks, accidents or natural disasters. In 
addition, the obligation to establish a national cyber-security policy requires member states 
to outline how their national cyber-security policy will achieve the objectives of protecting 
national CII from identified risks. In 2015, South Africa published a National Cyber-security 
Policy Framework and has worked towards implementing the Convention’s requirements on 
cyber-security.  
 
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Bill was tabled in Parliament on 15 September 2017. 
This Bill replaces the National Key Points Act (102 of 1980), and it deals with the process 
of the declaration of National Key Points. The Bill talks to the safeguarding of critical 
infrastructure and persons inside the critical infrastructure area. The Bill provides for the 
establishment of a National Infrastructure Council, and provides for designation and 
functions of inspectors, amongst others.  
 
South Africa has made recognisable strides towards the legal aspect of cyber-security. The 
Government of South Africa published the Regulation of Interception of Communicat ions 
and Provision of Communication-related information Act (RICA), 2002. The aim of RICA 
is to make the country safer as it assists law enforcement agencies to identify mobile phone 
users and track criminals using mobile phones for illegal activities. RICA regulates 
information communication interception and monitoring. On 9 December 2016, the 
Department of Justice and Correctional Services published the Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill.  
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2.4. SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL CYBER-SECURITY POLICY 
FRAMEWORK (NCPF) 
Cyber-security is one of the methods used to manage risks facing organisations, government 
and society. South Africa’s National Security is heavily reliant on the security of critical 
infrastructure (Mahlobo, 2015). The National Critical Information Infrastructure plays a vital 
role in the maintenance of economic strength, public safety, public health, national image, 
defence and security, government capability to function, and other essential individual and 
public needs (Wamala, 2011). Facilities that are information-based, assets and networks such 
as water supply, electricity, finance, and many more, are essential to national infrastructure.  
Cyberspace is the core to the provision of these national services (Wamala, 2011). 
Cyberspace has also become a national critical information infrastructure and, as such, its 
protection is of vital importance (ISO/IEC, 2012). The cyber-security landscape is 
increasingly evolving and, as a result, it is important for countries to manage the potential 
risk and vulnerabilities emanating from this situation (Wamala, 2011). One approach that 
countries can apply is to develop and implement policies, procedures and proactive strategies 
that are guided by a national cyber-security policy framework and strategy. The result of this 
locally was the signing and publishing of the South African National Cyber-Security Policy 
Framework (NCPF) in September 2015 by the Minister of State Security. The NCPF was 
developed in order to address and reduce the country’s vulnerabilities and exposure to cyber-
risks. National government leaders are accountable for cyber-security since governments, in 
the main, function to enable commerce, protect citizens’ lives and property, and mainta in 
social order. 
Most efforts as guided by the NCPF are focused on promoting awareness, which is 
appropriate on its own; however, is insufficient (Grobler et al., 2012). This research project 
advocates the approach of performing a rigorous quantitative risk assessment and utilis ing 
mitigation techniques. The central thrust is on cyber-security on national, provincial and 
local levels of government.  
The NCPF of South Africa aims to promote a cyber-security culture by strengthening the 
judicial processes, including investigation, to ensure the safeguarding of the national critical 
information infrastructure. The aim is also to establish public-private partnerships for 
national and international plans of action, and to advance and ensure a comprehensive legal 
framework to govern cyberspace (ITU, 2015). In the main, the NCPF promotes the reduction 
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of cyberspace vulnerabilities and cyber-threats and, most importantly, the prevention of 
attack, in the first instance. Where there is a cyber-attack, the policy needs to ensure a swift 
recovery of the critical information infrastructure (Mahlobo, 2015). The NCPF has 
acknowledged that currently there is no coordinated approach to dealing with cyber-security 
issues, despite having established various structures to deal with these issues 
(Phahlamohlaka, Jansen van Vuuren, & Coetzee, 2011). The development of cyber-security 
research is promoted by the NCPF in order to advance and enhance cyber-security research 
within South African tertiary institutions, industry and the Department of Science and 
Technology (Mahlobo, 2015). The NCPF aims to achieve the following benefits: 
a. A cyberspace that is secure and safe and which underpins national security priorities. 
b. A coordinated approach to addressing cyber-security through the establishment of 
institutional structures. 
c. A national critical information infrastructure identification and protection framework . 
d. Stimulation of economic growth and competitiveness of the country through a secure 
e-environment. 
e. Advancement of cyber-security through the national research and development 
agenda. 
f. Combating of cyber-crime through effective prevention and prosecution. 
g. Improved cyber-security management. 
2.5. CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
The NCPF of South Africa defines the National Critical Information Infrastructure as all IT 
systems, such as databases, data systems, networks – including buildings – processes, 
people, and facilities that are essential to the effective functioning of the Republic (Mahlobo, 
2015). There are various national and international definitions of CI where, in some 
countries, they stress the purpose of the infrastructure, whilst in others, they stress the effects 
of the destruction or disruption of infrastructure on society at large (Clemente, 2013). The 
Department of Homeland Security in the United States of America defines CI as “assets and 
systems, virtual or physical, so critical or vital to the nation such that the incapacitation or 
destruction of such assets and systems would have debilitating consequences on national 
security, economy, health and safety” (Clemente, 2013, p. 13).  
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CIs mostly perform their functions through the support of IT and industrial control systems 
and, as a consequence of this reliance on IT and ICS interconnectivity, there is increased 
potential of cyber-vulnerabilities and risk exposures. The municipalities’ critical information 
infrastructure considerations entail the safeguarding and mitigation strategies of the critical 
systems, including both virtual and physical systems, and assets. Failure of these critical 
systems and assets would result in both economic and social unrest, if disrupted for a 
considerable amount of time (Dennis et al., 2014). IT systems support and improve the 
services and information received from the municipalities’ critical information 
infrastructures, the protection and security of which are municipal responsibilities and 
should therefore assume high priority. The list of municipalities’ critical infrastructures 
includes: energy facilities like electricity; transmission and distribution systems; water 
SCADA systems; water reservoirs, treatment plants and networks; emergency services 
facilities; and transportation facilities, including traffic control systems, and ICT software 
and hardware, including the Internet infrastructure.  
2.6. ATTACK ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: THE STUXNET WORM 
Stuxnet is a computer virus and was first discovered in July 2010 by Virus-BlockAda in 
Belarus (Chen, 2010). However, this worm had been around for several months and 
estimates around this vary. It has been estimated that Stuxnet has infected in the region of 
50 000 to 100 000 computers, mainly in Iran, Indonesia, India and Pakistan (Chen, 2010). 
Stuxnet seems to be targeting the critical physical machinery of the intended organisation of 
which it attempts to take control. Stuxnet’s final intention is to manipulate and reprogram 
ICS by making them function differently from their operator’s or owner’s intentions, and 
most probably outside their specified boundaries (Chen, 2010).  
ICSs are operated on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) which are instructed by a 
specialised assembly-like code. Often the PLCs are programmed on Windows computers 
and are not connected to the Internet or even the organisational internal network (intranet). 
The attacker needs the ICS schematics for the intended target environment which are 
normally made available by insiders or through other reconnaissance methods (Falliere, 
Murchu, & Chien, 2011). Stuxnet may be introduced by a removable drive and once it infects 
a computer within the target environment, it begins to spread in search of PGs, which are 
used to program PLCs and are typically Windows computers (Falliere et al., 2011). Once 
the Stuxnet finds a suitable intended computer, it modifies the PLC code and sabotages the 
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ICS. Stuxnet has the ability to conceal its modifications of the PLC; it attempts to isolate the 
rogue PLC code and this becomes a challenge (Chen, 2010).  
Stuxnet developers are highly skilled software developers such that they have made it 
possible to compromise two digital certificates and inject malicious code into PLCs to affect 
the functioning of the ICS; furthermore, the code cannot be recognised by operators 
(Fallieres et al., 2011). Direct cyber-attacks on the CIs are not just a theory but a reality, and 
the Stuxnet Worm has proven that. It has been estimated that Stuxnet was developed by more 
than four people for over five months with access to SCADA systems (Chen, 2010) which 
shows the manpower required to develop this worm (Matrosov et al., 2010). The complexity 
and size of this worm – almost half a megabyte – is an indication that significant manpower 
was utilised in developing Stuxnet (Chen, 2010). The initial infection trajectory was a 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) and not the usual suspect Internet, and this is a clear indicat ion 
that the cyber-attackers were familiar with the target environment and possibly knew that it 
was not reachable via the Internet (Chen, 2010).  
To demonstrate the complexity and sophistication of Stuxnet, Karnouskos, (2011) 
highlighted that Stuxnet: 
 used security gaps that the software coders/programmers were unaware of, such as 
zero-day exploits; 
 was coded in way that revealed a function that was difficult and used a custom 
encryption algorithm for data configuration; 
 used a stand-alone network, but was able to keep it posted automatically as the new 
version became available, and could keep in touch with all Stuxnet installat ions 
through peer-to-peer networks; 
 ensured that no disk evidence existed since all actions were done in computer memory; 
 disguised itself under legal programmes and could keep/record the number of infected 
machines – Stuxnet design architecture was modular, which is in line with the new 
trends in software development; 
 could detect connectivity to the web and would attempt to connect to its commanders; 
it could also automatically deploy anti-virus detection mechanisms; 
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 would infect targeted systems in a unique manner and could lift up its rights in a 
computer that was unpatched through explicit exploits to have appropriate execution 
rights; 
 would spread the virus to no more than three machines and had strict self-scalability 
control; 
 had two inappropriately acquired digital certificates from separate organisations, 
which it used to deploy legal digitally-signed device drivers; 
 could fake system process control sensor signals through the man-in-the-middle attack 
code; consequently, the relying processes and tools would falsely show normal 
boundaries’ values and functionality that were not the real world representation; 
 had a self-cycle management to delete itself on June-24-2012; and 
 had externally configured websites as control and command servers to enable 
controlling and monitoring of functions; since most firewalls allow uploading of 
information from internal to external servers, there was industrial espionage taking 
place. 
2.7. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IT SECURITY AND CYBER-SECURITY 
Safeguarding the industrial control systems is different from the safeguarding of IT systems 
when it comes to issues pertaining to cyber-security. It is, therefore, essential that the IT 
professionals and ICS professionals should work together to jointly develop a cyber-security 
solution that will benefit the entire municipality (Neitzel & Huba, 2014). According to 
Neitzel and Huba (2014), there are ten key differences between ICS and IT cyber-security 
and these are discussed below:  
a. Security objective – The primary cyber-security objective for IT systems is to protect 
data (confidentiality). The main ICS cyber-security objective is to maintain the 
production process integrity and the availability of its components.  
b. Network segmentation – Business IT systems are made of connected subnets that are 
connected to the Internet. Subsequently, protection from internet and access controls 
are IT networks security’s primary focus. ICSs are seen as industrial intranets with two 
security needs, the first being that access to the Internet and e-mail is not permitted, 
and the second is that rigorous protection of ICS networks from other business 
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networks is required, particularly those networks with access to the Internet. ICSs are 
isolated from other business IT networks through a ‘demilitarised’ zone (DMZ) which 
operates in-between the other business networks and the ICS.  
c. Network topology – IT systems are often large and include Wi-Fi networks, data 
centres, and intranets. In contrast, ICSs are small and are composed of a configura t ion 
database and event/data historians. Normally IT systems comprise many nodes that are 
daily affected by the number of users and applications that are connected and 
disconnected continuously. On the other hand, the ICSs are considerably smaller and 
normally have configurations that are statically defined.  
d. Functional partitioning – The functional partitioning of IT systems and ICSs are 
different. IT systems are commonly divided into different administrative partitions in 
order to restrict access to information. The partitioning of ICS is divided into three 
levels: Level 0, which represents the physical process; level 1, which is control and 
monitoring; and level 2, which is supervisory control. IT security cannot be mapped 
onto the ICS due to the fact that ICSs have vendor-specific security-related tools which 
are unknown to IT systems, such as universal serial bus ports disabling features, 
custom event logs, and port lockdown mechanisms.  
e. Physical components – IT systems consist of off-the-shelf workstations, servers, and 
networks that IT can access and administer. Consequently, IT can define security 
policies for such components, and can implement off-the-shelf security-related tools 
such as anti-virus systems, firewalls, and patch management systems. ICSs are made 
up of components which are custom built and generally foreign to IT. These 
components include network devices for industrial use, such as Ethernet switches and 
firewalls, servers and workstations that are ‘hardened’ such that their software is 
custom built, and as a result, their security policies are industry standards which may 
not align with the ones used within IT systems.  
f. User accounts – There are two types of user accounts in IT systems and these are the 
operating system user account, and the application-specific user account. ICSs have 
operating system user accounts and their own application-specific users that are role-
based users to access controls for granting and denying access to control data and 
devices. Such roles include process engineers, operators, and maintenance engineers. 
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ICS is a complete distributed system that is made up of configuration, databases, event 
journals, operation, and maintenance applications.  
g. Safety instrumented system (SIS) is a key aspect for ICS for the maintenance of the 
safe operation of the process, through putting into a safe state the process, when there 
is a detected condition that threatens the safety of the process. SISs are securely 
segmented and are separated from ICS networks. Therefore, managing the security of 
ICSs includes the safeguarding of SIS; all of these are normally not outside the IT 
systems professionals’ scope.  
h. Untested software – To maintain IT systems’ security, it is critical to keep pace with 
the evolution of new software, thereby keeping the systems current. In contrast, ICSs 
are specific to hardware configuration and operating system versions, and, when the 
component is changed or updated, other components may not run appropriately. 
Thorough testing of patches and virus definition files must happen first, before 
approval is given for implementation. IT systems’ new software is often not rigorous ly 
tested for compatibility with the IT system.  
i. Patching – IT systems, generally, have software for managing patching to 
automatically and quickly install security updates. ICS patching takes a longer time 
because those patches require testing, approving, scheduling and validating to 
maintain the state and to render control repeatable. 
j. Security inconveniences – Security measures that are tolerable for IT systems are 
intolerable for ICS. For example, in IT systems the users have to wait for the operating 
system’s patches update to finish before using the system, and wait for the helpdesk to 
reset the user control password. These inconveniences are intolerable in ICS due to the 
criticality of services provided by the ICS systems. Consequently, the security 
measures that are acceptable in IT systems may not necessarily be the same for ICSs. 
If IT systems’ security measures are enforced indiscriminately, they may pose a 
serious threat to ICS security.  
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2.8. CURRENT RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON CYBER-SECURITY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
2.8.1. National cyber-security in South Africa  
Like the rest of the world, South Africa has become increasingly reliant on cyberspace to 
conduct business and to govern. This reliance has increasingly exposed the country to threats 
that are inherent in cyberspace (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2015). South Africa approved a 
cyber-security policy in March 2012; however, there is no reported progress towards the 
implementation thereof (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2015). Other countries are reporting 
progress they have made towards safeguarding their cyberspace, which is regarded as the 
essential requirement for contemporary critical information infrastructure, society and the 
economy. South Africa has released its national cyber-security policy framework, which 
highlights the need to have a coordinated approach to addressing cyber-security issues. 
National government is responsible for this coordination, but various institutions within the 
country are the owners and custodians of national critical information infrastructures. The 
country needs to act urgently on the implementation of cyber-security strategies (Von Solms 
& Von Solms, 2015) as it cannot continue to drag its feet on protecting our cyberspace. The 
national cyber-security policy framework identifies what the country aims to implement 
towards addressing the protection of cyberspace. The framework needs to be followed by 
generating strategy documents that will address related cyber-security issues, and these 
strategy documents need to spell out clearly how the country intends to address cyber-
security (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2015). Various countries have spent and are still 
spending huge budgets on the implementation of their cyber-security-related strategies, and 
some have even considered quality control mechanisms in the strategy itself and in the 
implementation thereof (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2015).  
2.8.2. Fostering a cyber-security culture: A case of South Africa  
South Africa is currently one of the leading countries when it comes to knowledge of cyber-
crime matters (Kortjan & Von Solms, 2014), and this may be attributable to the recent 
bandwidth increase. Taking into cognisance all that has happened in the country regarding 
cyberspace crime, and South Africa’s exposure to the possibly devastating consequences of 
cyber-ills, cyber-security efforts have not been matching the pace set by innovations related 
to cyberspace usage, according to Kortjan and Von Solms (2014). Their research is meant 
to address the inadequate emphasis on cyber-security education in the country. A cyber-
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security culture is necessary to inculcate acceptable user behaviour in cyberspace. The 
increasing dependence on cyberspace and digital resources has, unintentionally, invited 
many exposures to malicious cyberspace attacks. South Africa aims to promote a cyber-
security culture which is envisaged to advance the national cyber-security policy framework; 
however, there is no discussion on how this cyber-security culture will be promoted. 
According to the research in question, awareness and education are regarded as pillars in 
promoting a cyber-security culture (Kortjan & Von Solms, 2014) and it is argued that 
appropriate awareness campaigns would aid in fostering the desired cyber-security culture. 
It is highlighted that comprehensive awareness initiatives could impact positively on 
changing the behaviour of cyberspace users towards a cyber-secure culture (Kortjan & Von 
Solms, 2014).  
2.8.3. Cyber-security awareness initiatives in South Africa: A synergy approach  
One of the top cyber-crime types reported in South Africa is phishing attacks and the country 
is one of the top three countries facing this threat, behind only the UK and US (Dlamini & 
Modise, 2013). It is argued that the existing approach to promoting cyber-security awareness 
is not making an adequate impact, especially because of the uncoordinated and fragmented 
nature of the approaches (Dlamini & Modise, 2013). It is acknowledged, however, that 
cyber-security is multi- faceted and complex. The estimated total cost of cyber-crime in 
South Africa is R10.9 billion, which is one per cent of the R2.9 trillion of global cost 
(Dlamini & Modise, 2013). Their research suggests that the first line of defence against 
cyber-attack is cyber-security awareness.  
Their study also highlights the fact that, in South Africa, initiatives that are intended for 
cyber-security awareness are delivered via various independent mechanisms that are 
uncoordinated. Cyber-security awareness is intended to promote and inspire cyberspace 
users to practise safety precautions when using cyberspace. Users should be kept well 
informed on the criticality of practising cyberspace hygiene at all times; hence the awareness 
initiatives should include a plan that is clear, with goals and objectives clearly articulated 
and the targeted results clearly stipulated (Dlamini & Modise, 2013). Their research 
indicates that the cyber-security initiatives in the country are effective, although these 
initiatives are on a smaller scale than they should be. These initiatives are reported to be 
comparable with counterparts internationally and their focus is on communities. A 
recommendation is made that a single forum to integrate a cyber-security awareness 
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mechanism be formulated to ascertain whether all necessary roles and key players of each 
initiative are spelt out clearly, and that these awareness programmes reach every cyberspace 
population in the country.  
2.8.4. An e-safety educational framework in South Africa  
This study highlights the concern around the safety of children in cyberspace (De Lange & 
Von Solms, 2012). IT has an important role to play in human lives, but the benefits it brings 
also expose individuals to risks. The research argues that IT threats should be taught to 
children at a young age and that children need to be educated on acceptable online behaviour.  
They also need to be educated on cyber-bullying and illegal or inappropriate online 
behaviour. Currently, there appears to be a generational divide between parents and their 
children and many parents are unaware of both cyber-ills and of activities being conducted 
by their children online. E-safety is considered essential and should be implemented to 
protect the lives of children.  
Most countries have introduced e-safety in their curricula; however, South Africa is lagging 
behind in terms of e-safety implementation. E-safety awareness in the country is lacking and 
should be viewed seriously by the government. Their study acknowledges that the 
implementation of e-safety at schools will inculcate the desired cyber-security culture in the 
entire population.  
2.8.5. Implementation of the NCPF for South Africa 
Volatility and dynamicity of cyberspace warrant robust research in the area of cyber-security 
in South Africa (Van Vuuren, Leenen, & Zaaiman, 2014). In order for South Africa to 
safeguard its resources and population, the country needs to protect its critical infrastructure, 
especially as it relates to national security. The South African geographical regions are 
incorporated into the global cyberspace, warranting government’s extra efforts at addressing 
the digital divide and cyber-security. Cyber-security has been identified as a basic essential 
element contributing towards national security with critical information infrastructures and 
information itself being essential in the implementation and roll-out of a cyber-security 
policy. Government has a critical responsibility to enhance and advance cyber-security 
awareness campaigns, particularly because the entire nation is hugely dependent on essential 
services that are rendered by government. The process of developing the national cyber-
security policy framework has taken far too long, but the policy framework has since been 
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finalised. Van Vuuren et al. (2014) argued that there is no adequate emphasis on the national 
cyber-security policy, despite the fact that such a policy would be an overarching document 
to guide the cyber-security implementation in the country. In an effort to safeguard the 
cyberspace, this research proposes an ontology that identifies various stakeholders and 
defines their roles. It has been recognised that a multi- levelled structure of key stakeholders 
exists in the cyber-security environment and that, more often than not, the responsibilit ies 
and roles overlap.  
2.9. SOUTH AFRICAN CYBER-SECURITY STATISTICS  
As part of the Global Forum for Cyber Expertise initiative, the African Union Commiss ion 
and Symantec in 2016 released a report on the cyber-crime and cyber-security trends in 
Africa. The report highlights the increase of technology adoption in Africa. It further posits 
that policymakers need to stem the cyber-security rising tide through the implementation of 
effective policies and awareness initiatives (Symantec, 2016b). The report provides the 
following statistics: 
a) 67% of South Africans have experienced some form of online crime compared to 48% 
globally. 
b) 20% of South African social network users share their passwords with others, while 
21% connect with people they do not know. 
c) 67% of adults reported experiencing cyber-crime is estimated to have cost the South 
African economy $242 million USD. 
The report (Symantec, 2016b, p. 89) provides the following significant crimes that are 
associated with cyber: 
 “Gautrain incident: Computer-related theft/fraud committed by a group of persons. 
There was insider collusion with IT persons working for company. Value of potential 
loss was in the region of R800 Million. 
 Eskom incident: Attempted computer-related theft/fraud committed by a group of 
persons. There was insider collusion with IT persons working for company. Value of 
potential loss was in the region of potential loss R3.5 Billion. 
 Telesure incident: Relates to ransomware. Potential loss in the region of R20 Million. 
Perpetrated by a group of persons”.  
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The picture that is clearly articulated in the report relates to the lack of necessary capacity to 
systematically implement cyber-security strategy in the country. The report states that “the 
biggest impediments is probably the slow pace at which the NCPF is implemented and the 
unavailability of resources and capacity” (Symantec, 2016b, p. 88). The report argues that 
in order to ensure capacity building, government should promote special initiatives. It further 
put a stance that when implementing the NCPF, an incremental approach is adopted, which 
entails focusing on aspects that require to be attended to urgently.  
The report lists the following tables which present the top ten source (originating from) 
African countries for malicious behaviour and their percentages within the continent. 
a. Attacks 
“Attackers use various exploits to gain unauthorized access to a computer or an 
organization’s network. Motivations for these attacks can range from gaining financ ia l 
profit, stealing sensitive information, disabling a network, establishing a C&C server, or 
using the system as a launching point for future attacks. Attacks can be active such as a 
brute-force attack that determines a user’s password, or passive such as a web-based attack 
that waits for a user to visit a malicious webpage in an attempt to infect the user’s computer 
with malicious code” (Symantec, 2016b, p. 31). 
Table 2.3: Top ten malicious attacks  
Country Rank Percentage within Africa Incident count 
South Africa 1 25% 314,880 
Egypt 2 12% 149,685 
Kenya 3 9% 106,265 
Nigeria 4 7% 89,100 
Mauritius 5 6% 73,134 
Algeria 6 5% 60,381 
Seychelles 7 4% 45,661 
Botswana 8 3% 37,880 
Morocco 9 3% 34,464 
Tunisia 10 3% 32,187 
Source: Symantec. (2016b). Cyber-crime & cyber security, p. 25. [Online] Available 
WWW: https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/media/com_hsd/report/135/document/-
Cyber-security-trends-report-Africa-en.pdf. 
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b. Malware  
“Malware is software that attackers use to steal confidential information, destroy data, 
disrupt computer operations, or gain access to the network from the compromised system. 
Types of malware include viruses, worms, Trojans, and ransomware, and they spread 
through the use of a variety of tools such as e-mail, drive-by downloads, and infected files. 
They can also exploit existing vulnerabilities to infect systems” (Symantec, 2016b, p.35). 
Table 2.4: Top ten malware sources  
Country Rank Percentage within Africa Incident count 
South Africa 1 20% 1,716,308 
Tunisia 2 14% 1,166,774 
Kenya 3 8% 668,194 
Nigeria 4 6% 469,018 
Cote D’Ivoire 5 5% 407,112 
Ghana 6 5% 405,805 
Egypt 7 5% 400,679 
Algeria 8 4% 304,114 
Ethiopia 9 3% 245,172 
Cameroon 10 3% 224,546 




Spam is an unspecified, unsolicited bulk e-mail which eats up a lot of network bandwidth, 
and is sent in huge quantities using deceived sender addresses to conceal the real sender. 
Examples of spam can include advertising materials and newsletters if the receiver did not 
elect to receive it. 
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Table 2.5: Top ten spam sources  
Country Rank Percentage within Africa Incident count 
South Africa 1 24% 271,700,021 
Tunisia 2 14% 160,301,789 
Egypt 3 7% 78,429,009 
Kenya 4 7% 78,410,109 
Nigeria 5 4% 50,491,804 
Algeria 6 4% 50,253,534 
Cote D’Ivoire 7 4% 47,632,285 
Ghana 8 4% 43,938,441 
Morocco 9 3% 32,197,294 
Cameroon 10 2% 25,478,566 
Source: Symantec-1. (2016b). Cyber-crime & cyber security, p. 27. [Online] Available 
WWW: https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/media/com_hsd/report/135/document/-
Cyber-security-trends-report-Africa-en.pdf. 
d. Phishing hosts 
Phishing is when an attacker deceives a person, mainly through e-mail communication to 
distribute mischievous attachments or links that can achieve a variety of purposes, includ ing 
the extraction of user profile or credentials. 
Table 2.6: Top ten phishing host sources  
Country Rank Percentage within Africa Incident count 
South Africa 1 74% 4,621 
Morocco 2 5% 319 
Egypt 3 3% 184 
Kenya 4 3% 160 
Nigeria 5 2% 136 
Tunisia 6 2% 112 
Cameroon 7 1% 57 
Libya 8 1% 53 
Zimbabwe 9 1% 51 
Algeria 10 1% 48 
Source: Symantec-1. (2016b). Cyber-crime & cyber security, p. 28. [Online] Available 
WWW: https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/media/com_hsd/report/135/document/-
Cyber-security-trends-report-Africa-en.pdf. 
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Cyber-security efforts in South Africa are led by the Cyber Response Committee which 
operates under the State Security Agency’s oversight (Symantec, 2016b). This interim 
committee has the following role players: 
a) South African Police Service (SAPS), which plays the role relating to the investiga t ion 
of cybercrimes.  
b) Department of Telecommunication and Postal Services is the custodian of a cyber hub, 
and supports initiatives to ICT users on cyber-security matters. 
c) Department of Justice and Constitutional Development whose role is legisla t ion 
drafting.  
d) State Security Agency provides administration support to the Cyber Response 
Committee and is also responsible for the implementation of cyber-security initiat ives 
in the country whilst waiting for promotion of comprehensive legislation on various 
aspects of cyber-security. 
e) Department of Science and Technology plays a significant role in the development and 
implementation of research and initiatives to advance the needed skills to deal with 
cyber aspects in the country. 
f) Department of International Relations and Cooperation, which is responsible for 
international relations specific to cyber-security. 
g) Department of Defence is responsible for the cyber offensive and defensive 
development and implementation thereof.  
2.10. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK IN SOUTH 
AFRICA  
This section discusses the pertinent local government legislation that is important to the 
objectives of this enquiry which aims to assess the cyber-security status of metropolitan 
municipalities in South Africa.  
2.10.1. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
The Constitution (RSA, 1996) is the supreme law of the Country. No other Act or legisla t ion 
in South Africa can override the prescription of the Constitution. Chapter seven (7) of the 
Constitution is dedicated to the local government in the country. Section 151 of the 
Constitution provides the status of municipalities and states that: “(1) The local sphere of 
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government consists of municipalities, which must be established for the whole of the 
territory of the Republic; (2) The executive and legislative authority of a municipality is 
vested in its municipal council; (3) A municipality has the right to govern, on its own 
initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provinc ia l 
legislation, as provided for in the Constitution, and (4) The national or a provinc ia l 
government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right to exercise its 
powers or perform its functions” (RSA, 1996). 
Municipal responsibilities are presented in section 152 which states that “(1) the objects of 
local government are- 
(a)  To provide democratic and accountable government for local 
communities; 
(b)  To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable 
manner; 
(c)  To promote social and economic development; 
(d)  To promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
(e)  To encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organisations in the matters of local government”  
Section 155 of the constitution makes provision for the establishment of municipalities under 
the following categories. It states: 
“(a)  Category A: A municipality that has exclusive municipal executive and 
legislative authority in its area. 
(b)  Category B: A municipality that shares municipal executive and legislative 
authority in its area with a category C municipality within whose area it falls. 
(c)  Category C: A municipality that has municipal executive and legislative 
authority in an area that includes more than one municipality”. 
2.10.2. The Municipal Finance Management Act, No.56 of 2003  
National Treasury introduced financial management reforms across government in 1994 and 
in local government in 1996. The Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) is the 
cornerstone of the local government reform, and seeks to provide a framework for financ ia l 
management to maximise municipalities’ capacity to deliver services as entrenched in the 
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Constitution (RSA, 2003). This act intends to establish a sound financial governance 
framework by describing roles and responsibilities of officials, the Mayor, and Council. 
Cyber-security initiatives are dependent on the management support which could include 
financial support. The financial support ought to fall under the ambits of MFMA. The 
prescripts of MFMA must be met including budgeting requirements if management is to 
provide financial support to implement cyber-security processes in the municipality.  
2.10.3. Municipal Systems Act, no 32 of 2000 (MSA) 
The Municipal Systems Act (MSA) (RSA, 2000) states that “A municipality- 
(a)  is an organ of state within the local sphere of government exercising legislative 
and executive authority within an area determined in terms of the Local 
Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998;  
(b)  consists of- 
(i)  the political structures and administration of the municipality; and 
(ii)  the community of the municipality; 
(c)  functions in its area in accordance with the political, statutory and other 
relationships between its political structures, political office bearers and 
administration and its community; and 
(d)  has a separate legal personality which excludes liability on the part of its 
community for the actions of the municipality”. 
One of the objectives of the act is to ensure universal access to essential services (RSA, 
2000). The MSA refers to basic municipal services as “a municipal service that is necessary 
to ensure an acceptable and reasonable quality of life and, if not provided, would endanger 
public health or safety or the environment” (p, 14). Cyber-security breaches can be one of 
the serious risks that can negatively impact the municipality to deliver some of such basis 
services. Section 4 (2)(a) of MSA Chapter 2 prescribes that “the council of a municipality, 
within the municipality's financial and administrative capacity and having regard to practical 
considerations, has the duty to exercise the municipality's executive and legislative authority 
and use the resources of the municipality in the best interests of the local community” (RSA, 
2000). 
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2.10.4. Local government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998  
The Structures Act prescribes the municipalities in the country to develop an Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP) which is a strategic plan document for municipalities (RSA, 1998). 
Section 26 of the Structures Act presents components that must be contained in an IDP 
document and it states that “An integrated development plan must reflect (a) the munic ipa l 
council's vision for the long term development of the municipality with special emphasis on 
the municipality's most critical development and internal transformation needs; (b) an 
assessment of the existing level of development in the municipality, which must include an 
identification of communities which do not have access to basic municipal services; (f) the 
council's operational strategies; (g) applicable disaster management plans; (h) a financ ia l 
plan, which must include a budget projection for at least the next three years”. Cyber-security 
initiatives within the municipality are part of Council’s operational strategies. Financia l 
support should be incorporated into the financial plan as prescribed by the Structures Act 
applied together with the MFMA.  
2.10.5. Definition of a metropolitan municipality in South Africa 
The Structures Act (RSA, 1998) defines Category A Municipality (Metropolitan 
Municipality) as 
“(a)  a conurbation featuring— 
(i)  areas of high population density 
(ii)  an intense movement of people, goods, and services: 
(iii)  extensive development: and 
(iv]  multiple business districts and industrial areas; ~o 
(b)  a centre of economic activity with a complex and diverse economy: 
(c)  a single area for which integrated development planning is desirable: and 
(d)  having strong interdependent social and economic linkages between its 
constituent units”. 
2.11. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
The chapter presented a review of literature that was considered pertinent for this study. 
Globally, various governments have different views on cyber-security, but all those views 
converge around protecting resources/assets that are impacted by cyberspace risks. Various 
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international organisations have developed standards/guides/frameworks that member 
countries should adopt for addressing cyber-security matters. The RSA NCPF was discussed. 
Cyber-attacks on PCS was discussed, and an example of such attacks was the Stuxnet Worm. 
The chapter highlighted the differences between IT security and cyber-security. Various 
research perspectives on cyber-security in the context of South Africa were discussed. 
Finally, the RSA legal framework on local governments was discussed where the 
Constitution, MFMA, MSA, and the structures Act were presented. A definition was 
provided of a metropolitan municipality from the context of the Structures Act (RSA, 1998). 
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CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The chapter presents the philosophical worldviews and research methodology that were 
adopted for this research. The sections discussed are presented in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1: Structure of Chapter 3 
 Topic Overview 
3.1 Chapter introduction Provides context and road map of the chapter. 
3.2 Philosophical worldviews Discusses research paradigms. 
3.3 Justification for choosing 
constructivist worldview 
Researcher’s stance on adopted paradigm. 
3.4 Grounded theory  
methodology 
Presents research method adopted in the enquiry. 
3.5 Study population Discusses the profile of participants to the study. 
3.6 Data collection Presents enquiry’s data collection methods. 
3.7 Theoretical sampling Discusses how the participants were chosen. 
3.8 Data analysis Presents data analysis techniques adopted. 
3.9 Credibility, original ity, 
resonance and usefulness 
Discusses guidelines adopted to achieve credibility. 
3.10 Grounded theory guidelines 
for IS studies 
Discusses GT guidelines for IS studies considered.  
3.11 Chapter summary Presents highlights on the topics covered in the 
chapter. 
 
Constructivism was the chosen worldview for this research. The other worldviews are also 
discussed, particularly positivism and pragmatism. The chapter also highlights how the 
chosen research methodology guided data collection, data analysis and theory development. 
Amongst the various GTM approaches, the constructivist GT of Charmaz (2006) was the 
adopted approach for this investigation.  
3.2. PHILOSOPHICAL WORLDVIEWS  
In academic research, the research is predisposed by the researcher’s worldview known as 
the paradigm. The researcher’s belief system is a position of fundamental viewpoint 
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pertaining to (a) the nature of the world; (b) the person’s position in it; and (c) the extent of 
relationships possible to that world (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Academic research is 
underpinned by theoretical assumptions about what constitutes valid research and 
appropriate research methods for the development of knowledge (Klein & Myers, 1999). 
The research process has three dimensions: ontology, epistemology and methodology. These  
three dimensions define the nature of enquiry (Terre Blanche, Durrheim, & Painter, 2006) 
through an all-encompassing system of interrelated practice and thinking called a research 
paradigm. Ontology relates to the nature of reality, epistemology refers to how one knows 
what one knows, and methodology relates to the modus operandi or mode of operation used 
in one’s research. The research paradigm guides how knowledge is processed and how 
values and reality are interpreted. A paradigm is a set of values, beliefs and assumptions 
regarding the nature and conduct of research. Sometimes a paradigm in a research process 
is referred to as a worldview (Creswell J. W., Research design: Qaulitative, Quantitat ive, 
and Mixed Method Approaches, 2009).  
The research methodology is a process followed by the researcher to execute the research 
process. The questions that the researcher poses in the research and the approach used to 
find solutions to those questions are influenced by the worldview of the researcher (Morgan, 
2007). Traditionally, a researcher is influenced by either a positivist (quantitative) worldview 
or a constructivist (qualitative) worldview (Crotty, 1998). Pragmatists argue that research 
always happens in social, historical, political and other settings or contexts (Creswell, 2013). 
However, this research employed a constructivist worldview as the lack of cyber-security 
research in the context of local government in South Africa requires a more holist ic 
approach.  
3.2.1. Positivist/post-positivist worldview 
Positivists argue that there is a single reality and aim to identify causal relationships through 
objective quantitative measurements. This worldview gives rise to a research approach that 
is sometimes referred to as the scientific method (Creswell J. W., 2013). Positivists approach 
research by examining the relationships among variables (Creswell J. W., 2013). The 
researcher is independent to avoid bias in the process of inquiry. Positivists develop 
knowledge based on observation and measurement of the objective reality that exists in the 
world. In this worldview, researchers argue that there are laws or theories that govern the 
world. These laws and theories need to be verified in order to understand the world 
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(Creswell, 2013). The conventional research approach in this worldview is that the 
researcher starts with a theory, then collects data to support or refute the theory, then designs 
tests and executes necessary revisions (Creswell, 2013). The research aims to construct 
relevant, true statements that can serve to explain the situation of concern. An essential 
aspect of competent inquiry is being objective; hence validity and reliability are critical in 
this worldview. 
3.2.2. Constructivist worldview 
Constructivists contend that there are multiple realities and different interpretations which 
are shaped by particular circumstances in the process of inquiry. The researcher is thus 
subjective in constructivism. A qualitative researcher follows an approach for exploring and 
understanding the meanings people ascribe to a social problem (Kaplan & Maxwell, 2005). 
The constructivist research approach entails emerging questions, data collection in the 
interviewee’s setting, inductively building from particulars of general themes, and 
interpreting the data meanings (Creswell J. W., 2013). Such researchers inductively develop 
or generate a theory or pattern of meaning. This worldview posits that human beings develop 
meanings as they interact with the world on the basis of their social perspectives (Kaplan & 
Maxwell, 2005). By visiting the environment of the interviewees and collecting information 
personally, the researcher aims to understand the setting (Crotty, 1998). 
3.2.3. Pragmatic worldview 
Pragmatists argue that inquiry always take place in social, historical, political and other 
settings or situations (Creswell, 2013). As the name implies, the researcher foregrounds 
practicality and efficacy in their approach. The researcher draws from both qualitative and 
quantitative assumptions when conducting the research; the researcher focuses on the 
research problem instead of focusing on any one method, hence the use of all availab le 
approaches in order to understand it (Cherryholmes, 1992). Having a pragmatic worldview 
opens the door for mixed method researchers to use multiple methods, different assumptions, 
different worldviews and various forms of data collection and analysis (Morgan, 2007). The 
pragmatic worldview, therefore, gives rise to mixed methods research as the inquirer has 
freedom to select the methods that best meet the purpose of the research. Consequently, 
researchers employ both qualitative and quantitative data since they are useful in 
understanding the study problem (Morgan, 2007).  
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3.3. JUSTIFICATION FOR CHOOSING CONSTRUCTIVIST WORLDVIEW 
In executing the study, the researcher aims to develop theory through the process of data 
collection from the real context. The researcher intends to follow an approach for exploring 
and understanding the meanings people ascribe to a social problem; and, in the case of this 
study, evaluating cyber-security status in the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. 
This study sought to inductively generate a theory or pattern of meaning through the 
continuous collection of empirical data from the research participants. Combination of GT 
and a constructivist approach allowed analysis and interpretation of the participants’ 
perspectives through the identification of concepts and categories from collected empirica l 
data.  
3.4. GROUNDED THEORY METHODOLOGY (GTM) 
Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) are the originators of the GTM. They argued that 
through qualitative data analysis, theory could emerge (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). GTM was 
developed for health and medical sociology research domains (Charmaz, 2006). Over the 
years, the application of GTM has gradually extended to other areas such as IS (Lehmann, 
2010). For emergent research areas such as the cyber-security environment, GT is regarded 
as the ‘best fit’ method as it guides conceptual foundations that are grounded in empirica l ly 
collected data. Theory development that is grounded in data during concurrent data 
collection and analysis technique is a tenet for GTM (Charmaz, 2008). GT was proposed by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) as a four-step methodology from which theory emerges from data. 
The first step entails data coding by means of assigning unique identifiers (codes). The 
second step entails bringing together the codes with similarities in concepts to form 
categories. The third step brings together the categories based on their relationships to create 
a substantive theory. The forth step employs the substantive theory that emerged from the 
previous step to explain the phenomenon. 
For IS research, the relevance of GT includes its ability to interpret multifaceted phenomena, 
social issues accommodation, its appropriateness for socially constructed experiences, and 
its absence from the limitations of prior knowledge (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). It is for this 
reason that the GTM was chosen for this research. The complexity and multifaceted nature 
of the IS environment requires a full conceptual understanding of wrestling with many 
interwoven and overlapping themes (Walsham, 1995). GT, as an interpretive approach to 
research, provides thick descriptions which help to disentangle conceptual relevance 
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(Fernandez, Lehmann, & Underwood, 2002). The value that is derived from this is the 
meaningful emergent concepts (Charmaz, 2006). Practitioners in the IS environment are 
preoccupied with issues that are of a socio-technical nature.  
The three prominent schools of thought of GTM are: Charmaz constructivist, Classic – also 
called Glaserian, and Straussian grounded theory. The following table presents the 
characteristics of each view.  
Table 3.2: Characteristics of prominent GTM 
  Constructivist  Straussian  Glaserian 
1 Worldview Constructivism Post-positivism Positivism 
2 Study problem 
identification 






No need to 
depend on 
literature review 
in the beginning 
3 Relationship with 
participants 
Co-construction Active Independent  





data toward theory 
Paradigmatic 
checking model 
Emphasis on the 
emergence of 
data through the 
induction process 











6 Data analysis  Initial coding 
 Focused coding 
 Open coding 
 Axial coding 
 Selective 
coding 





7 Memoing & 
diagrams 




the use of memos 
8 Theory evaluation  Congruence & 
consistency of 
the theory in 
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Classic and Straussian are associated with the positivist view that theory is not formulated 
through the predetermined assumptions of researchers but is entrenched in the research data 
collected. On the other side, the Charmaz (2006) constructivist grounded theory is built on 
the premise that researchers should construct theory on the foundation of their “past and 
present involvements and interactions with people, perspectives, and research practices” 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 19) and present an understanding of what is studied. Various schools of 
thoughts of GTM have different attributes. Therefore it is important for the researcher to 
make known the specific perspective applied in the study. 
3.4.1. Classic grounded theory methodology overview 
Classic grounded theory methodology originates from the Glaser and Strauss stance that 
research conducted for theory development purposes should be on an equivalent traction 
with studies executed to verify theory. Relative to theory generation, Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) posited that researchers have not “focused directly on how their theory emerged; as 
a result, they have not explored how they could have generated more of it more 
systematically, and with more conceptual generality and scope” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 
27). Glaser and Strauss (1967) put theory as an evolving process that is “an ever-developing 
entity” and not a “perfect product” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 32). In formulating a theory, 
there is the constant comparative method which is a process by which theory unfolds through 
constantly selecting the data as it is collected. Glaser and Strauss (1967) highlighted the 
following four stages to the constant comparative method:  
 Categories are matched to the incident or accounts. In this situation, the enquirer looks 
for connections and differences in how the categories are articulated in the data that 
has been collected.  
 Linking properties to categories. In this situation, the enquirer develops ideas about 
the categories and their properties that may eventually arise from the collected data. 
This is achieved through a memoing process.  
 Delineating the grounded theory. In this instance the researcher begins to make an 
intellectual association between categories and properties.  
 Formulating substantive theory. This is the constant comparative method final phase.  
To the fundamental spirit of GT, Glaser (1992) viewed it absurd to begin with a theoretical 
standpoint before conducting research. To begin with a preconceived theoretical perspective 
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results in the substantive theory being biased (Glaser, 1992). The implication of the Classic 
GT perspective is that the literature review process is postponed to the end, after a theory 
has been generated. Glaser (1992) contended that interviewees would tell the researcher their 
main concern and the resolution strategy in a particular setting, and hence the main focus is 
on what emerges in the setting without the involvement of the researcher, and preconceived 
theoretical underpinning. During the data analysis process, Glaser (1992) relied on 
theoretical codes working on the tensions between theoretical sensitivity and extant 
theoretical concepts. The theoretical codes introduced by Glaser (1978) include theoretical 
families of concepts such as “Six Cs: Causes, Contexts, Contingencies, Consequences, 
Covariances, and Conditions” (Glaser, 1978, p. 74). Charmaz (2008) argued that coding 
families in some instances are arbitrary and haphazard as inevitably they are not mutua lly 
exclusive. Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist all prefer purposive and theoretical 
sampling strategies. Glaser (2004) lumped all non-classic grounded theory methodologies 
into what he referred to as “remodelled” grounded theory (Glaser, 2004).  
3.4.2. Straussian grounded theory methodology overview 
Classic grounded theorists discard any prior knowledge they possess on the focus of their 
research. As grounded theorists, Strauss and Corbin (1998) stated whether “we want to admit 
it or not, we cannot completely divorce ourselves from who we are or what we know. The 
theories we carry within our heads inform our research in multiple ways, even if we use them 
quite un-self-consciously” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 47) and consequently, that is a 
departure of Straussian grounded theory from classic grounded theory. Both Straussian and 
Classic grounded theories as methodological similarities adopt the constant comparative 
method, purposive and theoretical sampling techniques.  
The main difference between the Straussian and Classic grounded theorists is at the data 
analysis processes. Strauss (1987) viewed induction, deduction and verification as forming 
important aspects of data analysis and he stated they are “absolutely essential” (Strauss, 
1987, p. 12). On the other hand, Glaser viewed GT as inductive only. Strauss put emphasis 
on deduction and verification, and hinted about the overstated role of induction by the 
Classic grounded theorists.  
Compared to Glaser, Strauss and Corbin (1990) put less emphasis on the emergence of what 
is happening in the setting but indicated that it is preferable to start from a wider lens. They 
contended that in addition to what emerges from the happening in the setting, professiona l 
Page | 49  
necessities, personal experiences, and other influence may spark the research (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Strauss’s perspective on the emergence includes interaction, construction and 
reconstruction of meaning. In their data analysis technique, they applied axial coding and 
the causal conditional matrix, particularly as a means of specifying category dimensions, 
delineating relationships between categories into a coherent whole account. This data 
analysis approach is essentially a different technique from that of Glaser.  
3.4.3. Constructivist grounded theory overview 
This study adopted the constructivist grounded theory. This school of thought assumes that 
the enquirer’s experiences, prior knowledge of relevant theory and values will surface in the 
grounded theory that develops from the enquiry. Predominantly, ConGTM “explic it ly 
assumes that any theoretical rendering offers an interpretive portrayal of the studied world, 
not an exact picture of it” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 10). Both the researcher and the participants 
participate in formulating the theory. By following the constructivist grounded theory, the 
researcher has a chance to voice their point of view while at the same time allowing the 
interviewees’ voices to be heard. 
“Grounded theorists' background assumptions and disciplinary perspective alert them to look 
for certain possibilities” (Charmaz, 2006, p.16). Charmaz (2006) put supreme importance 
on richness of data rather than quantity. She adopted a coding protocol for data reduction 
similar to the coding process first proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), but attached 
different labels to the coding phases. For instance, Charmaz (2006) referred to open coding 
as initial coding, after which she applied a focused coding strategy. Initial coding entails 
comparing incidents or line by line, word by word, or paragraph by paragraph. “Focused 
coding requires decisions about which initial codes make the most analytic sense to 
categorise your data inclusively and completely” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 57). Focused coding or 
selective coding allows the researcher to classify and synthesize large amounts of data. 
Focused codes are scrutinised to assess which ones best explain or interpret the empirica l 
phenomenon. Focused codes through an emergent process, are tested against the data. 
Researchers look for those codes that carry the weight of the analysis to become tentative 
theoretical categories.  
Charmaz (2006) alluded to the fact that it is essential to understand the question of what 
theory is before embarking on a grounded theory study. Charmaz (2006) “calls for the 
imaginative understanding of the studied phenomenon... [and] assumes emergent, mult ip le 
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realities; indeterminacy; facts and values as linked; truth as provisional; and social life as 
processual” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 126). Charmaz (2006) argued that theory emerges from the 
shared relationship of the researcher and participant, both being influenced by their prior 
values, beliefs and experiences. Further, Charmaz (2006) claimed that regardless of the 
theoretical perspective, theories are rhetorical in that they function to “present arguments 
about the world and relationships within it, despite sometimes being cleansed of context and 
reduced to seemingly neutral statements” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 128). 
Charmaz (2006) also argued that the approach to enquiry followed by grounded theorists 
should offer a systematic inductive, comparative, and interactive format which offers several 
open-ended strategies for conducting emergent inquiry. These strategies provide more than 
the inductive only as they encourage the interviewer to make inferences, check them through 
engaging in deductive reasoning as the research progresses. These strategies make the 
grounded theory method explicit, and the development of emergent conceptual analysis is 
fostered by their open-ended qualities.  
Theory emergence has elements of subjectivity emanating from collectively agreed-upon 
objective properties. In the beginning of GT, the researcher moves from inductive logic 
through to abductive reasoning. The application of abductive reasoning seeks to 
accommodate anomalies, and surprises in the collected data. With regard to emergence, the 
constructivist grounded theorist’s position differs from both Glaser’s (1978) theoretical 
codes and Strauss and Corbin’s axial coding together with a conditional matrix. The 
argument is that both approaches promote researchers to force their data into extant 
categories. The constructivist grounded theorist sees theoretical codes adoption echo 
application, not emergence, and hence the posture that “the theoretical questions that 
researchers pose arise from the particular issues grounded in the studied empirical world” 
(Charmaz, 2008, p. 161).  
3.4.4. Rationale for adopting ConGTM  
In as much as it applies to all grounded theorists, the premise that the researcher can refer 
back to the setting to ask the interviewees further, supplementary precise questions to clarify 
the developing theoretical categories is an attractive benefit. The flexibility of grounded 
theory strategies is interesting as the researcher may adapt them to suit the exigency of the 
enquiry (Charmaz, 2008). Importantly, the researcher has flexibility to choose and create the 
methods as the research progresses. Constructivist grounded theory offers transparent 
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analytic guidelines that afford researchers to make transparent analytic choices and 
constructions. During the research process, the researcher can create and see a straight 
connection linking data and conceptual categories. The researcher is not the observer in the 
research data analysis, but an active participant. Constructivist grounded theory is in line 
with contemporary thinking which the research subscribes to. The positivistic principle of a 
neutral observer, as advocated by Glaser and Strauss, emerged as problematic to the beliefs 
of the researcher which are aligned to social constructivist ontology. Constructivist grounded 
theory considers broader environmental and contextual factors that influence the 
phenomenon under study. It also aims to produce a theory that is relevant (theory that fits 
the situation) to guide the action in practice. It is recognised that the broad goal of all 
grounded theory approaches is to generate theory. The data analysis guidelines are 
considered helpful. 
3.5. STUDY POPULATION 
Cooper and Schindler (2001, p. 69) stated that “a population is the total collection of 
elements or participants about which the researcher makes some inferences”. A population 
is necessary to draw a sample from (Cooper & Schindler, 2001). For this enquiry, the target 
population consisted of IT professionals encompassing IT auditors, IT risk management 
specialists/practitioners, and PCS professionals such as telecommunications network 
engineers and other professionals working on, and supporting municipal information 
infrastructures. The rationale for the population selection is based on the perceived roles they 
have in cyber-security towards safeguarding the information infrastructures.  
Research participants selected for interviewing must be expert participants possessing prior 
experience with the phenomenon to be able to offer the researcher useful information. The 
ConGTM adopted in the enquiry endorses open-ended interview, conversational, and is 
mutually constructed, thus ensuring the required depth, richness and rigour. The ConGTM 
recommends fewer participants compared to descriptive statistical research methods. The 
number of participants in this qualitative research was 33. 
3.6. DATA COLLECTION 
This enquiry adopted semi-structured interviews as a method for data collection which is in 
line with ConGTM. During the study duration, collection of data and data analysis occurred 
simultaneously, as is the norm for GTM. Also as a tenet of grounded theory, purposive 
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sampling was adopted to select the participants. The selection of research participants was 
based on their roles and responsibilities in the municipality’s information infrastructures. 
The study site for the ConGTM enquiry was eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality in 
KwaZulu Natal Province of South Africa. The choice was prompted by the fact that the 
researcher is a citizen of this municipality and it was thus not expensive to collect data since 
limited travel was involved.  
The ConGTM is focused on finding emergent concepts from a few, but intensive, data 
collection processes compared to seeking generalisation and representation as is the gist of 
other research approaches. 
The researcher was able to ask for more detail during the interview process as he could probe 
back and forth into an issue being discussed as important points emerged, and could request 
for more clarification (Charmaz, 2006). Potential participants were systematically gathered 
through their roles in cyber-security in relation to the municipal information infrastructure. 
The data collection process was iterative and evolutionary and hence the total number of 
potential participants was not predetermined. The participants represented a diverse mix of 
personalities, each having different experiences, authority and expertise in the domain of IT 
and PCS (including management). The participants were all viewed as specialists in their 
various fields of work. One-on-one semi-structured interviews that lasted between 30 and 
60 minutes were conducted, and each was conducted at the various participants’ work place. 
Five pre-prepared questions were asked during the semi-structured interviews. 
As outlined by Patton (1990, p. 317), the guidelines for conducting an effective interview 
were adopted. The guidelines adopted included attentively listening and appropriately 
responding to indicate to the participant that they were being heard (Patton, 1990). During 
the interview process, the researcher participated in the content of what the respondents were 
alluding to as both the researcher and participants were active participants in data collection.  
The researcher applied understandable and proper language, to communicate clearly, and to 
let the participant know how the interview was progressing, built rapport with the participant, 
and showed respect for the participant as a person. 
3.7. THEORETICAL SAMPLING 
Sarantakos (2005, p. 166) argued that theoretical sampling is based on choosing consequent 
interviewees based on the emergent information from the already coded data. The intention 
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is to choose participants which will provide data that is relevant to the research (Sarantakos, 
2005). Theoretical sampling is a technique of data sampling for the development of a 
theoretical category and is conducted only after a researcher has tentative categories to 
develop or refine (Charmaz, 2008). Emergent categories form the basis of theoretical 
sampling and, as a result, the researcher cannot anticipate where theoretical inquiry will take 
them. Through the analytic process, tentative categories arise and thus lead to new research 
sites and substantive areas. The enquiry conducted theoretical sampling until theoretical 
saturation was reached. Theoretical saturation happens when collecting more data yields no 
further views on the properties of the theoretical category. 
3.8. DATA ANALYSIS 
In the GTM, data analysis is a continuous process of analysing data through methodica l 
filtering and the arranging of data obtained from interviews and any other data collection 
process. Data was reduced through manageable units for coding. Data analysis took place in 
parallel with data collection, and this was in accordance with GTM. Data was analysed until 
saturation was reached, meaning until no new information or additional information could 
be obtained from the collected data. Collecting, simplifying, transforming data into 
categories is another form of data analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
3.8.1. Coding data 
In GT, coding begins the emergent process of analysing data and is made up of at least two 
stages which are initial coding and focused coding (Charmaz, 2008). Initial coding enables 
the researcher to concentrate on the probable logic of the data while interrogating it. The 
researcher was cognisant of the fact that emergent leads could be gained through identifying 
in vivo codes (these are research participants’ direct statements) which aid the researcher in 
understanding participants’ meaning and in elucidating emergent actions (Charmaz, 2008).  
Focused coding followed after the open coding. The researcher focused on the initial codes 
that were most frequent from the data collection. The researcher sorted and synthesised large 
amounts of data, scrutinised the codes more in order to assess the ones that described best or 
interpreted the empirical phenomenon (Charmaz, 2008). Tentative theoretical categories 
were derived from focused codes. By applying an analytical approach, the researcher linked 
the theoretical categories to develop the conceptual theory.  
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3.8.2. Memo writing 
Ideas in process and in progress during the enquiry were captured through memo writing. 
Memoing (memo writing) is also a tenet of GTM. According to Charmaz (2008), memos 
can be partial, tentative, and exploratory. Through memo writing, the researcher gets the 
opportunity to discover more about the data. In terms of the memo guidelines provided by 
Charmaz (2008, p. 166), the following was done:  
title the memos for easy sorting and storage; (2) wrote memos throughout the 
entire research process; (3) defined the code/category by its properties found in 
the data; (4) delineated the conditions under which the code/category emerged, 
maintained, and changed; (5) compared the code/category with other codes and 
categories; (6) included the data from which the code or category was derived 
right in the memo; (7) outlined the consequences of the code/category; (8) noted 
gaps in the data and conjectures about it.  
3.8.3. Theoretical saturation  
Theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation are two key processes of CGTM. Theoretica l 
sampling was guided by the theoretical saturation. Theoretical saturation is whereby the 
researcher reaches a point where no additional information or new concepts are emerging 
from the new data that is collected. Thus, repeated occurrences of similar data could be an 
indication that a point of saturation has been reached and data collection can then stop. 
Theoretical saturation is a situation whereby all the research concerns are clear and the 
theoretical framework does not change or improve at all. Thus, at this point further data 
collection will be simply confirming the theoretical proposition already developed and 
known rather than modifying or further explaining it. 
3.9. CREDIBILITY, ORIGINALITY, RESONANCE AND USEFULNESS 
The research was guided by Charmaz’s (2006) four criteria for credibility, originality, 
resonance, and usefulness. The four criteria aided the researcher to address the implic it 
actions and meanings in the phenomenon investigated and helped to analyse how it was 
constructed (Charmaz, 2006). The researcher sought to answer the four criteria associated 
questions in the affirmative way in order to comply with the GT guidelines.  
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Table 3.3: Criteria for improving GT  
Criteria One - Credibility  
1. “Has your research achieved intimate familiarity with the setting or topic? 
2. Are the data sufficient to merit your claims? Consider the range, number, and depth 
of observations contained in the data.  
3. Have you made systematic comparisons between observations and between 
categories? 
4. Do the categories cover a wide range of empirical observations?  
5. Are there strong logical links between the gathered data and your argument and 
analysis? 
6. Has your research provided enough evidence for your claims to allow the reader to 
form an independent assessment - and agree with your claims?”  
Criteria Two – Originality 
1. “Are your categories fresh? Do they offer new insights? 
2. Does your analysis provide a new conceptual rendering of the data? 
3. What is the social and theoretical significance of this work? 
4. How does your grounded theory challenge, extend, or refine current ideas, concepts, 
and practices?”  
Criteria Three – Resonance 
1. “Do the categories portray the fullness of the studied experience?  
2. Have you revealed both liminal and unstable taken-for-granted meanings?  
3. Have you drawn links between larger ‘collectivities’ or institutions and individual 
lives, when the data so indicate?  
4. Does your grounded theory make sense to your Interviewees or people who share 
their circumstances? Does your analysis offer them deeper insights about their lives 
and worlds?” 
Criteria Four – Usefulness 
1. “Does your analysis offer interpretations that people can use in their everyday 
worlds?  
2.  Do your analytic categories suggest any generic processes?  
3.  If so, have you examined these generic processes for tacit implications?  
4.  Can the analysis spark further research in other substantive areas?  
5.  How does your work contribute to knowledge? How does it contribute to making a 
better world?” 
Source: Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory. A practical guide through 
qualitative analysis (p. 182-183). London: SAGE Publications. 
3.10. GROUNDED THEORY GUIDELINES FOR IS STUDIES 
A refined set of GT guidelines was established by Urquhart et al. (2010) for researchers 
within the IS discipline. Throughout the enquiry the researcher was guided by these 
guidelines for theoretical analysis.  
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Table 3.4: GT guidelines for IS studies  
1. Constant 
comparison 
This advice encourages both rigorousness and theory formulation. 
It involves repetitively associating instances of data labelled as a 
particular class with other instances of data in the same 
classification. Theory development is supported by uncovering 




This recommendation recommends the intensification of the 
amount of abstraction and link categories through iterative 
conceptualisation. It is achieved through the process of theoretica l 
coding which assist to understand the relationships amongst 
concepts or theory factors. Memoing is another important process 




This guide emphasises the necessity of selecting research sample 
that is based on analytic grounds. It promotes theory development 
that is truly grounded in the data thereby ensuring the 
comprehensiveness nature of the emergent theory.   
4.  Scaling up This recommendation advocates solution to what is thought to be 
a common grounded theory problem, viz. the generation of low 
level theory which is difficult to relate to the broader literature. It 
involves grouping higher- level categories into broader themes 
thereby contributing to theory generalisability.  
5. Theoretical 
integration 
This recommendation assist the researcher to relate the emergent 
theory to other theories in the similar field. It is important to 
compare the formulated substantive theory with other existing 
theories and this could help in formal theories generalisation.  
Source: Urquhart, C., Lehmann, H., & Myers, M. D. (2010). Putting the ‘theory’ back into 
grounded theory: Guidelines for grounded theory studies in information systems. 
Information Systems Journal, vol. 20, no. 4, p. 369.  
3.11. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter discussed the design and approach that was followed to execute this research. 
The researcher’s chosen paradigm was presented, GT was the chosen methodology and 
specifically the ConGTM. Three GTMs were discussed, namely Constructivist, Straussian, 
and Glaserian. Further, the rationale for adopting the ConGTM was provided. The research 
population, data collection process, and data analysis procedures were all deliberated upon. 
Lastly, the GT guidelines for achieving credibility were discussed.  
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CHAPTER 4  
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
4.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the empirical enquiry of which the aim was to examine cyber-security 
capacity in metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. The sections covered in this chapter 
are discussed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Structure of Chapter 4 
 Topic Overview 
4.1 Chapter introduction Presents an outline of the chapter. 
4.2 The study site Background on the site where enquiry was 
conducted. 
4.3 Research participants Discusses the research participants. 
4.4 Research design and data 
collection  
Presents the steps followed to conduct the enquiry. 
4.5 Chapter summary Presents highlights on topic covered in the chapter. 
 
The researcher identified the general research problem, which was to investigate how cyber-
security capacity in South African metropolitan municipalities could be assessed. Assessing 
cyber-security capacity entailed determining the structures, processes and relationa l 
mechanisms that the municipalities have implemented to manage cyber-security business 
risk facing the organisation.  
4.2. THE STUDY SITE 
The empirical study was conducted in the only metropolitan municipality found in the 
Province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) in South Africa. EThekwini Municipality covers an area 
of roughly 2555km2 and was home in 2016 to some 3.7 million people (ETh-IDP, 2017). 
As enshrined in Section 155 (1) of the South African Constitution of 1996, the Municipa lity 
is Category A, which means it has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority 
in its area. The population in the municipality represents 33, 7% of the provincial population 
and 6, 6% of South Africa’s total population (ETh-IDP, 2017).  
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Figure 4.1: Districts and metropolitan municipalities in KZN 
Source: EThekwini Municipality Integrated Development Plan (ETh-IDP). (2017). Durban: 
EThekwini Municipality, p. 32. 
The economic powerhouse of KZN, the eThekwini Municipality, makes a significant 
contribution to the South African economy and is an important link between the regional 
economies of Pietermaritzburg and Richards Bay. The municipality offers 10% of all 
employment opportunities in the country (ETh-IDP, 2017). Ranked as the second largest 
economic centre, the municipality is the second most significant industrial region in the 
country and is a promising global competitor with a world-class manufacturing sector (ETh-
IDP, 2017). Being home to Africa’s first multimodal logistics platform, eThekwini 
Municipality has an international passenger airport and that is King Shaka Internationa l 
Airport. The municipality is home to Africa’s busiest port which is Durban Port; and has an 
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international conferencing centre, which is the Durban International Conference Centre. It 
is also regarded as South Africa’s playground and tourist destination. The municipa lity 
provides essential public services within its jurisdiction. Being a coastal municipality with a 
large manufacturing base, eThekwini Municipality like any other government institution in 
the country, is at risk and vulnerable to a range of technological, natural, man-made and 
environmental disasters.  
The Rockefeller Foundation launched the 100 Resilient Cities Centennial Challenge  
(100RCCC) to enable cities globally to better address the 21st century major challenges, and 
to assist in the building of urban resilience. Urban resilience is the ability of the city to 
withstand continual stress and acute shocks while at the same time sustaining the provision 
of essential functions. 100RCCC prepares cities to cope with future changes. As a pioneer 
for the 100 Resilient Cities Centennial Challenge, the City of Durban was selected as one of 
372 cities internationally to apply for the 100RCCC. In December 2013, it was selected as 
one of the first cohort of 33 successful cities to be inaugurated into the 100 Resilient Cities 
(100RC) Programme (ETh-IDP, 2017). The City of Durban has to face up to the challenge 
of translating global ideas around resilience into our local context. The eThekwini 
Municipality as local sphere of government is particularly susceptible to changes to 
environmental, social, and economic systems, with many citizens vulnerable to lack of 
adequate housing, access to sanitation and waste removal, safe drinking water, a healthy 
natural environment and adequate health care facilities. To avoid exacerbating an already 
fragile situation, it becomes important how the municipality plans and prepares for these 
challenges such that it can respond effectively to current and future changes. The opportunity 
to participate in the 100RC Programme provides the municipality with the prospect of 
starting to consider and plan in a coordinated and innovative way on resilience issues and to 
stimulate the needed support to implement action around key resilience priorities for the city.  
This study sought to enhance the implementation of cyber-security at local government level. 
At a national government level, in 2015, the country published the NCPF which stresses the 
importance of cyber-security implementation at local government level. The Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996) requires local government to ensure the provision 
of services to communities in a sustainable manner, promote social and economic 
development, and promote a safe and healthy environment. Section 41(1)(b) further requires 
all spheres of government to secure the well-being of the people of South Africa. Some 
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municipal essential services are effectively and efficiently provided to communities through 
the utilisation of cyberspace. Participating in cyberspace presents colossal challenges to the 
municipality and hence for institutional arrangements to manage the information, critical 
infrastructures need to be better structured. The country’s National Development Plan 
(NDP) vision 2030 put forward the need of establishing a municipal fibre-optic network to 
provide the backbone for broadband access to meet social objectives. 
Municipalities in South Africa are required by the Municipal Systems Act (No.32) of 2000 
(RSA, 2000) to prepare Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) which comprise a key 
component in entrenching government principles. Municipalities deliver the community 
needs through IDPs. EThekwini Municipality has aligned the IDP with internationa l, 
national, provincial, and local developmental policies (ETh-IDP, 2017). The services 
provided by the municipality to the eThekwini citizens include clean water, energy, and 
emergency services. The municipality uses an information infrastructure to support the 
administration of the city.  
4.3. RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
The research participants were employees of eThekwini Municipality. The municipality has 
diverse departments. To achieve the research intentions, the study participants were 
purposively selected based on their role to implement cyber-security initiatives to safeguard 
the information infrastructure from cyber-security vulnerabilities. The participants were 
selected from different departments which are ICT, Water and Sanitation, Electricity, and 
Finance. Thirty-three participants were intensively interviewed with the aim of achieving 
the research objectives. The rationale on the total number of research participants was based 
on the theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation. The composition of the participants 
comprised employees working in both streams of ICT, and PCS. The participants working 
on ICT were selected on the basis that ICT forms part of information infrastructure. PCS 
participants were chosen on the basis that PCS, such as SCADA, are largely dependent on 
ICT. The industrial control systems form part of the information infrastructure in the 
municipality. Industrial processes are remotely controlled through the use of a SCADA tool, 
the functionality of which is embedded in the ICT infrastructure. The professions of the 
participants varied and comprised a range of different skills.  
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Table 4.2: Profile of research participants 
Based on theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation 
Stream Department Profession Number 
ICT ICT ICT Networks  3 
Software Development 3 
Systems Support  3 




IT Audit IT Audit Specialists 2 
IT Risk Management IT Risk Specialists 2 
PCS Water and Sanitation Computer Network Systems 4 
Water SCADA 4 
Electricity Computer Network System 4 
Electricity SCADA 4 
Total 33 
 
4.4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 










Figure 4.2: Research design and data collection 
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4.4.1. Ethical review and approval  
The research complied with the UKZN’s ethical processes. The application for ethical 
clearance was submitted to the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, 
and was approved. The application included a completed “Ethical Clearance Application 
form”, copy of the gatekeeper’s letter that was signed by the eThekwini Municipal Manager, 
participants’ information sheets, consent forms, and initial interview protocol and questions. 
The ethical clearance reference number was HSS/0894/017D.  
4.4.2. Data collection 
The researcher prepared five semi-structured interview questions as an instrument to collect 
data. Intensive interviewing permitted an in-depth exploration of cyber-security status 
through the participants’ experiences in implementing cyber-security to safeguard munic ipa l 
information infrastructures. In alignment with GTM, the first group of research participants 
encompassing both ICT and PCS professionals was interviewed following theoretical 
sampling. The second group of participants which also encompassed both streams, and 
various professions, was interviewed to confirm the initial codes that had been developed 
from the first group of interviews. The final set of interviews was conducted to achieve 
theoretical saturation. 
4.4.2.1. The interview questions 
Excluding the questions related to biographical information, three semi-structured interview 
questions were prepared by the researcher. The research questions aimed at answering the 
study’s core research question. The main objective of the research was to determine the 
cyber-security status in the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. The concepts of 
cyber-security and information infrastructure were discussed with the each participant before 
the start of the interviews. The participants were asked the interview questions as presented 
in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Semi-structured interview questions 
 Question Objective 
1.  How is eThekwini Metropolitan 
Municipality protecting 
organisational information 
infrastructure assets against cyber-
threats? 
The objective of the question was to explore 
the practices that eThekwini Metropolitan 
Municipality has implemented to protect 
organisational information infrastructure 
assets against cyber-threats.  
Page | 63  
2.  What methodologies are currently 
available to assess the cyber-
security status in the eThekwini 
Metropolitan Municipality? 
The objective of the question was to explore 
the methodologies currently employed to 
assess the cyber-security in the eThekwini 
Metropolitan Municipality. 
3.  How is eThekwini Metropolitan 
Municipality inculcating the 
culture of cyber-security across the 
organisation?  
The objective of the question was to 
understand the processes that are employed to 
provide an enabling environment to develop, 
implement, and sustain a cyber-security 
culture in organisation. 
 
The duration of each interview conducted was between 45 and 60 minutes. The researcher 
captured the proceedings of the interviews on his laptop during the interview session. The 
interviews details were transcribed in compliance with confidential consideration of the 
ethical clearance. Interviews were conducted until no new information could be obtained 
from participants in relation to achieving the research objectives. 
4.4.3. The two coding processes 
The two coding phases were undertaken, namely initial coding and focused coding. Data 
analysis was iterative and was conducted at the same time as data collection. The coding 
process applied in the study was adopted from ConGTM of Charmaz (2006) and is presented 
in Figure 4.3. 
  










Figure 4.3: Coding process adopted 
 
4.4.3.1. Initial coding 
This was the first phase of coding undertaken after each of the data collection and interview 
transcriptions. The research worked closely with the data and tried to understand each 
sentence in terms of identifying what exactly was meant by the respondent. Initial codes 
were formulated and treated as provisional because the researcher wanted to remain open to 
other analytic possibilities and create codes that best fit the data at hand. The research 
concentrated on the codes that indicated that they fit the data and the phenomenon being 
studied. Concurrent data analysis and data collection assisted the researcher to go further 
and deeper into the research problem. During the analysis, the researcher kept codes active, 
analytic, short, and simple. An attempt was made to code with words that reflected action. 
As the first step, line-by-line coding was employed, meaning naming each line of written 
data. However, not every line contained a complete sentence and not every sentence could 
appear to be important. During line-by-line coding, the researcher could identify implic it 
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Table 4.4: List of initial codes for Question 1 
1. Municipality 
develops, and 
implements the IDP 
2. Comply to applicable 
legislation and 
regulations 
3. Authority originates from 
the Constitution of RSA 
4. Provide essential 
services to the public 
5. Municipal council is the 
highest decision-making 
body 
6. Day-to-day highest 
decision making is 
delegated to Exco 
7. Exco comprises of 
politicians  
8. Municipal manager 
reports to Exco 




comprises of various 
functional domains 
11. Functional domains are 
made of various business 
units 
12. Business units are led by 
unit heads 
13. Unit heads implement 
municipal vision 
14. Unit heads implement 
municipal strategies 
15. Unit heads implement 
municipal policies 
16. Management of 
finances is guided by 
MFMA  
17. Corporate governance is 
guided by the King IV 
report 
18. Exco delegates policy 
development to the 
municipal manager 
19. Municipal Systems 
Act guides the 
implementation of 
performance 
management systems  
20. Senior management 
comprise municipal 
managers, and deputy 
municipal managers,  
21. Municipal manager leads 
the senior management 
team 
22. Municipality provides 
services to the public 
23. Various business units 
provide essential 
services 
24. Water and sanitation is 
an essential service 
provided 
25. Provision of 
electricity is an 
essential service 
provided 
26. Various forms of 
infrastructure are further 
services provided 
27. Municipal administration 
requires ICT support 




29. Process automation is 
entrenched in ICT 
30. Process automation is 
made up of PCS 
31. Water SCADA 
system is an example 
of PCS 
32. Electricity SCADA 
system is an example of 
PCS 
33. MFMA guides the 
establishment of the 
internal audit function 
34. Governance processes 
are executed by 
senior management 
team 
35. Various committees have 
been developed to 




oversight on municipal 
infrastructure assets 
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37. Finance committee 
provides oversight on 
municipal finances 
38. Audit committee 
provides oversight on the 
internal controls that 
management has 
implemented to mitigate 
the identified risks 
39. Audit committee 
provides oversight on the 
governance processes 
that management has 
implemented 
40. Audit committee 
provides oversight on 









42. Composition of cyber-
security steering 
committee is made up of 
senior management 
officials responsible for 
delivery of essential 
services  
43. Cyber-security 
steering committee is 
guided by the cyber-
security steering 
committee charter 
44. Cyber-security steering 
committee charter should 
be reviewed annually 






advise Exco on cyber-
security matters 












50. Audit committee 
approves the internal 
audit annual operational 
plan  
51. Internal audit function 
provides assurance on 
the municipal 
performance information 
52. Formulate central 




53. Cyber-security policy to 
extend from information 
security policy 
54. Cyber-security policy 
encompasses all 
information 
infrastructures beyond IT 
unit 
55. Internal audit 
function provides 
assurance on the 
implementation of IT 
governance processes 
56. Senior management has 
implemented risk 
management processes 
across the organisation 
57. Senior management has 
developed a portfolio 
responsible for strategic 
assets management 
58. Senior management 
has developed supply 
chain management 
policy  
59. Senior management has 
developed skills 
development policy 
60. Senior management has 
developed recruitment 
policy 
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61. Unit heads are 
responsible for the 
functional/operations 
effectiveness of their 
business units 
62. Unit head provides 
methodologies to 
safeguard organisational 




63. Unit heads develop and 
implement business 
continuity strategies 




65. Various units adopt 
industry best practices to 
achieve consistent results 
on their business 
objectives 
66. Supply chain 
management processes 
include vendor/supplier 
management practices  
67. ICT unit is 
responsible for 
protecting 
information assets in 
the municipality 
68. Business units develop 
and continuously 
maintain the risk 
registers 
69. Senior management team 
develops and 
continuously maintains 
strategic risk register 
70. Unit heads develop 
and maintain their 
respective operational 
risk registers  




72. Business units who own 
PCS plan/design their 
specific computer 
networks 
73. ICT unit implements 
hardware and related 
software to run and 
protect the corporate 
telecommunication 
networks 
74. ICT unit implements 
hardware and related 
software to monitor 
corporate computer 
network activities  
75. ICT unit is responsible to 
implement information 
security policy  




77. Various business units 
conduct contingency 
plans testing 
78. ICT unit deploy 
technologies to monitor, 
detect, prevent 
unauthorised access to 
organisational computer 
networks 
79. The basis of business 
processes is to deliver 
services to the local 
citizens 
80. IDP is the service 
delivery framework in 
the municipality 
81. Expenditure is linked to 





processes in pursuit 
of service delivery 
83. Critical infrastructures 
are supported by 
information 
infrastructures 
84. Each business unit 
manages its own cyber-
security affairs. 
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85. Business units that 




access to their 
computer networks 
86. ICT unit has developed 
and implemented IT 
assets maintenance plans 
87. Business units that own 




88. Through IT 
governance 
processes, ICT has 
adopted industry best 
practices such as 
Cobit 
89. ICT unit participates in 
IT systems acquisition 
processes  
90. Human resources unit 
implements the 
recruitment policy 
91. Before joining the 
employ of the 
municipality, 
employees are vetted 




92. Various business units 
develop and submit for 
approval their annual 
budgetary requirements  
93. Various business units 
conduct skills 
development for their 
employees 





95. Various business units 
conduct cyber-security 
user awareness and 
training in cyber-security 
96. Various business units 
encourage staff to get 
certified on their various 
occupations 
97. Various business 
units encourage staff 
to join and participate 
in their professional 
institutes  
98. On employee on-
boarding, HR conduct 
induction and it includes 
cyber-security, and the 
obligation of each 
employee to maintain 
and enhance cyber-
security within the 
organisation 
99. On employees exiting the 
employ of the 
municipality, HR 
communicates the 
termination details to 
ICT unit to terminate 
access to IT assets 
100. Audit on IT system is 
conducted by internal 
audit unit 
101. Control weakness 
identified during the 
audit process is 
communicated with 
senior management for 
subsequent rectification 
of those controls 
102. Internal audit reports are 
communicated to the 
audit committee to 
maximise accountability 
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103. Various business 
units have 
implemented physical 
protection on their 
infrastructures 
104. Various business units 
have implemented access 
controls into their 
information 
infrastructures 
105. Service level agreements 
as part of the SCM 
processes have been 
implemented 
106. Punitive clauses are 
incorporated in the 
service level 
agreements in case of 
poor delivery and 
non-compliance 
107. ICT unit communicates 
the computer network 
statistics to various 
business unit heads 
108. Breach of security is 
communicated to the 
process and information 
infrastructure owner 
109. Access to information 
infrastructure is 





110. Computer networks 
intrusion detection tools 
are implemented and 
monitored continuously 
111. Ant-virus software is 
implemented and 
maintained 








114. IT acquisition includes 
security testing process 
115. Internet usage is 
monitored 
116. ICT has implemented 
web security processes 
117. Access control processes 
include authentication 
mechanism 
118. Sensitive data 
communicated over 
computer networks is 
encrypted  
119. ICT unit conducts 
systems back-up 
procedures  
120. ICT unit has developed 
and implemented cyber 
incident management 
procedures 




122. Systems administrators’ 
privileges and access 
rights are monitored  
123. ICT unit has 
implemented IT service 
desk 
124. Units that have 
implemented PCS 
have established 24/7 
computer networks 
monitoring centres  
125. Disaster recovery plans 
for information 
infrastructures are 
continuously tested  
126. Business units 
encourage their staff to 
attend seminars and 
breakfast sessions 
normally hosted by 
professional institutes 
127. ICT educate end-user 
on cyber-attacks 
128. Where network 
vulnerability testing has 
been conducted, 
129. ICT unit has 
implemented IT assets 
disposal policy 
Page | 70  
including social 
engineering 
penetration testing is 
conducted 
130. Remote access to 
organisational 
information 
infrastructure assets is 
controlled 
131. Operating systems 
default passwords are 
controlled  
132. Collaboration on cyber-
security amongst various 
departments takes place 
133. Various business 




134. Tertiary education 
institutions partner with 
various business unit on 
cyber-security related 
matters  
135. Each employees’ 
performance assessment 
is conducted on a 
quarterly basis 
136. ICT and the data 
therein are the 
underlying causes for 
cyber vulnerability 
137. Adoption of ICT is the 
underlying cause of 
cyber vulnerability  







and breach of security 
by employees  
140. Downloading software is 
restricted to authorised 
individuals 
141. Uploading of software to 
the organisational 
information 
infrastructure is restricted 





reported to forensic 
investigation unit and 
subsequently to SAPS 
143. ICT unit communicates 
information security 
policies across the 
organisation 
144. Changes to information 





prescribed for system 
testing before 
implemented to live 
environment 
146. ICT unit provides 
guidelines on the 
complexity of IT system 
users’ passwords 
147. Users are made time-out 
if there is inactivity for a 
specified amount of time 
in a session  
148. Log-in attempts are 
monitored and 
reported to relevant 
management 
149. A cap has been set on 
unsuccessful log-in 
attempts in computer 
networks and IT systems 
150. Various business units 
have implemented 
segregation of duties 
control 
151. Various business 
units are conducting 
152. External independent 
assessments are 
153. Investment on cyber-
security 
Page | 71  
health checks on the 
information 
infrastructures 
conducted on the 
security of information 
infrastructure assets 
projects/implementations 
is monitored and 
reported on 
154. Trustworthiness of 
employees working 
on information 
infrastructures is a 
serious consideration 
155. Employees’ ethical 
behaviour is one of the 
factors to consider when 
addressing protection of 
information 
infrastructure 
156. Commitment by 





employees sign the e-
mail use policy 
158. Individually, employees 
sign the Internet use 
policy 
159. Various business units 
are monitoring 
compliance with the 









161. Individual employees are 
encouraged to attend 
relevant professional 
conferences in order to 
understand current trends 
on cyber-security 
162. Municipality has 
formulated a technical 
working group on cyber-
security, whose 
composition includes 
both streams of ICT and 
PCS 






164. Independent consultants 
are engaged to test 
compliance to pertinent 
IT laws and regulations 
165. Governance audits are 




166. Management provides 






167. Office of the Auditor 
General conducts audits 
on information 
infrastructures  
168. ICT unit has 
implemented network 
perimeter control on 
corporate networks 
 
Table 4.5: List of initial codes for Question 2 
1. Various ICT audits are 
conducted annually by 
information 
infrastructures 
2. Various ICT audits are 
conducted by the office 
of the Auditor General  
3. State Security Agency 
conducts network 
vulnerability 
assessments or critical 
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information 
infrastructures 













7. Various business units 
engage independent 
consultants to conduct 
various types of 
systems heath checks 
on information 
infrastructures 
8. Independent assessors 
check the budget 
allocated to implement 
cyber-security processes 






conducted to evaluate 
the effectiveness of 
various committees on 
cyber-security matters 
11. Internal audit function 
assesses the design and 
effectiveness of 
governance processes 
that are related to cyber-
security 
12. Various business units 
on a continuous basis 




13. External quality 
assessment reviews 
are conducted on 
internal audit function 
14. Internal audit function 
conduct audits on risk 
management processes 
across the organisation 




16. ICT keeps records of 
computer networks 
down time 
17. ICT unit keeps statistics 
on cyber-security user 
awareness training 
initiatives 
18. Status on audit queries 
is kept by the internal 
audit function and other 
assurance providers 
19. Number of employees 
with necessary 
qualifications and 
skills for protection of 
information 
infrastructure 
20. Frequency of staff 
attending continuous 
professional development 
initiatives related to 
information infrastructure 
protection 
21. Budget allocated to 
implement cyber-risk 
mitigation strategies  
22. Presence of cyber-
security risk in the 
strategic risk register 
23. Presence of cyber-
security risks in business 
units operational risk 
registers 
24. Availability of the 
approved cyber-security 
policy 
25. Availability of the 
cyber-security steering 
committee charter 
26. Availability of cyber-
security steering 
committee meetings 
27. Availability of 
infrastructure committee 
minutes 
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28. Presence of cyber-
security agenda item 
on infrastructure 
committee’s agenda 
29. Frequency of cyber-
security steering 
committee meetings 
30. Number of cyber-
attacks reported in the 
organisation 
31. Number of devices 
infected by virus and 
related illicit software  
32. Successful tests of DRP 33. Successful tests of BCP 
related to information 
infrastructures 




35. Testing of ICT system 
before implementation 
36. Review and monitoring 




38. Signing of internet use 
policy by individual 
employees 
39. Signing of e-mail use 
policy by individual 
employees 




41. Compliance to HR 
recruitment policies 
42. Compliance to ICT 
related laws and 
regulations 
43. Discussion of cyber-
security in executive 
authority meetings 
44. Assess the effectiveness 
of various oversight 
committees 
45. Assess implementation 
of IT governance 
processes 
46. Availability of tools to 
detect intrusion into 
organisational 
computer networks 












50. Operating effectiveness 
of physical safeguarding 
of information 
infrastructure 
51. Availability of 
functional access 
control to information 
infrastructure 




53. Availability of network 
plans and designs  
54. Adoption of industry 
best practices 
55. Level of 
collaborations within 
and outside the 
organisation 
56. Availability of statistics 
on log-in attempts  
57. Number of staff 
engaging in research 
and development 
projects 




59. Attendance to pertinent 
local and national 
conferences related to 
information infrastructure 
protection 
60. Compliance to cyber-
security policy 
assessment 
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plans on performance 
gaps identified during 
individual performance 
assessments  
63. Compliance to pertinent 
municipal legislation 
and regulations 
64. Controls implemented 




65. Encryption of transmitted 
data 
66. Availability of signed 
job descriptions for 
employees working on 
information 
infrastructure 
67. Availability of Exco 
minutes where cyber-
security was discussed 
68. Deployment of network 
monitoring tools 
69. Deployment of network 
security tools 




71. Communication on 
various cyber-security-
related policies 
72. Adoption of 
international standards 
73. Conducting social 
engineering tests 
74. Time it takes to solve 
audit queries raised on 
cyber-security weakness 
75. Availability of cyber-
security strategy 
76. Adoption of industry 
best practices on risk 
management 
processes 
77. Adoption of industry best 
practices on ICT and 
PCS processes 
78. Level of information 
between ICT and PCS 
domain 
79. Reported/unreported 




incidents reported to 
forensic investigation 
unit and SAPS 
81. Adoption of King IV 
report in corporate 
governance processes 
82. ICT drive cyber-
security 
implementation 
83. Availability of 
information security 
portfolio within the 
organisation 
84. Segregation of duties to 
individuals working on 
information 
infrastructure 




86. Monitoring of systems 
administrators’ activities 
in the computer system 
87. Records of Exco 
training in cyber-
security  




89. Management monitoring 
of SCM policy-related 
information 
infrastructures 
90. Availability of security 
reports on information 
infrastructures 
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91. Availability of records 




92. Communication of 
changes to information 
infrastructures 
93. 24/7 monitoring of 
cyber-security nerve 
centre for PCS  
94. Availability of 
continuously tested 
backup procedures 
95. Communication of cyber-
security emergent 
risks/threats  
96. Availability of bring 
your own device policy 
97. Monitoring of VPN 98. Information workshops 
conducted on cyber-
security across the 
organisation 
99. Continuous security 
clearance procedures on 




Table 4.6: List of initial codes for Question 3 
1. Involve senior management 
in cyber-security processes 





4. Implement cyber-security 
policy 





6. Monitor operational 
effectiveness of 
oversight committees 






9. Enforce compliance 
to cyber-security 
policy 
10. Monitor compliance to cyber-
security-related legislation 
and regulations 
11. Conduct various 
types of ICT audits 
on information 
infrastructures 
12. Comply with SCM 
policies related to 
information 
infrastructure 
13. Implement performance 
management system 
14. Implement and 
enforce compliance 
to industry best 
practices 




16. Conduct continuous user 
awareness campaigns 
17. Educate computer 
users on cyber-
security risk 
18. Comply with HR 
policies on 
recruitment 
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19. Assess individual employee 
performance assessments 
20. Conduct research 





21. Monitor employee 
activities on the 
computer networks 
22. Monitor compliance to 
MFMA 
23. Monitor compliance 
to Systems Act 
24. Monitor compliance 
to structures act  
25. Promote individual 
continuous professional 
development 












28. Promote communication 
amongst various business 
units on matters related to 
cyber-security and 
information infrastructure 
29. Conduct information 
security health 
checks across the 
organisation 
30. Conduct assessments 
on governance 
processes’ alignment 
to best practices such 
as King IV report  
31. Implementation cyber-
security enforcement tools 
32. Remind users on 
good cyber-security 
practices 




34. Conduct risk assessments on 
information infrastructures 
35. Conduct network 
vulnerability 
assessments 
36. Automate security 
processes 
37. Develop help desk to solve 
cyber-security-related 
problems across the 
organisation 
38. Monitor remote 
access to information 
infrastructures 
39. Align cyber-security 
to IDP processes 
40. Manage cyber-security 
investments 

















45. Conduct period test 
on social engineering 







users to report 
Page | 77  
compliance to cyber-security 
polices 
punitive mechanisms 




taking place on 
information 
infrastructure 
49. Make users aware what to do 
if they experience cyber-
attacks or mischievous 
activities in the organisational 
computer networks  
50. Monitor internet 
usage, and make 
users aware that their 
activities on the 
Internet are 
monitored 
51. Monitor e-mail 
system usage and 
make users aware 
that their usage of 
the e-mail system is 
monitored 
52. Monitor current trends on 
cyber-security and 
communicate the emerging 
risk across the organisation 
53. Cyber-security is 
driven from ICT unit 
54. Investigate incidents 
of cyber-security 
breaches 
55. Report statistics of cyber-
security breaches to various 













58. Conduct cyber-security health 




between PCS and 
ICT streams 




61. Report progress on 
implementing cyber-risk 
mitigation strategies 







63. Test system security 
before 
implementations 











67. Conduct BCP test 68. Conduct DRP tests 69. Test back-up and 
recovery procedures 
70. Keep records on information 





72. Promote compliance 
to Occupation Health 
and Safety Act 
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4.4.3.1.1. Consolidated memoing for Question 1 initial coding 
Charmaz (2006, p. 72) stated that “Memo-writing is the pivotal intermediate step between 
data collection and writing drafts of papers”. During memo writing the researcher analysed 
ideas about the codes in any and every way possible, but related to the research objectives. 
Memoing kept the researcher entrenched in the analysis and helped to increase the level of 
abstraction of ideas. During memo writing, thoughts were recorded, comparisons were 
captured and connections were made for further considerations by the researcher. The 
researcher was an active participant and was thus an important instrument during the data 
collection and analysis phases. The processes of memo writing provided a space to become 
actively engaged in research, to develop ideas, and to fine-tune subsequent data gathering. 
Memo writing for formulation of Question 1 initial codes is presented in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: Consolidated Memo writing for Question 1 initial codes 
Consolidated memo writing for Question 1 after the initial codes 
Question: How is eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality protecting organisationa l 
information infrastructure assets against cyber-threats?  
Objective: The objective of the question was to explore the practices that eThekwini 
Metropolitan Municipality has implemented to protect organisational information 
infrastructure assets against cyber-threats. 
Premise: “In grounded theory the analyst humbly allows the data to control him as much 
as humanly possible, by writing a theory for only what emerges through his skilled 
induction. The integration of his substantive theory as it emerges through coding and 
sorting is his verification that the hypotheses and concepts fit and work and are relevant 
enough to suggest. They are not proven; they are theory” (Glaser, 1992, p. 87). 
Section 1 – Municipal mandate and authority to deliver services 
A metropolitan municipality is a government service delivery machine. The Municipa l 
Systems Act, No 32 of 2000 (RSA, 2000), requires all municipalities in the country to 
develop an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) to guide all developments in the 
municipality. IDP informs allocation of resources and municipal budgeting. IDP is a 
strategic development plan which spans for five years. IDP is owned by the munic ipa l 
council, and is reviewed annually. IDP ensures that the municipality is accountable to the 
citizens and businesses located within the municipality. The development of the IDP is 
normally delegated to the municipal manager by the municipal council. For example, the 
eThekwini Municipality’s IDP mentions global agendas which include the African Union 
agenda, New Urban agenda, the Paris agreement, and other commitments which the 
municipality is committed to achieve. In the 2017/18 eThekwini Municipality’s IDP, the 
Mayor Councillor, Zandile Gumede, says “I am proud to say that as a City we have been 
actively involved in influencing policy and strategy at a Global, National, provincial and 
Local Government level” (Eth-IDP, p. 9). 
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Capacity to deliver services to the municipal public and businesses alike is important. 
Capacity ensures that the IDP is achieved as intended. Cyber-security is one amongst 
many capacities that the municipality needs to deliver services. Cyber-security spans 
across various sectors and business units within the municipality. A competent workforce 
is core to the delivery of effective and quality services in the municipality. To strengthen 
administrative governance, the municipality has integrated risk assurance in pursuit of 
effective and efficient service delivery. The adoption of IT assists the municipality to 
eliminate resources wastage, improve effectiveness, efficiencies and accountability. IT 
adoption also assists to develop a Smart City. 
Some of the risks that are faced by the municipality include service providers’ 
unavailability to provide much needed and essential services. Disruption to services raises 
the continuity risk exposure. Cyber-attack and unplanned information and 
telecommunication outages are some of the key risk drivers. Continuity risk if materialised 
results in the municipality being unable to deliver services to the municipality community. 
Cyber-security is essential to minimise or mitigate the risk of service delivery continuity.  
The municipality has established an executive committee (Exco) which is the principa l 
committee of the municipality. Members of Exco are politicians from political parties 
represented in Council in the same proportion. On a day-to-day basis, Exco is the highest 
decision-making body in the municipality on behalf of full Council (has delegated 
powers). There are portfolio committees (composition by councillors) that support Exco. 
These portfolio committees include the Human Settlements and Infrastructure Committee 
which “Considers and makes recommendations to the Executive Committee and Council 
on all matters pertaining to electricity, engineering, human settlements, transport, waste 
management and water & sanitation” (ETh-IDP, 2017, p. 485). There is also a Governance 
& Human Resources portfolio committee “responsible for corporate administrat ion; 
national and international stakeholders; and human resources matters including skills 
development” (ETh-IDP, 2017, p.485). 
There are also statutory committees which have been created in compliance with various 
Acts. Amongst these types of committees is the audit and risk committee whose comprise 
independent individuals who are not municipal employees or municipal councillors. The 
core of this committee is to advise Exco and senior management on the status of interna l 
controls that management are implemented to ensure that municipal objectives are 
achieved, maintained, and enhanced. This committee also advises Exco on the risk 
management and governance process that the municipality has implemented in pursuit of 
organisational objectives and mandates.  
Given the municipal strategic objectives, it has become apparent that ICT is a valuable 
municipal asset which enable municipal service delivery. Cyber-security is no longer an 
option for the municipality particularly taking into consideration that most essential 
services are entrenched in ICT. Participants have indicated that cyber-security is not only 
about technical solutions but also about human issues.  
Section 2: Utilisation of process control systems in service delivery 
Being a Category A Municipality, eThekwini Municipality offers a variety of services to 
the public under the jurisdiction of the municipality. The delivery of services is made 
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possible in some functional areas through the utilisation of ICT. The interconnectedness 
of municipal computer networks makes it possible for the municipality to: 
 distribute electricity to the municipality community  
 distribute water to the Municipality community 
 provide much needed administrative support across the municipality. ICT systems 
such as e-mails, Internet system, and enterprise resource planning systems, are 
examples of support systems in the municipality.  
PCS for electricity 
Electricity unit: through the use of SCADA system the unit delivers electricity to the 
citizens. SCADA is a form of a process control system (PCS). ICT is used to improve 
reliability, intelligent control, optimum operation, and protection of a power system 
network. The functioning of the PCS is entrenched on ICT. A SCADA system has 
advanced data collection capability, facilitates remote monitoring, and automates entire 
electricity distribution by coordinating, controlling and operating distribution 
components. As a PCS, SCADA enables the operator to monitor and control distributed 
systems at various remote geographical areas. SCADA is made up of computers, 
networks, controllers, instruments, actuators, and interfaces to manage automated 
industrial processes. SCADA systems are economical as they eliminate the visit of 
personnel to geographically dispersed locations to conduct inspections, make adjustments 
in the processes, and data collection. 
PCS for drinking water 
SCADA systems measure, control, and monitor (locally and remotely): water collection 
and extraction, transport water to settling basins, transport water to filtration/purifica t ion 
processes, monitor and control filtration/purification processes, monitor treated water 
distribution, and monitor and control pressure boost pumps.  
The following diagram shows the electricity distribution SCADA system 
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In the eThekwini Municipality, the distribution of the essential services such as electric ity 
and water is largely dependent on the SCADA systems. SCADA systems use open 
standard protocols of which the description is available on the Internet. A SCADA system 
uses Internet protocols such as TCP/IP to transfer data, also runs on Linux or Windows 
operating systems as an application. SCADA systems are becoming vulnerable to hackers 
around the world. Security of SCADA is a challenge to the organisation. Contractors can 
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connect to the SCADA network, Worm and virus scans are rarely conducted. Patches are 
not deployed and if deployed they are deployed late. 
Most participants indicated the challenges often experienced when working on SCADA 
systems, and these included issues raised by various individuals from various business 
units. These were their individual views and not those of the department or unit.:  
 No change management policy 
 No network vulnerability testing conducted 
 Lack of password policy 
 No security awareness 
 Lack of cyber-security policy 
 Physical security threats such as vandalism and fire 
 Hardware and software malfunctions due to various factors such as denial-of-
service attacks, viruses, etc. 
 Inadequate risk management processes 
 Limited audit involvement 
 Uncoordinated efforts amongst departments and units 
 Poor support from senior management (sponsorship & buy-in). 
Example of Water SCADA system destruction in South Africa 
For 11 days, the citizens of Eersterust (Pretoria) and Mamelodi in Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality were left with no drinking water. This was caused by a damaged SCADA 
system in the reservoir due to vandalism. This happened in August 2006.  
The controls that were highlighted to be important by the participants are the following: 
 SCADA specific cyber-security policy. The municipality has an approved 
information security policy; however, participants indicated that the approved 
information security policy is biased towards ICT compared to PCS. This situation 
has led to ad hoc enactment of security measures. It is not known if security gaps 
exist or the right security measures have been implemented. 
 Risk management approach. At senior management level, SCADA/PCS forms an 
integral part of risk management processes. This ensures that all information 
security aspects such as confidentiality, integrity, and reliability of SCADA 
systems, and business continuity planning are considered. 
 Security awareness. Human element is one of key risk factors that needs attention 
in the cyber-security environment. Continuous security awareness keeps 
employees focused. Security aware employees assist to enhance the organisationa l 
security posture. 
 SCADA systems and networks audit. The audit process provides assurance on the 
security of connections between networks and SCADA systems; security status of 
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distantly controlled and monitored sites; reporting security incident approach; and 
status of security relating to physical and logical access of SCADA components.  
 Supply chain management policy to include SCADA systems. This enhances 24/7 
availability of SCADA systems. Service providers and vendors have to be 
managed based on the SCM policy. After a disaster or malfunction, SCADA 
systems must be operating as soon as possible, and service providers could be part 
of the team to make the system functional again. Third parties must provide 
assurance that their employees are honest and reliable. Consultants working on 
SCADA systems must be supervised. Faulty equipment replaced by third parties 
may contain sensitive information. Sensitive information must be erased or the 
devices must be destroyed or sanitised before leaving the municipal premises.  
 Defence in depth. SCADA networks are separated from corporate networks and 
from public networks. Accessibility of SCADA from other networks is a screen 
with no uncontrolled access able to take place. There are firewalls, separation of 
networks, and an authentication process. SCADA systems are not directly 
connected to the Internet. 
 Controlled access to SCADA systems. Access to SCADA systems and networks 
is only available to authorised employees. It is controlled through electronic and 
physical controls. 
Section 3: Information security 
The IT unit has implemented cyber-security in the municipality, however; it has been done 
in a siloed approach. The controls implemented ensure that there is confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the data contained, and transmitted in the municipal ICT 
systems. The participants have indicated that IT personnel are competent to safeguard 
organisational information infrastructures. EThekwini Municipality has an approved 
information security policy. The custodian of this policy is the municipal IT unit. IT has 
been successful in the endeavours to implement an information security policy because 
the municipality has invested in both technical and social (human) resources. Municipa l 
employees have to a large extent complied with the information security policy. This has 
been demonstrated by the internal audit reports, and reports from the office of the Auditor 
General. 
The municipality has implemented various technologies to safeguard information 
infrastructures. The municipality has also ensured that employees are aware of cyber-
security risks facing the organisation. The municipality has provided employees with 
necessary skills and knowledge to implement information infrastructure protection 
mechanisms. In its endeavours, the IT unit has adopted industry best practices to safeguard 
organisational information infrastructures. Cobit is the IT governance framework that has 
been adopted in the municipality. The municipality has deployed technical tools to protect 
the organisational computer network. These tools include intrusion detection tools, 
network protection tools, network monitoring tools, and unauthorised access preventio n 
tools.  
Participants have indicated that IT governance takes place at senior management level in 
the organisation. The municipality has implemented an IT steering committee to provide 
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leadership and direction on strategic IT initiatives. The IT budget is allocated based on the 
IT governance reports that are submitted to the IT steering committee. This committee 
meets at least quarterly. The IT steering committee monitors the implementation of the IT 
annual operational plan. The IT steering committee comprises senior management team 
members. Other cyber-security controls that have been implemented in the municipa lity 
include the following: 
 Business continuity management (DRP) 
 Access control to information infrastructures (both physical and logical) 
 Network management 
 ICT asset management (inventory management, maintenance, procurement) 
 Computer networks vulnerability assessments 
 Research & development on information security to understand current trends on 
cyber-security, and information infrastructure protection  
 Software assets acquisition 
 Segregation of duties  
 Incident management 
 Raising information security awareness 
 Deployment of anti-virus software 
 Individual performance management system 
All these information security controls are applicable to cyber-security; however, they are 
only implemented in the ICT components. PCS also require similar to or more protection 
than the ICT counterpart. All the ICT security processes are included in the Service 
Delivery Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP). Any other initiatives that are outside of 
SDBIP are not provided for in the budget and are not funded. The cyber-security initiat ives 
must be included in the SDBIP in order to be successfully implemented. As a strategic 
goal, information infrastructure protection must be incorporated in the IDP in order to get 
the sponsorship it deserves.  

















Main issues raised by the participants 
 There is lack of direction regarding the cyber-security in the organisation. There is no 
champion for cyber-security. This champion is supposed to facilitate and coordinate 
the efforts of safeguarding information infrastructures in the organisation. Various 
sectors within the organisation are safeguarding their sector-specific information 
infrastructures; however, this could lead to inconsistencies in the practices adopted to 
protect the vulnerable assets. Some sectors are more concerned about their core 
business and put in little effort for the protection of information infrastructures. This 
is more prevalent in the industrial control systems environment.  
 The lack of cyber-security policy contributes to the uncoordinated efforts currently put 
into cyber-security. The roles and responsibilities are not clear in the execution of 
cyber-security. In as much as the ICT unit plays a role, it is a siloed role because other 
critical stakeholders are left out. The information security policy is not sufficient as it 
only focuses of ICT, while leaving out other sectors that have a role to play in cyber-
security. 
 Allocation of resources to safeguard the information infrastructure is not 
commensurate to the risk impact should the risk materialise. Allocation of cyber-
security resources is not aligned to the value of the assets being protected. Some 
information infrastructures require control and monitoring 24/7, particularly those that 



























Laws & Regulations 
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 The interconnectedness of information infrastructures compounds the problem of 
resource ownership and responsibilities, hence the protection thereof. These 
interdependencies create problems when planning and testing procedures for 
contingencies. One sector within the organisation has a disaster recovery in location 
X, another sector in location Y, and another in location Z. Due to interconnectedness, 
all these sites need each other in order to bring the information infrastructures up and 
running again. However, the siloed approach makes it difficult for all these sectors to 
consolidate their efforts to secure information infrastructures. 
 The inter-governmental relations on cyber-security and information infrastruc ture 
asset management is almost non-existent. Municipalities operate and own information 
infrastructures that support national critical infrastructures such as national airports, 
harbours, etc. Other spheres of government should be role players in the protection 
and risk management processes of these supporting information infrastructures.  
 
4.4.3.1.2. Consolidated memoing for Question 2 initial coding 
Table 4.8: Consolidated memo for Question 2 after the initial codes 
Question: What methodologies are currently available to assess the cyber-security status 
in the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality? 
Objective: The objective of the question was to explore the methodologies currently 
employed to assess the cyber-security in the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality. 
The municipality has various committees to strengthen the governance processes in order 
to achieve the municipal mandate and objectives. Some of these committees exist as a 
result of statutory requirements such as Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA). 
This committee is independent as its members are not employees of the municipality, nor 
are they councillors in the municipality. Audit and risk committee is one such committee 
that was formulated as a statutory compliance. The core function of this committee is to 
assess the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls that management of the 
municipality has implemented to ensure that the municipality objectives are achieved, 
maintained, and enhanced. The internal audit committee advices Exco on risk 
management, and governance processes within the Municipality.  
Reporting to the audit and risk committee is the internal audit function. This is the audit 
that provides assurance services across the municipality processes. Amongst the 
components of the internal audit function is the ICT audit component which provides 
assurance on ICT processes across the municipality. The internal audit plan is approved 
by the audit and risk committee, and consulted with management before being 
implemented. In executing its function, the internal audit unit subscribes to industry best 
practices, and is guided by the prescripts for pertinent legislation and regulations.  
Industry best practices that have been adopted by the internal audit unit include the Cobit 
framework, and King IV report on corporate governance. Cobit guides the implementa t ion 
of IT governance processes (protect IT assets, manage IT resources, alignment of IT to 
municipal strategic business objectives, etc.) King IV report on corporate governance 
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guides the municipality in adopting best practices when executing governance processes, 
risk management processes, and also IT governance processes. King IV report also 
provides guidelines on the mandates and composition of the audit committee. Assurance 
in the municipality is also provided by the office of the Auditor General of South Africa 
(AGSA).  
Cyber-security is not the responsibility of one unit within the municipality. Cyber-security 
is the responsibility of all municipal business units that are using and or dependent on ICT 
in pursuit of their business unit’s objectives. Most municipal business units are dependent 
on ICT. The dependencies vary per business units. Almost all departments are in the 
municipality play a role in cyber-security implementation.  
Assessment is performed by auditors when they evaluate internal controls implemented in 
the municipality. Assessing cyber-security means evaluat ing 
processes/structures/relational mechanisms to identify whether cyber-security processes 
are adequate to safeguard the municipal information infrastructure. Assessing cyber-
security includes processes to evaluate human behaviour towards information 
infrastructure protection. Assessment is conducted to identify if the environment is 
conducive to enhance the objectives of protecting information infrastructure protection.  
As there is no known instrument to comprehensively assess the status of cyber-security in 
the metropolitan municipality environment in the country, the researcher requested the 
participants to identify how they would assess cyber-security in the municipality. What 
cyber-security processes and structures can be part of the assessment? The participants’ 
responses include the following: 
In the absence of cyber-security policy, information security policy can be used as a 
benchmark to assess cyber-security. Assessment of cyber-security enhances capacity 
development as the assessment processes identify the gaps in information infrastruc ture 
protection. Assessment of cyber-security enhances communication channels within the 
municipality as the assessment participants are given feedback to maintain and or improve 
cyber-security.  
 Municipal governance processes are assessed through internal audit processes to 
determine if they cover cyber-security sufficiently. Governance processes include 
the various types of oversight committees. 
 Various business units are conducting their own assessments through control of 
self-assessment processes. These assessments are conducted to identify gaps in 
their business processes. The intention is to strengthen their control processes.  
 Internal audit function is also assessed for quality through the external quality 
review processes. But this assessment does not directly enhance cyber-security.  
 Risk management processes are also assessed to determine if they adopt industry 
best practices. Risk management approach has been identified by the participants 
as one of the key areas that need to be evaluated to determine if they deal with 
cyber-security risks. Strategic risk register, for example, contains cyber-security 
as one of strategic risks that the municipality must mitigate. 
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 Top management commitment is assessed to determine the support the cyber-
security programme receives from senior management in the municipality. 
Commitment from senior management can be in the form of sponsorship of 
various forms, i.e. sponsoring conferences dealing with cyber-security, sponsoring 
workshops, seminars, etc. Sponsorship can also include allowing employees to 
attend conferences, to join professional institutes, to attend user awareness 
programmes, etc. 
 Assessment of information infrastructure acquisition is also essential. This 
includes processes such as SCM, contracts management, monitoring of service 
level agreements. 
 Assess how the municipality is managing information infrastructure assets. This 
assessment includes identification of critical information infrastructure, 
maintenance, and disposal. 
 Evaluate technical capacity to protect organisational information infrastructures. 
Technical capacity assessment encapsulates areas such as implementation of 
technologies that detect and prevent cyber-attacks. Technologies that are used to 
monitor computer networks and related devices. Physical protection of 
information infrastructures is also important to evaluate. Network vulnerability 
assessments are important monitoring and evaluation tools used by computer 
network custodians to assess security posture of organisational computer network. 
Security weakness identified during vulnerability assessments are rectified by 
management to ensure continuous protection of computer networks.  
Cyber-security assessments can be grouped into various categories: 
 Organisation category – which deals with assessing structures and processes that 
provide for the “cyber-security enabling environment” within the municipality.  
 Technical category – deals with implementing relevant technologies and tools to 
effect the safeguarding of organisation information infrastructure. 
 Human category – this is a social issue with deals with human beings who are 
operating the information infrastructures within the organisation. Third party 
service providers are catered for in this category.  


























Key challenges identified by the participants 
Cyber-threats to municipal infrastructure, and other assets, are amongst the sources of 
increasing concerns to policymakers in the municipality. Information infrastructures are 
now ubiquitous and components are interdependent wherein disruption of one component 
has a destructive, cascading effect on others.  
 Cyber-security issues are not confined to ICT only but also involve physical threats to 
critical infrastructure. The current set-up to address the cyber-security challenges is 
not assisting the municipality as it should because ‘the left hand does not know what 
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municipality. There is no integration of activities, and if integration happens, it is by 
chance.  
 The various business units that have responsibilities to secure their information 
infrastructures are not consistently adopting standards for information infrastructures 
categorisation that is aligned to levels of risk. As a result, is becomes a challenge to 
assess the capacity of the organisation to protection information infrastructure assets 
against cyber-threats. A holistic posture of cyber-security in the municipality could be 
a serious challenge to obtain due to disintegration yet working on interconnected and 
interdependent systems.  
 There need to be checks and balances at a central point to ensure and certify that cyber-
security implementation and assessment thereof are executed to strengthen the 
information infrastructure holistically. One cyber-security solution to a sector within 
the municipality can cause weaknesses (vulnerabilities) to other sectors due to 
interconnectedness. Assessing the status of cyber-security in a siloed manner could 
produce skewed outcomes if conducted in a ‘mini shop’ fashion.  
 It is a challenge to determine if the overseeing that exists is assisting municipa lity 
efforts to provide risk-based, adequate, and cost-effective cyber-security. Sectors 
could be complying with various sector-specific legislation and regulations; however, 
with regards to cyber-security, there needs to a centralised assessment which should 
be conducted on an annual cycle. 
 There is a lack of strategic understanding of the municipality’s cyber-security risk 
profile, including capacity of the workforce, and current threats. Municipalities are 
increasingly susceptible to cyber-threats due to the fact that their cyber defences tend 
to be less robust than other spheres of government. 
 Users of information infrastructures are themselves threats to cyber-security. It 
therefore becomes essential for the municipality to assess how much users know about 
cyber-security. This assessment aims to strengthen controls around social enginee r ing 
attacks. Also, the challenge here is about the fragmentation of the initiatives geared to 
address user awareness and training in the municipality. The depth of user awareness 
and training is not standardised across the municipality.  
 
4.4.3.1.3. Consolidated memoing for Question 3 initial coding 
Table 4.9: Consolidated memo for Question 3 after the initial codes 
Question: How is eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality inculcating the culture of cyber-
security across the organisation? 
Objective: The objective of the question was to understand the processes that are 
employed to provide an enabling environment to develop, implement, and sustain a cyber-
security culture across the organisation.  
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Cyber-security is the responsibility of all business units that operate and or depend on 
information infrastructure in pursuit of organisational objectives. A cyber-security culture 
can focus on various levels of the institution. These levels are as follows: 
 Senior/Top management. This is the layer that drives corporate governance within 
the organisation. This layer sets the tone for all other layers in the organisat ion. 
This layer provides strategic direction to the organisation. It provides what to do, 
and how much has been budgeted for what has to be done. People participating on 
this layer are custodians of the IDP processes. This layer is a structure and the 
processes that are performed by the structure. At this level, cyber-security culture 
in the municipality is mainly influenced by: 
o the way things are done at a strategic level in the municipality  
o the personality of the municipality at a strategic level 
o what top management do to maintain, and in some areas enhance cyber-
security in the municipality 
 Business unit level. This the layer that implements cyber-security in the 
organisation. It is where technologies are deployed to safeguard information 
infrastructure. People participating on this layer are the technical experts who drive 
IDP implementation. This layer is made up of various structures and the processes 
that are performed by the structures. This structure provides actual delivery of 
services to the municipality community. At this level, cyber-security culture is 
mainly influenced by the following: 
o Nature of the business/operations that the unit conducts “influence 
employee attitudes and have an impact on their behaviour”. What level of 
risk is the information infrastructure exposed to? 
o Nature of information infrastructure operated. “Employees as members of 
a group/department” are influenced by the nature of monitoring and 
auditing in the group.  
o Leadership of the various business units to “to guide business units in 
making the right decision and to comply with Municipal policies”.  
 Individual employee level. This is where human issues are considered. User 
training and awareness happen on this layer. Technical tools can be implemented 
to safeguard information infrastructure. However, if human issues are not 
addressed, the technical solutions that have been implemented will not function. 
Human issues for consideration include: 
o ethical behaviours 
o attitude towards cyber-security 
o cyber-security awareness 
o change management. 
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The domains under each level discussed are not mutually exclusive. In some cases there 
is and overlap of the levels. The participants indicated the following: 
 Cyber-security culture is influenced by the tone at the top. Municipal executives 
show that they mean business by implementing policies and means to achieve 
those policies. A positive culture at executive management level motivates other 
tiers in the organisation to follow suit. Corporate governance culture on cyber-
security is one element that cultivates the cyber-security culture across the 
municipality. Corporate governance includes internal auditing, risk management, 
and internal control.  
 Cyber-security culture is influence by skill/training provided in the business unit 
as a group. Skills development can take many forms which include formal 
education through tertiary institutions, and occupational certifications through 
writing professional body examinations. Informal education is through 
collaborations with interested stakeholders within and external to the organisat ion, 
conducting workshops, seminars, breakfast sessions, etc. Strong leadership at 
business unit level has a positive influence on cyber-security culture in the 
municipality. Strong leadership will positively influence the cyber-security culture 
through enforcing asset management processes, contract management practices , 
cyber-security technical operations, and change management. Management 
reporting to various structures and committees also positively influences the 
culture of cyber-security in the municipality. 
 At an individual level, a positive cyber-security mind-set inculcates the culture of 
cyber-security in the organisation. A positive mind-set is enhanced by programmes 
such as awareness campaigns, education, ethical behaviour, and attitudes. Ethical 
values are embedded in the organisational business processes. Automation of 
cyber-security processes enhances compliance and hence the positive culture. 
Monitoring of individual actions is one such enforcement control that ensures that 
users/staff are accountable for their actions online and on information 
infrastructures. Other factors that influence individual behaviours and attitudes 
towards cyber-security include individual performance management systems, 
rewarding of good behaviour and practices. Security breaches and non-compliance 
to policies are punished according to the severity of the breach/non-compliance. 
Making staff and users aware that their actions are logged by the systems and are 
monitored by management also has a positive influence on cultivating the culture 
of cyber-security in the municipality. 
Key challenges identified by the participants 
The municipality is a legislated institution. There are various laws that impact how the 
municipality operates and these include the Protection of Personal Information Act. The 
institution does not have an idea of how much has been done to comply with this act and 
any other acts impacting on information infrastructure. 
 It is important to conduct continuous compliance, but there is no guarantee if those 
compliance tests cover all the areas that ought to be covered across the municipality. 
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 Reporting of cyber-security incidents is one factor that inculcates the culture of cyber-
security. However, due to the lack of a centralised reporting centre, some attacks that 
have hit some areas in the municipality are not communicated to pertinent stakeholders 
inside the municipality or outside. The existence of reporting processes could be found 
in pockets across the municipality, but when this has occurred not every staff member 
was aware of what to do to report a cyber incident. Not every staff member is aware 
of how to identify a cyber-incident due to treating cyber-security in a siloed way. 
Therefore, there appears to be a need for the development of coordinated programmes 
to strengthen user awareness and reporting mechanisms. This coordinated reporting 
will cultivate the culture of cyber-security in the municipality. The positive culture 
could offer valuable insight in the municipality’s preparedness to control cyber-
security. 
 Lack of cyber-security policy contributes to a poor cyber-security culture because 
there is no organisation-wide official stance on cyber-security. The presence of a 
cyber-security policy subsequently advances the compliance and enforcement 
processes. Without the official cyber-security it becomes a daunting task to preach the 
gospel of cyber-security in the organisation.  
 Some form of contingency planning does take place in the municipality. However, 
simulations and various tests conducted do not generate scalable results to inform 
strategy and policy development. Continuous assessment of contingency plans 
inculcates the culture of cyber-security in the municipality, but only if the efforts and 
outputs are appropriately coordinated and directed.  
 Continuous cyber-security assessments either through qualitative or quantitat ive 
approaches seek to produce structured results that are measurable. These assessments 
however only inculcate cyber-security culture if the results inform municipal cyber-
security strategy implementation, and form the basis for budgetary allocations 
regarding cyber-security. 
 
4.4.3.2. Focused coding 
The researcher never lost sight of what the enquiry wanted to achieve. The research sought 
to determine the cyber-security status in South African metropolitan municipalities. The 
codes that were identified during the initial coding process were aligned with the research 
intentions. After the initial coding had been done, focused coding was conducted, and that 
was in alignment with the ConGTM. During the focused coding phase, the codes from the 
initial coding were more directed, selective, and conceptual than for the initial coding. 
During this phase, the researcher synthesized and explained larger data segments. Most 
significant and frequent codes were identified; however, the researcher had to make 
decisions about which initial codes made the most analytic sense to categorise the data 
incisively and completely.  









 Various business units  
 Integrated Development plan 
 Coordination of efforts  
 Facilitation of cyber-security 
 Custodian of cyber-security 
 Alignment to service delivery 
 Centralised coordination 
 Policy development 
 Continuous assessment 
 Cyber-security steering 
committee 
 Continuous development 
 Continuous monitoring 





Municipality develops and implements  
the IDP. 
IDP is the service delivery framework in 
the municipality. 
Various business units participate in 
research and development activities . 
Unit heads implement the municipal 
vision. 
Each business unit manages its own 
cyber-security affairs. 
Adoption of ICT is the underlying cause of 
cyber vulnerability.  
Unit heads implement municipal 
strategies. 
ICT unit communicates information  
security policies across the organisation. 
Collaboration on cyber-security amongst 
various departments takes place. 
Business units encourage their staff to 
attend seminars and breakfast sessions 
normally hosted by professional 
institutes. 
Management provides budget and 
prioritises skills development for 
employees working on information  
infrastructures. 
Composition of cyber-security steering 
committee is made up of senior 
management officials responsible for 
delivery of essential services . 
ICT is the core of information  
infrastructure. 
Senior management team has developed 
cyber-security steering committee. 
Cyber-security steering committee should 
develop cyber-security policy. 
External independent assessments are 
conducted on the security of information  
infrastructure assets. 
Units that have implemented PCS have 
established 24/7 computer networks 
monitoring centres. 
Formulate central point for addressing and 
coordinating cyber-security municipal-
wide. 
Various business units are conducting 
health checks on the information  
infrastructures. 
Office of the Auditor General conducts 
audits on information infrastructures . 
Investment on cyber-security 
projects/implementations is monitored and 
reported on. 
Municipality has formulated a technical 
working group on cyber-security whose 
composition includes both streams of 
ICT and PCS. 
The basis of business processes is to 
deliver services to the local citizens . 
 
Cyber-security policy encompasses all 
information infrastructures beyond IT unit. 
 







Figure 4.4: Formation of focused code: Integrated development cyber-security 
 






 Formulate municipal strategy 
(IDP) 
 Provide direction in the 
organisation 
 Provide leadership 
 Provide sponsorship 
 Steer the municipality to comply 
with laws and legislation 
 Drives organisational culture 
 Implement corporate governance 
as guided by industry best 
practices 
 Implement oversight committees  
 Set the tone 
 Set the right culture 
 Implement IDP 
 Setting oversight structures  
 Continuous reporting 
 Setting regulatory framework 
 
Day-to-day highest decision making is 
delegated to Exco. 
Municipal administration requires ICT 
support. 
Exco delegates policy development to 
the municipal manager. 
Municipal council is the highest 
decision-making body. 
Municipal Systems Act guides the 
implementation of performance 
management systems. 
Senior management has developed a 
portfolio responsible for strategic assets 
management. 
Municipality comprises various 
functional domains. 
Municipal manager leads the senior 
management team. 
Senior management has developed a 
supply chain management policy. 
Senior management has implemented  
risk management processes across the 
organisation. 
Water and sanitation is an essential 
service provided. 
Senior management team develops and 
continuously maintains strategic risk 
register. 
Municipal manager leads the municipal 
administration processes . 
MFMA guides the establishment of 
internal audit function. 
Expenditure is linked to the IDP which is 
reviewed annually. 
IDP is the service delivery framework in 
the municipality. 
Exco delegates policy development to 
the municipal manager. 
Infrastructures committee provides 
oversight on municipal infrastructure 
assets. 
Unit heads implement municipal 
strategies. 
Corporate governance is guided by the 
King IV report. 
Management of finances is guided by 
MFMA. 
Information infrastructures support 
business processes in pursuit of service 
delivery. 
Governance processes are executed by 
senior management team. 
 
Through IT governance processes, ICT 
has adopted industry best practices such 
as Cobit. 
Finance committee provides oversight 
on municipal finances. 
Municipal manager reports to Exco. Critical infrastructures are supported by 
information infrastructures . 
Audit committee provides oversight on 
the governance processes that 
management has implemented. 
Various business units develop and 
submit for approval their annual 






Figure 4.5: Formation of focused code: Cyber-security governance 
 






 Implement internal audit 
function as guided by MFMA 
 Conduct compliance audit 
 Focus audit plan on high risk 
areas 
 Audit function report to audit 
committee 
 Internal control deficiencies 
are communicated to 
management 
 Enforce alignment to IDP 
 Conduct assurance 
 Hold management accountable 
 Conduct risk assessments  
 Focus on high risk areas 
 Approve assurance plan 
 Assess internal controls  
 Evaluate risk mitigation 
strategies 
 Conduct compliance 
Office of the Auditor General conducts 
audit on information infrastructures . 
Audit committee approves the internal 
audit annual operational plan. 
Various business units conduct contingency 
plans testing. 
MFMA guides the establishment of 
internal audit function. 
Internal audit function provides 
assurance on the implementation of IT 
governance processes . 
Internal audit function provides assurance on 
the municipal performance information. 
Business units that own PCS deploy 
technologies to monitor, detect, and 
prevent unauthorised access to their 
computer networks. 
Audit committee provides oversight on 
the internal controls that management  
has implemented to mitigate the 
identified risks. 
Control weaknesses identified during the 
audit process are communicated to senior 
management for subsequent rectification of 
those controls. 
ICT unit deploys technologies to 
monitor, detect, and prevent 
unauthorised access to organisational 
computer networks. 
Audit committee provides oversight on 
the internal risk management processes 
that management has implemented. 
Audit committee provides oversight on the 
governance processes that management has 
implemented. 
Unit heads provide methodologies to 
safeguard organisational assets guided 
by pertinent policies, legislation and 
regulations. 
Senior management has implemented  
risk management processes across the 
organisation. 
Independent consultants are engaged to test 
compliance to pertinent IT laws and 
regulations. 
External independent assessments are 
conducted on the security of information  
infrastructure assets . 
Internal audit reports are communicated  
to the audit committee to maximis e 
accountability. 
Cyber-security steering committee approves 
cyber-security implementation plan. 
Unit heads are responsible for the 
functional/operations effectiveness of 
their business units . 
Audit committee approves the three year 
risk based rolling plan. 
Audit on IT system is conducted by internal 
audit unit. 
Various business units are conducting 
health checks on the information  
infrastructures. 
Unit heads develop and maintain their 
respective operational risk registers . 
Governance audits are conducted to assess 





Figure 4.6: Formation of focused code: Cyber-security assurance  
 




 Identify critical information 
infrastructure 
 Formulate information 
infrastructure catalogue 
 Implement asset management 
 Secure information 
infrastructure 
 Conduct risk assessment on 
information infrastructure 
 Adopt industry best practices 
in managing information 
infrastructure 
 Provide assurance on the 





Various business units provide essential 
services. 
Senior management has developed a 
portfolio responsible for strategic assets 
management. 
Critical infrastructures are supported by 
information infrastructures . 
Senior management has implemented  
risk management processes across the 
organisation. 
Unit heads provide methodologies to 
safeguard organisational assets guided 
by pertinent policies, legislation and 
regulations. 
Business units that own PCS have developed 
and implemented their infrastructure 
maintenance plans. 
Legal unit has identified relevant 
legislation and regulation pertaining to 
information infrastructures . 
ICT unit has developed and 
implemented IT assets maintenance 
plans. 
Management provides budget and prioritises 
skills development for employees working  
on information infrastructures . 
Various forms of infrastructure are other 
services provided. 
Cyber-security policy encompasses all 
information infrastructures beyond IT 
unit. 
Breach of security is  communicated to the 
process and information infrastructure 
owner. 
Employees’ ethical behaviour is one of 
the factors to consider when addressing 
protection of information infrastructure. 
Electricity SCADA system is an 
example of PCS. 
Various units adopt industry best practices to 
achieve consistent results on their business 
objectives. 
Access to information infrastructure is 
restricted to only authorised employees, 
consultants, and service providers . 
Various business units are conducting 
health checks on the information  
infrastructures. 
Supply chain management processes include 
vendor/supplier management practices . 
Municipality has formulated a technical 
working group on cyber-security whose 
composition includes both streams of 
ICT and PCS. 
ICT and the data therein are the 
underlying causes for cyber 
vulnerability. 
Remote access to organisational information  
infrastructure assets is controlled. 
 
 








 Deploy tools, technologies 
and methodologies to secure 
information infrastructure 
 Prepare for cyber-incidents 
 Monitor tools deployed to 
safeguard information 
infrastructure 
 Implement cyber-security 
policy 
 Allocate resources to protect 
information infrastructure 
 Promote knowledge 
generation on cyber-security 
 Protect information 
infrastructure assets  
 Detect vulnerabilities  
 Control access to 
information assets  
 Monitor user activities on 
information infrastructure 
 
Cyber-security policy encompasses all 
information infrastructures beyond ICT 
Unit. 
Cyber-security policy to extend from 
information security policy. 
Senior management has implemented risk 
management processes across the organisation 
Breach of security is communicated to 
the process and information  
infrastructure owner. 
Formulate central point for addressing 
and coordinating cyber-security 
municipal-wide. 
ICT unit plans/design corporate/organisational 
telecommunication networks. 
Access to information infrastructure is 
restricted to only authorised employees, 
consultants and service providers . 
ICT unit conducts continuous computer 
networks vulnerability assessments . 
Systems documentation including user 
manuals are developed and maintained. 
ICT unit has implemented network 
perimeter control on corporate 
networks. 
Uploading of software to the 
organisational information  
infrastructure is restricted to authorised 
employees. 
Various business units have implemented  
segregation of duties control. 
Software development methodology is 
prescribed for system testing before 
implemented to live environment. 
Remote access to organisational 
information infrastructure assets is 
controlled. 
ICT unit provides guidelines on the 
complexity of IT system users’ passwords . 
Operating systems default passwords 
are controlled. 
Collaboration on cyber-security 
amongst various departments takes 
place. 
Tertiary education institutions partner with  
various business unit on cyber-security related 
matters. 
Users are made time-out if there is 
inactivity for a specified amount of time 
in a session. 
ICT unit communicates the computer 
network statistics to various business 
unit heads. 
Disaster recovery plans for information  
infrastructures are continuously tested. 
Control weaknesses identified during 
the audit process are communicated to 
senior management for subsequent 
rectification of those controls . 
Unit head provides methodologies to 
safeguard organisational assets guided 
by pertinent policies, legislation, and 
regulations. 
ICT unit deploys technologies to monitor, 
detect and prevent unauthorised access to 
organisational computer networks . 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Formation of focused code: Implement cyber-security technical operations  
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Human Issues on Cyber-security 
 
 Encourage cyber-security 
knowledge management 
 Conduct user awareness 
 Conduct research and 
development 
 Provide systems user 
manual/guidelines 
 Promote staff ethical 
behaviour 





Employees’ ethical behaviour is one of 
the factors to consider when addressing 
protection of information infrastructure. 
Individually employees sign the Internet 
use policy. 
Access control processes include an 
authentication mechanism. 
Internet usage is monitored. Various business units are monitoring  
compliance with the acceptable use of 
information infrastructures . 
Systems documentations including user 
manual are developed and maintained. 
Individual employees are encouraged to 
attend relevant professional conferences 
in order to understand current trends on 
cyber-security. 
Individually employees sign the e-mail 
use policy. 
 
Commitment by employees to protect 
information infrastructures is essential. 
 
Conduct user awareness workshops . Comply with HR policies and 
procedures. 
Perform vetting exercise before confirming 
employment. 
Send employees to training and 
development. 
Conduct breakfast sessions to empower 
users and operators of information 
infrastructures. 
Conduct social engineering assessments . 
Promote affiliations to professional 
institutes. 
Conduct performance assessment in 
alignment with pertinent policy. 
Communicate cyber-security policy across 
all the employees. 
Include cyber-security on induction 
programmes. 
Before joining the employ of the 
municipality, employees are vetted in 
terms of qualifications and previous 
work experience. 
Various business units conduct skills 
development for their employees . 
 
Educate end-users on cyber-attacks, 
including social engineering. 
Access to information infrastructure is 
restricted to only authorised employees, 
consultants and service providers . 
Employees are made aware of the 
consequences on breach of cyber-security 
policy. 
Systems logs are generated and checked 
by responsible officials . 
Trustworthiness of employees working  
on information infrastructures is a 
serious consideration. 
Various business units encourage staff to get 
certified in their various occupations . 
 
Figure 4.9: Formation of focused code: Manage human issues on cyber-security  


























Category 2: Cyber-security Technical Operations 
Category 1: Cyber-security Governance 
Category 3: Human Issues in Cyber-security 
Category 4: Integrated Development Cyber-security 
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Category: Cyber-security governance memoing 
It is important to justify how certain codes were grouped to formulate codes. That 
justification was developed through the utilisation of memo writing. The King III report 
(2009) posits that good governance is about effective leadership that rises to challenges. 
Effective leadership provides direction in a business situation, defines strategy, and 
establishes the ethics and values to guide behaviour and practices within the organisat ion. 
The respondents identified governance as one of the critical success factors for effective 
implementation of cyber-security within the municipality. Through governance practices, 
senior management develops strategies and policies to ensure that the direction taken does 
activate the mandate and organisational objectives. The metropolitan municipalities have a 
mandate entrenched to the Constitution of the country. The core mandate of each 
municipality is to provide service delivery to the citizens. Delivery of services includes the 
provision of electricity (energy), water and sanitation, transportation and other essential 
government services. The municipality through governance processes must ensure that 
services that are essential for daily lives of the citizens are provided. Governance processes 
entail: 
 setting and steering strategic direction of the municipality; 
 providing oversight of the municipal strategy implementation;  
 approving policies to steer municipal strategy direction; and 
 ensuring accountability through reporting and disclosures. 
Municipal council is ultimately accountable for cyber-security governance. The day-to-day 
municipal governance processes have been delegated to Exco. The administration of the 
municipality is delegated to the City Manager. Governance processes set the tone and culture 
in the municipality. In ensuring that there is continuous delivery of these essential services, 
through governance processes, the municipality must ensure that strategies are put in place 
to safeguard the information infrastructures that these essential serves are dependent upon. 
Through effective governance processes, the municipality should develop a cyber-security 
strategy and policy that will guide the protection of information infrastructures within the 
municipality. Participant 3 said “Senior Management in the municipality must illustrate 
leadership in managing cyber security and model the behaviour expected of employees” . 
The same sentiments were echoed by Participant 7 who said “The senior management of the 
organization should establish a cyber-security policy which is appropriate to the 
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organization’s business objectives. The policy should define cyber-security objectives or a 
framework for setting the same”. Participant 10 contended that “Leadership and governance 
on cyber-security is critical for successful implementation of cyber-security strategy across 
the municipality”. Cyber-security governance provides an environment that is conducive to 
implement cyber-security and subsequently securing critical information infrastructures that 
are essential for service delivery. The activities that are undertaken in the cyber-security 
governance include the following:  
 Sponsoring cyber-security through providing of adequate funding. Participant 13 said 
“Executive management involvement must be clear in implementing cyber-security 
strategy”. 
 Setting effective oversight committees to monitor cyber-security implementat ion. 
Participant 6 emphasised that “At a governance level, an oversight committee must be 
implemented to impose accountability and reporting on cyber-security. This 
accountability would strengthen the protection of information infrastructures against 
cyber threats”. 
 Fostering cyber-security accountability through continuous reporting. Participant 25 
said “Other governance processes are continuously reported on at various structures 
in the municipality. These processes include Financial Reporting, Disclosures, 
Performance Information, etc.” 
 Formulating and supporting effective guardian of governance processes. Participant 4 
said “Internal audit must operate according to the prescripts of MFMA, and industry 
best practices such as King IV report on corporate governance. Internal Audit annual 
operational plan must include all types of audits based on the high risk areas”.  
 Formulating and supporting enterprise-wide risk management processes. Participant 
10 said “The risks associated with cyber-security are colossus and therefore the 
treatment for cyber-security risks must be dealt with at a very high level of the 
Municipality. Cyber-security risk is a municipal strategic risk which affects business 
continuity”.  
 Formulating and supporting the Municipal Integrated Development Plan (IDP) to 
which the cyber-security strategy is aligned. Participant 18 said “Executive 
Management must develop municipal’s ability to secure information infrastructures 
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that are relevant to achieve strategic objectives which is the IDP. The ability to protect 
information infrastructure improves cyber incident response, cyber crisis 
management, redundancy, and enhance critical infrastructure protection resilience”.  
Generally corporate governance refers to the system by which an organisation’s processes 
are directed and controlled, in the pursuit of achieving business objectives. If the 
municipality is paying attention to safeguard stakeholders’ interests which is the core of 
corporate governance, then cyber-security must be part of the focus areas in corporate 
governance processes. 
Category: Integrated development cyber-security memoing 
Cyber threats are a serious concern to municipal authorities and hence they cannot be left to 
an individual person or a single business unit within the organisation. Cyber-security impacts 
almost every business unit in the municipality. The interconnectedness of information 
infrastructures warrants that every business unit that forms part of the interconnectedness be 
part of the team to deal with cyber-security. The risks associated with cyber-security are 
huge and could have devastating consequences should they materialise. Cyber-security risks 
are highly likely to happen and the possible impact could include non-delivery of essential 
services to the citizens. The municipality monitors and controls some service delivery 
processes through the industrial control systems (ICS) which often reside inside critical 
infrastructures like power plants, power grids, and water distribution. These ICS use ICT in 
order to function as intended. Due to inter-dependencies amongst systems, failures of ICS 
have a cascading impact in other systems. Participant 3 said “The municipality should 
implement a long-term plan for cyber-security”. Cyber-security strategy is an important 
element in addressing the cyber-security challenges in the municipality.  
The intention of this research was to assess the cyber-security status in the metropolitan 
municipalities. An assessment was conducted through benchmarking against a given 
yardstick. A strategy is one of the yardsticks to assess how far the organisation has gone 
towards reaching the intended destination as outlined in the strategy document. Participant 
10 confirmed the essential role of cyber-security strategy in the organisation when he said 
“In order to report on cyber-security, we shall need to devise and implement cyber-security 
strategy from which to develop targets that should be reported on continuously”. Cyber-
security policy cannot be separated from the associated cyber-security strategy. Cyber-
security policy present guidelines on what must be done and not done to achieve the 
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organisational endeavours to implement a cyber-security strategy. Cyber-security policy 
must, amongst other things, explicitly specify what information infrastructures have to be 
protected and against which threats. Cyber-security policy offers recommendations on the 
roles and responsibilities in implementing cyber-security strategy. Participant 6 said “Cyber-
security status can only be measured if there is a cyber-security policy in the municipality”. 
Participant 17 concurs this view when saying “Cyber-security strategy and cyber-security 
policy should be developed, implemented, and published for implementation in the 
municipality. Once implemented, they will be used as a benchmark to test compliance 
against”.  
Due to the interconnectedness of information infrastructures in the municipality, it is 
essential to establish a central point to coordinate and facilitate measures to safeguard 
information infrastructures from various cyber-threats. The central point will offer coherent 
synergy among all stakeholders in pursuit of secure, safe, and resilient information 
infrastructure for municipal critical sectors. The central point is a nerve centre that seeks to 
integrate common industry best practices/controls that are universal to all the information 
infrastructures. Each sector within the municipality, however, will advance their own best 
practices for the protection of their respective information infrastructures. The nerve centre 
will advise the management of the critical sectors about the manpower, infrastructure, skills, 
and strategies required to advance the protection of their respective critical information 
infrastructures. The controls to protect information infrastructures will be updated 
occasionally by the nerve centre to keep in tune with emerging technologies and related 
protocols. The programme will consult and collaborate with all the stakeholders through 
workshops, feedbacks, discussions, trainings, and regular interactions. The nerve centre will 
consult domain experts on the continuous protection of information infrastructure. The 
cyber-security central point aims to conduct and pursue measures, including raising 
information security awareness and conducting cyber-security associated research and 
development for the protection of the information infrastructure in the municipality. The 
activities that are undertaken in this domain include the following: 
 Planning and delivering municipal cyber-security policy and strategy that are aligned 
to the municipal IDP. Participant 14 said “Cyber-security strategy is crucial to 
mainstreaming cyber-security programme across the Municipality because it helps 
prioritise cyber-security as an important policy area. Cyber-security strategy and 
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policy determines responsibilities and mandates of cyber-security programme, and 
guides provision of resources to the emerging and existing cyber-security issues and 
priorities”. Participant 1 said “In order to successfully implement cyber-security in the 
municipality setting, there must be an existence of an overarching programme for 
cybersecurity coordination, including a coordinating body with a consolidated 
budget”. Participant 19 said “Municipal cyber-security strategy content must explicitly 
link municipal risks, priorities, and objectives such as critical information 
infrastructure protection, and cyber incident response capacity”. 
 Encouraging cyber-security knowledge across the municipality. Participant 2 said 
“The municipality must implement minimum competencies applicable to all businesses 
units that operate information infrastructures. Minimum competencies includes 
qualifications, certifications, and awareness of cyber threats”. 
 Rolling out and prioritising resources to implement cyber-security strategy across all 
the municipal units. Participant 21 said “There must be an existence of a designated 
structure or unit within the Municipality that is responsible for cyber-security 
mitigation strategies which include detection, prevention, and prepare for contingency 
situations”. 
 Building municipal-wide cyber-security capacity. Participant 6 said “The municipality 
must implement centrally managed effective widespread use of cyber-security 
technology to protect municipal information infrastructure. This centralised approach 
will encourage the implementation of cyber-security standards and good practices”. 
Participant 12 confirmed this view when saying “There is a need to build cyber-
security capacity starting from information infrastructure procurement procedures to 
software development processes”. 
 Assessing cyber-security status in the municipality. Participant 9 said “The cyber-
security nerve centre must assess the status of cyber-security to subsequently enhance 
the safeguarding of municipal critical information infrastructures. Cyber-security 
various stakeholders within the municipality must be assessed on their roles and 
responsibilities executed to implement or sustain cyber-security. The role of Executive 
Management, departments, and other actors must be constantly assessed to identify 
the gaps in the protection of information infrastructures”. 
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 Setting of standards and technologies to secure information infrastructures. Participant 
13 said “There must be a cyber-security framework that is built around industry best 
practices, and must include governance controls, technical security controls” 
Participant 20 also says “A function within the municipality must prescribe the 
adoption of industry best standards. There must be collaborative work through risk 
management practises to minimise the impact and likelihood of cyber-security 
threats”. 
The Municipal Systems Act put IDP at the centre in entrenching principles for local 
government development. Cyber-security is key to service delivery because the 
interconnectedness of ICT and PCS support the delivery of services as recorded in the IDP. 
Embedding cyber-security in the IDP is intended to formalise and elevate cyber-security 
processes so that they are given priority and commitment from all key stakeholders within 
the municipality. 
Category: Cyber-security technical operations memoing 
The core mandates of a metropolitan municipality are to provide service delivery to the 
people in the jurisdiction of the municipality. There are essential services provided by the 
municipality to the citizens and these include electricity and clean water. For the 
municipality to survive, there must be proper administrative support provided. There are 
mission critical computer systems that support the day-to-day running of the municipality. 
In order for the municipality to provide essential services, it must be able to collect rates and 
other monies due to it.  
Electricity distribution and water distribution by the municipality are dependent on ‘smart 
systems’ such as industrial control systems such as a SCADA system. These ‘smart systems’ 
exist in cyberspace because they are operated remotely through the use of intelligent devices 
such as computers, servers, sensors, networks and related software. Therefore, all the ‘smart 
system’ components are critical information infrastructures. These critical infrastructures 
operate or work with information – hence they are called critical information infrastructures.  
Essential services are referred to as critical services, and the infrastructures that support these 
critical services are referred to as critical infrastructures. The information infrastructures 
supporting the essential/critical services are known as critical information infrastructures. 
Critical information infrastructures include computer networks, servers, software, computer 
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applications, technologies and hardware, all which support the critical infrastructures in the 
municipality. CIIs are largely impacted by cyber-security. CIIs are those computer-related 
assets the incapacitation or destruction of which, shall have devastating influence on 
municipal well-being, security, the economy, public health or safety. Therefore in order to 
provide the needed cyber-security to CIIs, the municipality needs to know what IIs it has. It 
becomes important that the municipality develops an inventory or a register of all 
information infrastructures.  
Through a holistic approach, each information infrastructure custodian should take all 
necessary measures to facilitate protection of IIs, and this can be achieved through coherent 
coordination, synergy and raising information security awareness among all stakeholders. It 
is at this level where IIs are safeguarded from unauthorised access, modification, use, 
disclosure, disruption, incapacitation or destruction. The implementation of the protection 
controls has largely been driven by the availability of an approved information security 
policy and IT governance model employed by the ICT unit. Participants in this study 
highlighted that technologies such as firewalls, anti-virus tools and access controls (both 
logical and physical) have already been implemented in their areas. However, these 
technologies have been implemented in a siloed approach and hence there is no proper 
coordination of implemented activities to address the cyber-security challenges.  
  












Figure 4.11: Linking critical information infrastructures to critical infrastructures 
 
The entirety of inter-connected intelligent devices, computers and networks, and the 
essential information flowing through them is termed information infrastructure. ICS are 
part of the information infrastructure family as they use intelligent devices through 
telecommunication services to control and monitor the industrial processes. Security 
incidents in information infrastructures are mainly due to a mixture of technological and 
organisational weaknesses. The information infrastructure that supports critical munic ipa l 
processes becomes a critical information infrastructure purely because the critical 
infrastructures it supports are essential for the well-being of people and the munic ipa l 
economic prosperity. Information infrastructures have become vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
They are susceptible to threats exploiting software vulnerabilities such as operating systems, 
protocol implementation, and application. Information infrastructure requires protection 
from disruption; unauthorised modification, disclosure, access, and use. Various controls are 
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Cyber-security operations are the activities performed in order to protect information 
infrastructures from cyber-ills, and or to limit the impact should cyber-attack take place. 
These activities include: implementation of information security policy, controlling access 
to information infrastructure, user identification and authentication, controlling and 
monitoring systems administrators’ privileges, implementing cyber-security incidents’ 
response procedures, implementing network perimeter protection, conducting network 
vulnerability and penetration testing, implementation of information infrastruc ture 
maintenance plans, preparing for contingencies, implementation of assets and inventory 
management, security certifications, adoption of industry best practices, disposal of 
information infrastructure, vendor security and outsourcing, network device protection, 
hardware and software hardening, hardware and software testing, conducting of periodic 
audits (for assurance), implementing mechanisms for data/information protection, 
implementing physical security to information infrastructure, and conducting risk 
assessments. Protection of information infrastructures against cyber ills include s deploying 
technologies, tools and methodologies in pursuit of securing the assets.  
Participant 7 said “Cyber security program should provide the required confidentiality, 
integrity and availability (CIA) protection to the information assets of the organization”. 
Participant 20 said “Municipality must strengthen capacity to detect, and defend against 
cyber-attacks. Both technical security controls and human must be deployed to secure 
information infrastructures”. 
Category: Human issues in cyber-security implementation 
The first line of defence against cyber-attacks is well-trained staff. Cyber-security awareness 
and pertinent training assist in the reduction of cyber-security breaches and the related 
possibility by providing well-intentioned staff with the knowledge to avoid becoming 
inadvertent attack vectors for instance by unintentionally downloading malware. It becomes 
essential that the municipality establishes and maintains a cyber-security awareness 
programme that is robust to ensure that information infrastructure users are alert and 
responsive to the importance of guarding sensitive information and the risks that are 
associated with it. Cyber-security operations go hand in hand with user management. 
Operations address the technical components of cyber-security implementation. User 
management on the other side addresses soft issues on cyber-security implementa t ion 
including user awareness campaigns. In as much as the municipality has invested heavily in 
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technical controls to protect its computer systems and data, most of these controls can be 
rendered useless when staff lack cyber-security awareness training.  
Municipal staff members have access to internet and online activities. This exposure to the 
Internet significantly increases cyber-related risks to the organisation. Some of the activit ies 
performed by employees that are considered to be risky include not protecting sensitive 
information stored on, or transmitted from, their computers, and opening suspicious e-mails. 
User management initiatives include coordinated/facilitated sessions with the employees 
about good cyber-security practices. Through these awareness sessions, it is anticipated that 
employees will understand that they play a crucial role in safeguarding the organisation’s 
information infrastructure assets. Activities conducted in this category include the following: 
 Educating information infrastructure users on cyber-threats. Participant 21 said “While 
understanding the technological approaches including hacking tools and defence in 
depth are important countermeasure mechanisms, a cultural approach is necessary to 
control the human element which makes the selected technological approach a viable 
measure”.  
 Informing users of their responsibilities to safeguard information infrastructures. 
Participant 26 said “All users should receive regular refresher training on cyber-
security, information and human security risks relevant to their particular sectors’ 
information assets” Participant 2 echoed this sentiment when saying “Employees must 
sign consent on the acceptable use of organisational applications and related 
information. Before each employee is granted access to computer system, the employee 
must acknowledge read and understood security requirements and compliance 
thereof”. 
 Training employees who provide technical skills on protecting information 
infrastructures. Participant 29 said “Employees that support or operate information 
infrastructure are appropriately trained to ensure that Municipal information assets 
are always confidential, there is information integrity, and information is always 
available when required to authorised users”. Participant 31 confirmed this view when 
saying “Industry specific certifications are essential when supporting information 
infrastructure and related facilities. Security personnel be certified information 
security managers, Network practitioners / specialist must be certified network 
engineers”. 
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 Providing continuous skills development to enhance protection of information assets. 
Participant 23 said “Employees must know current trends on how to operate and 
protect information assets. Employees must be members of professional bodies, and to 
sustain their membership, they must continuously attend to relevant conferences and 
various sessions organised by the professional bodies”. Participant 25 said “Individual 
performance assessments are conducted with the aim of enhancing skills development 
to strengthen safeguarding of information assets”. 
 Enforce cyber-security policies at an individual level. Participant 11 said “The 
municipality must constantly conduct compulsory information sharing sessions with 
the users to refresh them on cyber-security policy. These compulsory session must be 
conducted during on-boarding of employees, and on an annual basis at a minimum”. 
 Inculcate cyber-security culture, through enforcement, monitoring, and evaluation.  
Participant 1 said “Access to information infrastructure is controlled even to legitimate 
users. Activities of legitimate users are recorded to keep the logs of events, and users 
are made aware when granted access to information assets” Participant 4 said 
“Management continuously monitor network activities in order to detect and prevent 
illicit activities to gain access to information assets” Participant 24 said “There are 
various types of ICT audits that are conducted to evaluate the adequacy and 
effectiveness of controls implemented to secure information infrastructures”. 
 Punishing cyber-security breaches and violations. Participant 8 said “Management 
monitor activities on information infrastructures. The intention of monitoring is to 
ensure that network users continuously operate within the ambits of the Municipal 
information security policy. The details of the users that are found to be transgressing 
the policy are communicated to the owner of relevant information assets impacted by 
the transgression”. 
This category is mainly responsible for driving a cyber-security culture through the 
understanding of cyber-related risks in the municipality. Activities in this category involve 
complying with the Protection of Personal Information Act. This category enforces users’ 
understanding of personal information protection online. Through this category, cyber-
security is prioritised and embedded in the values, attitudes, and practices of the users across 
the municipality. This category encourages a cyber-security mindset which fosters attitudes, 
values, habits and practices of employees individually, and other actors in the cyber-security 
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ecosystem that increase the resilience of users to cyber. Reporting of cyber-security breaches 
is encouraged through this category. It is through this category where users of the Internet 
are prepared with the capability to identify non-legitimate websites (including impersonation 
attempts), and have a sense of control over providing personal information online. Individua l 
employees are provided with the ability to assess the risk in using information infrastruc ture 
services, including the cyber-security environment and constantly adjust their behaviour 
based on their assessment. 

















Figure 4.12: Linking of focused codes  
 
The researcher recognised the need for a representation of the interrelationships between 
categories that would aid the development of theoretical explanations, and subsequently 
adopted the conditional relationship guide developed by Scott (2004). The conditiona l 
relationship by Scott (2004) suggests building a matrix to understand the relationship among 
categories by asking investigative questions of what, who, when, where, how, and with what 
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result of consequence (Scott, 2004). The researcher adopted the conditional relationship 
matrix guide as described in the following table. 
Table 4.10: Relationship matrix 
“What is the category?” 
“Who impacts on the category?” 
“When does the category occur?” 
“Where does the category occur?” 
“Why does the category occur?” 
“How does the category occur?” 
“With what consequence does the category occur or is the category understood?” 
 
Core category: Integrated development cyber-security  
This category ensures that singular municipal cyber-security posture exists, and is a 
designated municipal body to disseminate and consolidate feedback on the cyber-security 
strategy across the municipality to constantly improve the municipal cyber-security posture. 
Guided by the changing risk assessments, the programme will have the ability to reassign 
tasks and budgets dynamically. The three categories of cyber-security governance, cyber-
security technical operations, and cyber-security human issues are all linked to the integrated 
development cyber-security category. The core category is the centre for the munic ipa l 
cyber-security capacity through the formulation and delivery of the cyber-security strategy. 
This category enhances municipal cyber-security resilience through input from governance, 
technical operations, and management of human issues.  
What is the category about? 
The category is about consolidating the efforts implemented for cyber-security. It ensures 
that the municipal cyber-security strategy is linked explicitly and directly to munic ipa l 
objectives, risks, priorities, as well as the development agenda of the municipality. This 
category seeks to align the cyber-security strategy to municipal integrated development. 
Cyber-security supports the municipal mandate of service delivery. In the municipa lity 
context, allocation of resources to implement municipal development programmes is aligned 
to the service delivery budget implementation plan. The allocation of financial resources to 
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support cyber-security implementation is linked to the service delivery budget 
implementation programme. IDP is a strategic plan for the municipality and hence aligning 
cyber-security to the strategic plan invites the attention of the executive management of the 
organisation. Senior management sets the tone at the top regarding organisational culture. 
Positive cyber-security culture at the executive management level filters down to cyber-
security technical operations, and cyber-security human issues.  
How does this category achieve what it does? 
The category can achieve to be the cyber-security nerve centre through proactive, frequent 
revision and improvement of the municipal cyber-security strategy to adapt to the ever 
changing technology environments and threats. The municipal cyber-security strategic plan 
must align with municipal strategic priorities, drive investment in security, and drive 
capacity building for securing information infrastructures. The cyber-security programme 
performs monitoring processes, collects measurements and relevant metrics and data with 
the aim of determining trends to inform a decision-making process. At the centre of cyber-
security, the strategy should be to raise awareness, mitigate cyber-risks, establish and sustain 
cyber-incident response competence and safeguard critical infrastructures.  
The alignment is achieved through the involvement and commitment of executive 
management. Senior management provides leadership in the organisation. Executive 
management leads the entire organisation, not just the business unit. Risk management’s 
approach to service delivery is one of the key drivers that aligns cyber-security to the IDP 
(strategic plan). ICT and other information infrastructures support the delivery of services to 
the municipal community. Cyber-risks have the potential to interrupt the provision of service 
delivery due to the interconnectedness of the service delivery infrastructure to information 
infrastructures. Information infrastructures are susceptible to cyber-risks. Cyber-security as 
a mitigating action to cyber-risks enhances the possibilities of uninterrupted service delivery 
to the municipal citizens. Cyber-security is an enabler of efficient municipal service delivery. 
Who are the role players in this category? 
The role players in this category include the executive management members who are the 
custodians of information infrastructures and those that their critical infrastructure depend 
on the information infrastructure By default, the ICT unit is a member and key role player. 
Executive management is responsible to implement governance processes in the 
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municipality. By virtue of being part of the executive management, business unit heads are 
also role players. Business unit heads drive the implementation of the IDP, and subsequently 
the technical implementation of the cyber-security operations.  
When does the category take place? 
Integrated cyber-security takes place during the strategy-setting process in the municipality. 
This category is a risk mitigation action against continuity of service delivery risk. As an 
enabler to service delivery and municipal administration processes, ICT and information 
infrastructures must be protected against cyber ills. This category also takes place during 
cyber-security technical implementation at various business units.  
Where does the category occur? 
This category takes place across the organisation; however, it promotes a central point that 
is responsible to coordinate the cyber-security efforts. Through the implementation of the 
tools and technologies to protect organisational information assets, this category also takes 
place at business unit level across the impacted functional areas in the municipality. Through 
the use of IT systems, users at all levels in the municipality are impacted because they have 
an obligation to safeguard organisational assets including information and technology assets. 
User awareness and education take place at an individual level across the municipality. 
Why does the category occur? 
This category occurs to align cyber-security to the organisational strategic framework which 
is the IDP. The alignment focuses on key initiatives, projects, and strategic programmes that 
achieve the legislated municipal mandate. The alignment also links cyber-security to the 
municipal performance management tools and budget. The alignment forms the basis for 
cyber-security monitoring and evaluation. The integrated development cyber-security 
category does not only focus on what the cyber-security programme does to safeguard 
information infrastructure, but also how the cyber-security programme’s activities are 
planned and implemented municipal-wide. Integrated development cyber-security is an 
instrument for the integration and coordination of cyber-security planning, implementat ion, 
and monitoring.  
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What are the consequences of implementing this category? 
Vulnerabilities and cyber-security requirements in critical infrastructure supply chains are 
evidently recognised, recorded and managed. The consequences of implementing this 
category are: creation of effective integrated-cyber-security strategy and policy; deliver ing 
municipal-wide defence and resilience competency; maintaining the benefits of a cyberspace 
vital for the municipality; and centralised management and coordination of cyber-security 
efforts. Integrated development of cyber-security ensures that the developed cyber-security 
strategy and policy cover all the relevant functional areas within the municipality. The basis 
to allocate cyber-security resources to cyber-security implementation mechanisms is 
transparent as it is aligned to IDP. The category enhances consistency in the implementa t ion 
of cyber-security across the municipality as the various business units are involved. 
Integrated cyber-security strengthens coordinated efforts in addressing cyber-security 
challenges. It provides a centralised hub for cyber-security knowledge. This category 
enhances the critical infrastructure protection competencies. 
Cyber-security governance category 
What is this category about? 
This category is about providing leadership and governance in the municipality. This is 
achieved through strategy and policy development. The category provides the road map to 
implement strategies to achieve the municipal mandates of service delivery. Managing 
cyber-risks is one of the mechanisms employed to enhance the achievement of service 
delivery. 
How does this category achieve governance? 
This category is achieved through the adoption of industry best practices such as the King 
IV report on corporate governance. Also, compliance with regulations is essential to achieve 
cyber-security governance. There are various committees established to participate and 
enhance governance. The committees ensure oversight on cyber-security implementa t ion 
initiatives. An audit committee is formulated in compliance with MFMA. The audit 
committee provides assurance of the internal control, risk management processes, and 
governance implemented in pursuit of organisational objectives. Strategy formulation and 
setting direction through policy development contribute significantly to cyber-security 
implementation across the municipality. 
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Who are the role players in this category? 
Executive management members are the key role players as governance processes are their 
core functions and obligations. Various municipal committees also provide oversight in the 
implementation of cyber-security. These committees include Exco, and the audit committee 
and portfolio committee for municipal infrastructure. The audit committee holds 
management to account for the control weakness identified. The infrastructure committee 
ensures that service delivery is not disrupted. This is achieved through the monitoring of the 
support processes supporting the service delivery infrastructures. The monitoring is through 
risk management practices.  
When does the category take place? 
Cyber-security governance is a continuous process as it is part of corporate governance. The 
activities that are reported to executive management and various portfolios are normally 
reported quarterly. For example, the audit committee reports to Exco quarterly. This category 
takes place when reporting on cyber-security takes place. Reporting can be driven by the 
audit committee’s reports, portfolio committee’s reports, cyber-security steering 
committee’s reports, etc. During the processes of assessing strategic risks, the cyber-security 
governance process is embedded in the strategic risk management process.  
Where does the category occur? 
Cyber-security governance processes take place at an executive level in the municipality. 
The cyber-security strategy and policy development occur at the organisational leadership 
level. At strategic level, the integration, coordination, and alignment of various strategies 
take place. 
Why does the category occur? 
This category occurs to provide the direction that the organisation takes on implementing 
the cyber-security programme. The category provides leadership, and epitomises the cyber-
security programme to the municipal IDP. The allocation of resources to support the cyber-
security programme is decided at this level (category). This category takes place to elevate 
cyber-security to an executive management level for sponsorship and related support.  
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What are the consequences of implementing this category? 
Implementing cyber-security governance leads to coordinated efforts is dealing with cyber-
risks. The executive management team is responsible for organisational strategy and policy 
development. The cyber-security strategy and policy provide the direction that the 
organisation takes to address cyber-risk. Cyber-security governance strengthens the efforts 
made to protect the municipal information infrastructure. The involvement of the executive 
management team promotes opportunity for alignment between the municipal IDP and 
cyber-security strategy. This category is responsible for providing funding, i.e. allocation of 
resources to cyber-security implementation. Cyber-security governance provides an 
enabling environment for all other categories to take place.  
Cyber-security technical operations category 
What is this category about? 
It is about implementing the municipal cyber-security strategy guided by the policy. Strategy 
and policy are developed by the cyber-security governance team (executive management). 
This category is about deploying tools and technologies to safeguard the organisationa l 
information infrastructure against cyber-risks. The cyber-security operational team ensures 
that service delivery takes place by protecting the critical information infrastructures. 
How does this category achieve its objective?  
There are interdependencies in the information infrastructure environment, and this 
interconnectedness has strategic effects on the well-being of the municipality. Collapse or 
destruction of information infrastructures has serious consequences. Attack on II could lead 
to blocking or disrupting the municipality communication, impede the circulation and 
distribution of energy/electricity, water, and other important services delivered by the 
municipality. Driven by risk management processes, various business units ensure protection 
of the information infrastructure against cyber-risks. The protection mechanisms include the 
utilisation of industry best practices to monitor, detect, and prevent illicit activities in the 
computer networks. Industry best practices such as Cobit are used to guide implementa t ion 
of IT governance which is an important proponent of cyber-security. The mechanisms that 
are implemented to safeguard information infrastructures include access controls (physica l 
and logical) network protection tools and technologies, IT asset management, risk 
management, business continuity, networks vulnerability assessments, etc.  
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Who are the role players in this category? 
Various business units and functional groups are key role players to effect the protection of 
information infrastructures. Custodians of information infrastructures are the ones who 
ensure that their assets are protected and functional to achieve the objectives of the 
municipality. The role players are groups/departments who depend on information 
infrastructures to deliver services. Assurance providers also participate in this category as 
they test if the controls implemented to protect ICT assets are functioning as intended by 
management.  
When does the category take place? 
Cyber-security technical operations take place on a day-to-day basis. Information 
infrastructure assets need protection 24/7. Cyber-security technical operations implement 
processes that aim to continuously safeguard IT assets across the municipality.  
Where does the category occur? 
This category occurs at business unit level (groups, departments). The actual deployment of 
technologies to protect information infrastructure assets thus takes place at business unit 
level. ICT is the custodian of information security in the municipality. HR is the custodian 
of human resources and development programmes. Various business units who are the 
custodians of service delivery processes such as electricity and water are involved. These 
business units facilitate the implementation of cyber-security programme in their respective 
functional areas. 
Why does the category occur? 
The category occurs to deploy the technologies and tools to protect the organisationa l 
information infrastructure against cyber-threats. Information infrastructures support other 
infrastructures in the municipality. This category therefore occurs to ensure that there is 
uninterrupted support provided by information infrastructures to those other critical 
infrastructures. This category supports and protects the interconnectedness of information 
infrastructures. 
What are the consequences of implementing this category? 
Cyber-security operations implement controls to safeguard information infrastructure assets 
in the municipality. Uninterrupted service delivery is achieved because protection of support 
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systems, such as information infrastructures is provided. Critical information infrastructures 
are identified. Protection of information infrastructures is commensurate with the priority of 
services supported by the infrastructure. Compliance with relevant legislation and 
regulations is achieved.  
Human issues in cyber-security category 
What is this category about? 
The first line of defence against cyber-attacks is well-trained staff. Cyber-security awareness 
and pertinent training assist in the reduction of cyber-security breaches and any related 
possibility by providing well-intentioned staff with the knowledge to avoid becoming 
inadvertent attack vectors.  
How does this category achieve its objectives? 
To protect information infrastructure, employees need to know the use and value of the 
infrastructure being operated. The employees need to understand the cyber-risks, and their 
potential impact on the functioning of the information infrastructure being used, and the 
organisational impact should the risk materialise. User awareness and education mechanisms 
are important in this category. Individual performance management processes are key to 
ensure that employees are performing as expected, and that they possess the requisite skills 
and capacity to protect organisational information infrastructure assets. Skills development 
is aligned to the strategic objectives of the municipality. 
Who are the role players in this category? 
The role players are the individual employees. Each employee has an obligation to safeguard 
organisational assets. Through the performance assessment process, management 
determines the capacity of each employee to protect information infrastructure assets. 
Management also plays a role in providing the needed resources to achieve skills 
development, education, and awareness campaigns. Various business units such as human 
resources, ICT, and internal audit have roles to play. 
When does the category take place? 
User and employee activities take place on a day-to-day basis. User awareness is driven by 
the ICT department, and the custodians of the information infrastructure assets. User 
awareness also takes place during new employees’ induction process and the HR department 
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gets involved. When conducting employee performance assessments, skills gaps are 
identified and training is provided based on the gaps identified.  
Where does the category occur? 
This category takes place at an individual level across the organisation. Each employee 
working on protecting the information infrastructure is provided with appropriate skills to 
execute the protection function competently. Users of information infrastructures are 
sensitised and educated on the risk associated with cyber environment. The enforcement of 
the cyber-security policy takes place in this category. Individual user activities on 
information infrastructure are logged and monitored. Where a user has violated the security 
policy, they face punitive measures. 
Why does the category occur? 
This category occurs to ensure that individual employees are competent to handle and protect 
organisational information infrastructure assets. Users are made aware of cyber-security 
risks. Users are educated in the “do’s and don’ts” when working on municipal information 
infrastructure. Skills and capacity to execute information infrastructure safeguarding duties 
are continuously upgraded to move with current trends on cyber-security. 
What are the consequences of implementing this category? 
Cyber-aware employees strengthen the protection of IT assets against cyber-risks. An 
employee with appropriate skills who supports the information infrastructure enhances the 
protection of information infrastructures. Skills development is directed because it is based 
on an individual performance assessment exercise. Cyber-security implementation becomes 
successful if everyone who works with information infrastructure is able to play a role in 
protecting information assets against cyber-risks.  
4.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter 4 provided a background on the research site which is eThekwini Metropolitan 
Municipality. This municipality is the only Category A Municipality in the province of KZN. 
The rationale for selecting this municipality was provided. The process followed to conduct 
the empirical study was discussed. Research ethical clearance was obtained from the UKZN 
research office before the empirical study could be initiated. Semi-structured interview 
questions were developed and discussed. ConGTM processes to analyse the data were 
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presented. The researcher followed the data collection and analysis process based on the 
ConGTM. Data collection took place at the same time as data analysis. Comprehensive 
interviews were conducted with the participants who were purposively selected based on the 
research objectives. Interviews were transcribed and initial codes were formulated. Through 
the memoing process, the initial codes were analysed further and focused codes were 
developed. Focused codes were further analysed through the memo-writing process. 
Theoretical coding took place following the focused coding process. Focused codes were 
theoretically linked together through a memoing process and conditional relationship as 
developed by Scott (2004).  
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CHAPTER 5  
THE EMERGENT THEORY 
5.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 discusses the process of the theory of integrated development cyber-security 
emergent. Table 5.1 presents the structure of this chapter. 
Table 5.1: Structure of Chapter 5 
 Topic Overview 
5.1 Chapter introduction Presents chapter outline. 
5.2 How the theory emerged Discusses how ConGTM was used to develop the 
theory. 
5.3 The dependent construct Discusses the theory main construct. 
5.4 The independent constructs  Discusses the theory secondary constructs. 
5.5 Chapter summary Presents highlights on sections covered in the 
chapter. 
 
5.2. HOW THE THEORY EMERGED 
ConGTM was adopted to conduct the research. Through semi-structured interviews, data 
was collected and in parallel analysed. Two coding processes were followed and these were 
initial coding and focused coding. In between these two coding processes, there was a memo -
writing process in which data was analysed and context provided for such analysis. After the 
two coding processes, theoretical coding started and the focused codes were linked together 
into a coherent unit. The researcher was an active participant during the data collection 
process. The researcher was able to apply his mind to interpret and put into proper context 
some of the responses that were provided by the participants. Figure 5.1 presents the steps 
the researcher undertook to develop the theory of integrated development cyber-security.  
It is important to highlight that the research main objective was to determine the cyber-
security status of metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. The GT study was conducted 
to determine how cyber-security can be assessed.  
 
 





























Figure 5.1: Process in which the theory was developed 
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collected was in a narrative form that warranted comprehensive interrogation by the 
researcher. The narratives did not provide answers at face value. The researcher had to 
carefully apply the ConGTM to analyse the data.  
The research participants provided narrative responses to semi-structured interview 
questions, and such narratives for example included that from Participant 3 “Appropriate 
Senior Management involvement in the Municipality cyber-security initiatives provides the 
enabling environment for all other cyber-related activities”. Another example was from 
Participant 11 “The composition of cyber-security committee includes all senior 
management team who are responsible for the delivery of essential services to the citizens. 
These managers have authority to commit organisational resources in cyber-security 
implementation”. These narratives, together with others, put forward the account that actions 
are needed to form the basis, and motivate and strengthen the safeguarding of munic ipa l 
information infrastructure from cyber-security threats. The narratives by the participants did 
not immediately reveal that Integrated development cyber-security is the cornerstone for 
successful cyber-security implementation in the municipality. The researcher was able to 
identify from the participants’ responses that four focus areas were key to assess the cyber-
security status holistically across the municipality. 
Through the memoing processes, the researcher interrogated the data to determine what 
kinds of questions needed to be posed to subsequent participants’ interviews. At some point 
during the data analysis process, the researcher reached a point when participants kept 
revealing similar sentiments, and that was when data saturation occurred. Guided by the 
research objectives, when data saturation materialised, the research ceased to collect data 
since latent meanings had been unearthed from the data already collected. 
Theoretical coding linked various codes in as logical way possible. This linking of different 
codes was made possible by memoing processes at various stages of data collection and the 
analysis phases. Various memos exposed the low level of descriptive data such as that from 
Participant 14 “Cyber-security processes are conducted in a siloed fashion. People from 
process control automation believe their systems are secured because their 
telecommunication networks are isolated from the corporate computer networks”. Similar 
narratives were observed from Participant 17 who said “Most employees believe cyber-
security belongs to IT unit, forgetting that everyone has a role to play. Some municipal 
business systems are used by almost every employees, such as e-mail system, and internet. 
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These users are not from IT Unit but across different functional areas within the 
Municipality”. Through data analysis processes, the researcher could extract the meaning 
attached to solve the issues highlighted by these narratives to mean Integrated development 
cyber-security is necessary for successful cyber-security implementation, and subsequent 
continuous assessments thereof.  
Through constant comparisons of different codes and memos, particular theoretical codes 
emerged. These theoretical codes conceptualised the relationships amongst various codes 
for resolving the research problem of what specifically needs to be the focus areas when 
assessing cyber-security status. Most of the participants highlighted in their narratives that 
they were aware of what the ideal cyber-security assessment entails. Through data 
interrogation it became clear that participants were doing the following: 
a. Emphasising the linking of cyber-security to the Municipal Integrated Development 
Plan; centrally coordinating and facilitating the protection of information 
infrastructures across the municipality; and development of cyber-security nerve 
centre to update policies and strategies as guided by the metrics and current trends in 
cyber-security and information infrastructure protection.  
b.  Highlighting the involvement of the senior management team to provide leadership, 
direct, formulate and approve cyber-security strategy and policy. Executive 
management is accountable regarding the delivery of municipal services to the local 
community. Any disruption to service delivery is a serious concern to executive 
management. Cyber-security risk is one serious threat to the service delivery mandate. 
Cyber-security risk mitigating actions must be sponsored and supported by executive 
management in every possible way.  
c. Highlighting the importance of deploying and monitoring appropriate tools and 
technologies to protect information infrastructure against cyber-risk. Automated 
safeguarding technologies and tools are implemented to continuously protect and 
monitor information infrastructures.  
d. Emphasising the need for critical consideration of human issues on cyber-security 
implementation. Implementation of excellent automated security tools alone does not 
guarantee total protection of information infrastructures. Humans are the first line of 
defence in protecting the municipal information infrastructure. 
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The adoption of ConGTM processes guided the discovery of the latent subject. This subject 
existed although it was not possible to extract it without ConGTM of two phases coding and 
the embedded memo writing activities. The ConGTM revealed this latent subject, with the 
dependent variable called Integrated development cyber-security. Integrated development 
cyber-security was the dependent variable because it took into account most of the variations 
in the data collected. The researcher picked up through data interrogation that Integrated 
development cyber-security was the mechanism that was constantly chosen by the 
participants to resolve their main unease of “siloed fashion, lack of organisational direction, 
and co-ordination” on strengthening cyber-security implementation in the municipality. One 
valid account on which Integrated development cyber-security grounded theory that has 
emerged from this enquiry could be evaluated is to determine whether it is a vigorous 
consistent hypothesis on which the participants repeatedly attempt to resolve their uneasiness 
of “siloed fashion, lack of organisational direction, and co-ordination” of cyber-security 
implementation in the municipality. All three identified independent variables have an 
impact on the “Integrated development cyber-security” dependent variable.  
5.3. THE CORE CONSTRUCT 
The research identified Integrated development cyber-security to be the dependent construct 
which is the core construct in this study. The study participants were based in eThekwini 
Metropolitan Municipality. They had to resolve the issue of “siloed fashion and lack of 
organisational coordination and direction” to successfully implement cyber-security in the 
municipality. The researcher defined the Integrated development cyber-security core 
construct as follows: 
Embedding cyber-security processes in the municipal IDP with the aim of 
unifying all cyber-security initiatives to strengthen and cultivate information 
infrastructure protection against cyber-risks. In other words, what is required to 
successfully implement and assess the cyber-security status in the metropolitan 
municipality? The answer that this research came-up with is Integrated 
development cyber-security that epitomises the municipal IDP.  
Integrated development cyber-security promotes integration and coordination of 
cyber-security activities that are centred on the municipality strategic objectives.  
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 The participants indicated that Integrated development cyber-security is positive ly 
influenced by the appropriately functioning cyber-security governance in the 
municipality.  
 The participants indicated that Integrated development cyber-security is positive ly 
influenced by the appropriately working and coordinated cyber-security technica l 
operations. 
 The participants highlighted that Integrated development cyber-security is positive ly 
influenced by the adequately managed cyber-security human issues.  
The researcher identified the constructs of the Integrated development cyber-security 
dependent construct. These constructs include: 
 centrally coordinated and directed cyber-security initiatives; 
 aligning cyber-security to IDP to support allocation of resources; 
 conducting cyber-security research and development to enhance cyber-security 
knowledge; 
 centralised protection of municipal critical information infrastructure; 
 centralised development and updating of cyber-security strategy and policy; 
 integrated cyber-security assessments; 
 integrated setting of industry best practices and cyber-security framework; 
 integrated implementation of contingency plans due to interconnectedness of 
information infrastructures; 
 facilitating collaborations with various actors in cyber-security; and  
 unified management of supply chains involving critical information infrastructures. 
5.4. THE THEORY CONSTRUCTS 
The researcher identified three independent variables that influence the core (dependent) 
construct.  
Independent construct: Implement appropriate cyber-security governance 
Good working cyber-security governance ensures that: 
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 there is a cyber-security strategy, and that there are resources to achieve the strategy 
objectives; 
 there is an approved cyber-security policy, and that there are resources to achieve the 
policy objectives; 
 the cyber-security strategy is in alignment with the municipal strategic framework 
which is IDP; 
 there are municipal oversight committees performing the oversight function in the 
cyber-security programme; 
 the executive management team provides the required leadership to drive the 
implementation of the cyber-security programme throughout the municipality – tone 
at the top is important to cultivate the cyber-security culture; 
 compliance with relevant legislation and regulation takes place; 
 risk management processes include cyber-security risks; 
 independent assurance is provided over cyber-security processes that have been 
implemented to protect the information infrastructure; 
 consequence management is performed in cases where there is poor/inadequate 
implementation of internal controls to mitigate cyber-risks – also in cases where there 
are breaches or violations of security on the information infrastructure; and 
 there are directed and coordinated efforts across the municipality to implement the 
cyber-security programme. 
Independent construct: Cyber-security technical operations 
Cyber-security technical operations implement and deploy tools, methodologies, and 
technologies to protect information infrastructures. Competent cyber-security technica l 
operations ensures that: 
 information infrastructure assets are protected against cyber-risks; 
 the right technology is deployed to secure municipal telecommunication networks; 
 critical information infrastructures are identified and protected; 
 there is a catalogue of the critical information infrastructure; 
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 industry best practices are adopted in the protection of information of the 
infrastructure; 
 continuous monitoring and evaluation of the implemented controls are in place to 
protect information infrastructure; 
 acquisition of the information infrastructure follows organisational supply chain 
management processes; 
 appropriate management of vendors and consultants – this includes management of 
service level agreements to ensure continuous provision of support to munic ipa l 
critical information infrastructures; 
 there is centralised management and coordination of the cyber-security programme – 
information security functions with the ICT unit which is the custodian of information 
security across the organisation; and any information security mechanisms are 
centralised in this function; and  
 appropriate management of information infrastructure assets is in place. 
Independent construct: Human issues in cyber-security 
Implementing good technical controls to protect information infrastructures on their own 
does not guarantee information infrastructure protection. Human beings that work on 
information infrastructures make it possible that the implemented technical controls are 
operating as intended. Appropriate management of human issues on cyber-security ensures 
that: 
 employees are provided with skills and knowledge to protect information 
infrastructure; 
 employees are encouraged to be affiliated to pertinent professional institutes; 
 there are individual performance management systems to assess the competency of 
employees; 
 adequate budget is provided to implement user awareness programmes, employees’ 
continuous professional development, user education, and research and development 
initiatives; 
 there is enforcement of cyber-security policy; 
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 there is compliance with pertinent legislation, regulations and policies. 
 there are collaborations amongst interested parties within and external to the 
organisation – collaborations provide platforms to share information on the protection 
of information infrastructures; and  
 appropriate culture of cyber-security is implemented across the organisation. 
5.5. DEMONSTRATION OF HOW THE INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT 









Figure 5.2: Categories of the integrated development cyber-security theory 
 
The participants indicated that the integrated development cyber-security is the glue holding 
together all the puzzles for successful implementation of the cyber-security programme in 
the metropolitan municipality. The integrated development core category is the structure that 
is responsible for inculcating the culture of cyber-security throughout the municipality. This 
structure ensures that an all-encompassing cyber-security policy is developed. Integrated 
development cyber-security ensures that there is an inventory of critical information 
infrastructure, and that the developed cyber-security policy covers all critical information 
infrastructures. The integrated development structure advises executive management on the 
industry best practices for cyber-security, and information infrastructure. After developing 
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policy to the cyber-security governance structure for official sign-off and to make the policy 
an official municipal document. To implement the cyber-security policy, the integrated 
development cyber-security structure formulates the cyber-security strategy that is aligned 
to the municipal IDP strategy. The strategy is also submitted to the cyber-security 
governance structure for approval, and to commit resources to achieve the strategy.  
The cyber-security governance category mainly sets the right tone at the top because the role 
players in this category are the executive management who are driving the implementa t ion 
of the municipal IDP. The cyber-security governance domain ensures that cyber-security is 
in the strategic risk management agenda. Cyber-security affects municipal business 
continuity which is a strategic priority. Cyber-security governance ensures that there are 
adequate resources to drive the implementation of the cyber-security programme by the 
integrated development cyber-security structure. Aligning cyber-security to the munic ipa l 
IDP elevates the cyber-security agenda in the municipality, and therefore the buy-in from 
executive management in order to commit resources for cyber-security activities. Amongst 
other important roles of the cyber-security domain, is setting up the oversight structures that 
can hold management at all levels accountable for the control deficiencies in cyber-security 
and the information infrastructure environment. The cyber-security governance domain sets 
the cyber-security culture through the resources that drive the agenda of the information 
infrastructure protection against cyber-security threats.  
The functions of the cyber-security technical operations domain take place in the various 
business units that are operating or working on information infrastructures. This category 
aligns the duties of pertinent employees to the cyber-security policy.  The business units buy 
the information infrastructures with the intention of achieving their business objectives. The 
technical functioning of the controls implemented to secure the information infrastruc ture 
takes place in this domain. For example, the Finance unit implements a revenue management 
system to collect revenue from customers such as rate payers, and other municipal services 
that are paid for by the citizens. Access control to the revenue systems is implemented by 
the integrated development cyber-security domain, but monitored by the Finance unit. It is 
the cyber-security technical operations domain that determines if the cyber-security controls 
that have been implemented are assisting the business unit to achieve the business objectives. 
It is this domain that determines the risk appetite when it comes to information infrastruc ture 
protection. Cyber-security risk appetite determines how the integrated development cyber-
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security should drive the cyber-security programme for various information infrastructures. 
The business units employ people to use the information infrastructure in pursuit of business 
objectives. Technology can be implemented, but without people to operate it, it will not 
achieve the intended objectives. People who are employed within the business there are the 
first line of defence for securing the information infrastructures. Employees’ knowledge, 
behaviour, and attitudes play an essential role in securing the information infrastruc ture 
against cyber-security threats. Business units employ people with minimum requirements to 
perform their duties while operating the information infrastructures. Due to the pace of 
changes in the cyber-security environment, and the information infrastructure environment, 
employees need to constantly keep pace with the innovation in these areas. Therefore, in 
order to address employees’ issues in dealing with cyber-security, the human issues in the 
cyber-security domain are regarded as key issues.  
The human issues in the cyber-security category involve individual employees that operate 
the information infrastructure in the municipality. The cyber-security governance domain 
sets the legislative and regulatory framework that includes, amongst others, the Labour 
Relations Act. The Municipal Systems Act requires the municipality to implement 
performance management systems. There is varied legislation that regulates how employees 
must be engaged and treated in the municipality. Within the ambits of the regulatory 
framework, human issues in the cyber-security category relate to ensuring that users are 
trained to work on the information infrastructure so as to minimise opportunity to commit 
errors when conducting their duties. This category ensures that employees/users, through the 
cyber-security awareness programme, are continuously made aware of the current trends of 
cyber-security threats and their impact on the information infrastructures that 
employees/users operate. The integrated development cyber-security domain drives the 
implementation of these cyber-security trainings and awareness programmes. It is for this 
reason that the integrated development cyber-security core category is the main driver to 
successfully implement cyber-security in the municipality. The integrated development 
cyber-security structure implements, facilitates, and co-ordinates the activities of the cyber-
security programme.  
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5.6. INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT CYBER-SECURITY THEORY (IDCT) 
EVALUATION 
In conducting this study, the research was guided by Charmaz’s (2006) four criteria for 
credibility, originality, resonance, and usefulness in developing this substantive theory. The 
four criteria assisted the researcher to address the implicit actions and meanings in the 
phenomenon investigated and helped to analyse how it was constructed (Charmaz, 2006). 
The researcher sought to answer the four criteria’s associated questions in the affirma tive 
way in order to comply with the GT evaluation guidelines.  
Table 5.2: IDCT evaluation 
 Criteria One - Credibility Response 
1.  “Has your research achieved intimate familiarity with the setting or 
topic?” 
Yes 
2.  “Are the data sufficient to merit your claims? Consider the range, 
number, and depth of observations contained in the data.”  
Yes 
3.  “Have you made systematic comparisons between observations and 
between categories?” 
Yes 
4.  “Do the categories cover a wide range of empirical observations?”  Yes 
5.  “Are there strong logical links between the gathered data and your 
argument and analysis?” 
Yes 
6.  “Has your research provided enough evidence for your claims to allow 




 Criteria Two – Originality Response 
1.  “Are your categories fresh? Do they offer new insights?” Yes 
2.  “Does your analysis provide a new conceptual rendering of the data?” Yes 
3.  What is the social and theoretical significance of this work? Yes *** 
4.  How does your grounded theory challenge, extend, or refine current 
ideas, concepts, and practices?” 
Yes *** 
*** refers to the research conclusion, under research contribution section 
 
 Criteria Three – Resonance Response 
1.  “Do the categories portray the fullness of the studied experience?”  Yes 
2.  “Have you revealed both liminal and unstable taken-for-granted 
meanings?”  
Yes 
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3.  “Have you drawn links between larger ‘collectivities’ or institut ions 
and individual lives, when the data so indicate?”  
Yes 
4.  “Does your grounded theory make sense to your participants or people 
who share their circumstances? Does your analysis offer them deeper 
insights about their lives and worlds?” 
Yes 
 
 Criteria Four – Usefulness  
1.  “Does your analysis offer interpretations that people can use in their 
everyday worlds?  
Yes 
2.  Do your analytic categories suggest any generic processes? If so, have 
you examined these generic processes for tacit implications? 
Yes 
3.  Can the analysis spark further research in other substantive areas?  Yes 
4.  How does your work contribute to knowledge? How does it contribute 
to making a better world?” 
Yes *** 
*** refers to the research conclusion, under research contribution section 
 
5.7. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
The ConGTM revealed the latent patterns of practitioners’ behaviour when dealing with 
cyber-security challenges in the municipality. One of the objectives of adopting the 
ConGTM was to discover a vigorous empirically resultant core variable or hypothesis. The 
resultant theory has earned its way through its undoubted demonstration that it represents 
the research participants’ main concern. Through the integrated set of hypotheses by the 
participants and the researcher, the theory was developed. The researcher applied his 
theoretical sensitivity to advance the objectives of the study and the study methods. Through 
the theoretical sampling, the researcher sampled the data until the participants’ main concern 
was discovered in the data being analysed. Within the chosen research population, the 
researcher sampled the participants’ input while busy collecting the data, hence it was not 
possible prior to conducting the research to state exactly what data would be required. The 
emerged core variable was derived at a point where the researcher reached a situation where 
no more new patterns surfaced from the data being collected, and at this point the data was 
considered to be saturated   
Memoing was an important instrument for the researcher in deriving a substantive theory of 
integrated development cyber-security. The activities of memoing entailed writing up of 
ideas on the formulated codes as they were conceived by the researcher while conducting 
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data coding in pursuit of data analysis. The researcher adopted memoing as a rationale to 
ideation and abstraction. At the beginning of the data analysis, memoing started out as short 
sentences but moved to be several pages long. Through constant comparisons of memos, and 
linking of various codes, theoretical coding was achieved. In theoretical coding there was 
both intuition and intellect on the side of the researcher in order to move from low level 
description to high level abstraction. 
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CHAPTER 6  
MUNICIPAL CYBER-SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
6.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Metropolitan municipalities require a framework to assess their cyber-security posture with 
the intention of enhancing the information infrastructure protection against cyber-risks. The 
researcher developed the framework from the substantive theory that was established 
through the ConGTM study. The framework served as the foundation to assess cyber-
security status in the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. The independent construct 
and the three independent constructs of the substantive theory were used as a basis to 
formulate the municipal cyber-security framework. Successful attainment of these three 
independent constructs guaranteed the Integrated development cyber-security which the 
research identified as a yardstick or benchmark against which to assess the cyber-security 
status in the metropolitan municipality environment.  
Table 6.1: Independent constructs 
Domain Processes 
Dependent variable/core category: Integrated development cyber-security 




Organisation of cyber-security efforts 
Research and development 
Cyber-security steering committee 
Independent construct 1: Cyber-security governance 
2.  Cyber-security 
governance 
Risk management (Strategic risk register) 
Cyber-security sponsorship 
Cyber-security assurance  
Oversight committees 
IT governance 
Corporate governance best practices (King IV 
report) 
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Independent construct 2: Cyber-security technical operations 
3.  Cyber-security technical 
operations 
Cyber-security tools & technologies  
Information infrastructure certifications 
Cyber-security monitoring & evaluation 
International standards & best practices 
Cyber-security policy enforcement 
Catalogue of critical information infrastructure 
Information infrastructure asset management 
Contingency planning & procedures 
Independent auditing of systems & methodologies 
Allocation of resources 
Operational risk management 
Programme performance management 
Independent construct 3: Human issues in cyber-security 
4.  Human issues in cyber-
security 
Education & training 
User awareness 
Cyber-security policy enforcement 
Occupational certifications 
Affiliations to professional institutes 
Individual performance assessment 
Ethical conduct 
  
6.2. DEFINING THE CYBER-SECURITY FRAMEWORK PROCESSES 
6.2.1. Integrated development cyber-security 
A. Strategy development relates to the development of a municipal-wide cyber-security 
strategy, allocation of implementation structures across municipal sectors, and an 
understanding of municipal cyber-security risks and threats which drive competencies 
at municipal-wide level. Cyber-security strategy is vital to uplift the cyber-security 
agenda across the municipality. A well-articulated cyber-security strategy helps 
prioritise cyber-security as an important policy area. This plan presents an 
organisational-wide vision and stance on cyber-security. It is important to align the 
cyber-security strategy to the organisation’s strategic objectives so that the allocation 
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of resources will be directed towards achieving the organisation’s objectives. A 
strategy is an all-encompassing plan as it includes all the municipal functional areas. 
Cyber-security strategy links the cyber-security programme to the municipal IDP. The 
allocation of funds to the cyber-security programme is recorded in the service delivery 
budget implementation plan (SDBIP). 
B. Policy development entails developing a municipal-wide cyber-security policy, which 
ensures attainment of cyber-security strategy objectives. The cyber-security policy 
details the information infrastructure being referred to and what is meant by securing 
such an information infrastructure. Further, the cyber-security policy specifies the role 
players involved in securing the information infrastructure. If properly articulated, the 
cyber-security policy amongst other things, explicitly specifies what information 
infrastructures need to be protected and against what threats. The cyber-security policy 
also provides guidelines on the roles and responsibilities in implementing the cyber-
security strategy. 
C. Organisation of cyber-security efforts relates to the formation and maintenance of 
an overarching programme for cyber-security coordination, including authority 
(executive management), with a consolidated budget. 
D. Research and development entails continuous exploration of how best to safeguard 
information infrastructure against cyber-threats. Research and development is driven 
by the three domains of governance, technical operations and human issues. This 
sustains the benefits derived from the adoption of cyberspace as a tool to achieve 
municipal objectives. 
E. Cyber-security steering committee is a technical competent body that has no 
executive authority but advises management on the current trends, best practices, and 
emerging risks in cyber-security. This committee analyses cyber-security operational 
plans and measures implementation progress against the approved plans. This 
committee reports to executive management. 
6.2.2. Domain 1: Cyber-security governance 
A. Risk management, in the context of this study, is a process of identifying events or 
circumstances that can impact the municipality objectives. At a strategic level, risk 
management entails identifying those events or circumstances that influence the 
attainment of the organisation’s strategic objectives. The influence could be positive 
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or negative. A positive influence is one that enhances the opportunities to achieve the 
organisational strategic objectives. A negative influence is one that has a devastating 
or disastrous impact on the achievement of the organisation’s strategic objectives. At 
a strategic level, the executive management team is responsible for identifying those 
events or circumstances that have a devastating impact on the achieving of strategic 
objectives. These negative events or circumstances are recorded in a strategic risk 
register wherein the mitigating controls to minimise the impact or likelihood thereof 
are also provided. The mitigating controls require management to commit resources 
and hence the involvement of the executive management team is essential. Cyber-
related risks warrant the attention of the executive management team due to the 
potential impact they have on the delivery of municipal services. 
B. Cyber-security sponsorship refers to financial commitment by executive 
management to fund the cyber-security programme in pursuit of the cyber-security 
strategy. Sponsorship is not a responsibility of one business unit, but a collective 
executive management team effort. If treated properly, cyber-security sponsorship sets 
the management tone and inculcates the culture of cyber-security across the 
organisation. Sponsorship addresses cyber-security at departmental (group) level, and 
at individual level through funding the education, training, and user awareness 
campaigns. Cyber-security impacts almost every business unit in the municipality, and 
therefore sponsorship cannot be the responsibility of only one individual business unit. 
The interconnectedness of information infrastructures warrants that every business 
unit that forms part of the interconnectedness must be part of the cyber-security 
sponsorship. Sponsorship can also be translated to a situation where executive 
management permits staff members to leave their work stations to attend to education 
and training, and other skills enhancement initiatives. By providing sponsorship to 
cyber-security, executive management is leading from the front and is providing 
necessary leadership for everyone else in the organisation to follow.  
C. Cyber-security assurance entails providing an independent guarantee that the 
controls that management has implemented are working as intended to achieve the 
organisational goals. Risks present the possibility of not achieving the organisat ion 
objectives. The risks associated with cyber-security are enormous and could have 
devastating consequences should they materialise. Cyber-security risks are highly 
likely to happen and the possible impact includes non-delivery of municipal services. 
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Cyber-security assurance is a legislative requirement (MFMA) which requires the 
internal audit function to develop a risk-based internal audit plan in order to provide 
assurance on the controls implemented in the highest risk areas. Cyber risks are highest 
risk areas in the municipality as they affect the core mandate of the institution to deliver 
services to the local community. Industry best practice such as King IV report on 
corporate governance requires executive management to establish an internal audit 
committee to manage the activities of the internal audit function. The audit committee 
advises the municipal council on the internal controls, risk management, and 
governance processes that executive management has implemented to achieve 
organisational objectives. The office of the Auditor General of South Africa also 
performs assurance activities in the municipality. Cyber-security assurance presents 
an opportunity to identify weakness in the system of internal controls. It also presents 
an opportunity for consequent management to cyber-security delinquent employees. If 
properly implemented, cyber-security assurance strengthens the protection of the 
information infrastructure. Cyber-security assurance is the guardian of cyber-security 
governance processes.  
D. Oversight committees are the governance structures within the municipality that 
strengthen accountability through monitoring and evaluation. Examples include the 
infrastructure portfolio committee, audit committee, and Exco. Oversight committees 
hold management accountable for non-delivery of municipal services, non-
performance of performance targets, and non-compliance with applicable policies, 
legislation, and regulations. 
E. IT governance refers to executive management’s processes that delineate how the 
organisation directs and controls technology use and information infrastruc ture 
protection. IT governance is a component of corporate governance in the municipality. 
The ultimate aim of IT governance is to ensure that information technology 
continuously supports key business processes in order to sustain and enhance 
opportunities for meeting organisational objectives. IT governance promotes the 
implementation of cyber-security. Further, IT governance enhances information 
confidentiality, integrity and availability which are the core objectives for cyber-
security. 
F. Corporate governance is defined to mean setting and steering strategic direction of 
the organisation through ensuring accountability, development of policies, and 
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providing oversight in the implementation of organisational strategy. Corporate 
governance also involves setting appropriate structures to ensure that the organisat ion 
achieves the set organisational objectives. Corporate governance processes ensure that 
governance processes take place and that the organisation is steered towards achieving 
business goals. Corporate governance processes include risk management, cyber-
security governance, compliance with legislation, and regulations and reporting 
requirements. As part of corporate governance, the audit committee reports to 
municipal council on the effectiveness of controls that management has implemented 
to meet the organisational mandate and objectives. 
6.2.3. Domain 2: Cyber-security technical operations 
A. Cyber-security programme management refers to the composition and 
organisational design of cyber-security. This includes reporting structures, roles and 
responsibilities assigned to safeguarding the information infrastructure. Programme  
management plays a central role in implementing cyber-security policy. The cyber-
security officer/chief information security officer is responsible to ensure that the tools 
and technologies utilised to safeguard information infrastructures are providing the 
security as defined in the cyber-security policy. Programme management provides 
formal structures with allocated cyber-security roles which aid in providing centralised 
coordination and facilitation of cyber-security activities in the organisation. This is the 
structure that ensures that cyber-security matters form part of the executive 
management agenda on corporate governance. 
B. Cyber-security tools and technologies refer to the actual deployment of technologies 
and methodologies that are intended to provide information infrastructure protection. 
These technologies include anti-virus software, network monitoring tools, intrus ion 
detection software, intrusion prevention tools, logging of users’ and administrato rs’ 
activities, and access control mechanisms. Access controls include both logical and 
physical access to information infrastructure assets. Logical access incorporate s 
authentication processes where a user provides their user name and the corresponding 
password in order to gain access to the information technology system. Controlling 
physical access entails implementing security personnel and user identification tools 
in order to allow physical access to the information infrastructure assets. The 
deployment of security tools and technologies work hand in hand with industry best 
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practices. The utilisation of tools and technologies aims to achieve the requirements of 
the cyber-security policy in pursuit of achieving the cyber-security strategy to support 
the attainment of business strategy objectives. Cyber-security tools and technology 
permit the availability of critical information infrastructures 24/7.  
C. Information infrastructure certification entails meeting international and or 
national standards related to a specific information infrastructure. It also involves 
meeting the regulatory requirements specific to an information infrastructure. For 
example, the .zadna in the country, under the guardianship of the Department of 
Telecommunications and Postal Services manages the .za domain name space through 
issuing licences in terms of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
(RSA, 2002). Another example is the ICASA which issues electronic communicat ions 
operators and service providers licences according to the provisions of the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa Act of 2006 (RSA, 2006). The South 
African Bureau of Standards, through South African National Standards, plays an 
essential role in providing certifications – particularly those relating to process control 
systems.  
D. Cyber-security monitoring and evaluation refers to systems that have been 
implemented to ascertain that the tools and technologies deployed to safeguard 
information infrastructures continue to provide the services expected. To achieve 
monitoring function, there are reports generated by various tools to give statistics in 
various areas. Statistics generated include information such as failed login attempts, 
illicit sites visited by employees, transaction history, audit trails, and trends in the 
network activities. The evaluation part deals with assessing the adequacy of the 
deployed technologies and methodologies in protecting the information infrastructure. 
Monitoring and evaluation ensures that cyber-security mechanisms are operated within 
the prescripts of relevant policies, legislation and regulations. Continuous monitor ing 
and assessment inculcate and cultivate the culture of cyber-security as it enhances the 
protection of information infrastructures on an ongoing practice. 
E. International standards and industry best practices involve accredited institut ions 
that provide guidelines on the implementation of information infrastructures protection 
practices. The accredited institutions include ISACA for Cobit (IT governance 
framework), International Standards Organisation (ISO) for ISO/IEC 27000 suite, 
NIST, etc. Best practices are adopted to aid the institution to implement and monitor 
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cyber-security. The standards aid to mitigate cyber-security risks. By adopting best 
practices, support received from vendors and service providers is enhances, as both the 
organisation and vendors have adopted the same practices which are transparent to 
pertinent stakeholders. Adoption of industry best practices minimises or limits 
dependence on individual heroism and insulated mechanisms which are difficult to 
manage, maintain, and recover in case of emergencies.  
F. Cyber-security policy enforcement refers to the processes that management follows 
to ascertain that cyber-security policy is adhered to. After monitoring and evaluation 
exercises, gaps and weaknesses are identified. In situations where automating the 
processes for the protection of information infrastructure is an option, this is the 
preferred option because of consistency in application/functionality compared to 
manual processes of the same activity. For example, failed log in attempts of four or 
more should automatically disable the user profile. Also, visiting illicit websites should 
be automated and blocked. Users wanting to e-mail big amounts of data should be 
blocked or requesting permission from the system administrator. Unattended 
workstations, or where a session has been opened and no activity has taken place for 
five minutes (depending on the policy), the desktop should lock itself. When the user 
wants to continue using the system, the user must re-enter the credentials in order to 
get access. Information infrastructure must require users to change to change 
passwords after 30 days. All these activities are enforcement mechanisms that promote 
information infrastructure protection. 
G. Catalogue of critical information infrastructure  is a list of all critical information 
infrastructures in the municipality. The information infrastructures become critical 
information infrastructures if other infrastructures are dependent on them to deliver 
essential or critical services. Process control systems depend on ICT in order to operate 
as intended. PCS support the municipality’s delivery of essential services such as 
electricity and clean water. Therefore, the information infrastructures that support the 
PCS that in turn support the delivery of essential services, are called critical 
information infrastructures. Management in the organisation must ensure that the 
organisation has a list of all municipal critical information infrastructures. The 
catalogue will assist management to put appropriate controls in place for such 
infrastructures. Cyber-security priority is guided by the available list of critical 
information infrastructures. Critical information infrastructures in the eThekwini 
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Municipality include computer networks, servers, software, computer applications, 
technologies and hardware. All of these support the critical infrastructures in the 
municipality of which incapacitation or destruction shall have a devastating influence 
on municipal well-being, security, economy, public health and safety.  
H. Information infrastructure asset management relates to the identification of these 
assets and keeping an inventory thereof. Maintaining the asset inventory assists 
management to make informed decisions on information infrastructure acquisition or 
procurement, maintenance, and asset disposal mechanisms. Asset management assist s 
in monitoring and managing software licences across the organisation. Contingency 
planning is linked to asset management because some information infrastructure assets 
are dependent on the vendors and service providers (consultants) for emergency 
support. 24/7 availability of critical information infrastructures is largely dependent on 
asset management processes. Information infrastructure asset management is also 
linked to the cyber-security helpdesk or service desk. The helpdesk logs all the service 
requests for specific assets which then creates a database of all problems and possible 
solutions to those problems in relation to a specific asset type, make, etc. Asset 
management facilitates speedy resolution of problems through the linkage with the 
service desk. 
I. Contingency planning and procedures relate to proactively preparing for the 
unforeseen eventualities that have the potential of disrupting the normal 
functioning/operational effectiveness of the information infrastructure. Sometimes a 
contingency plan is known as plan B. If the normal information infrastruc ture 
processes are unexpectedly disrupted, what processes and procedures are in place to 
ascertain that those eventualities have minimum impact on the delivery of essential 
services? Properly planned disaster recovery plans and related procedures are 
examples of contingency plans. Contingency planning is a visionary method 
developed through suitable assessments aimed at dealing with the disruptions or 
adversaries on information infrastructure. This planning considers amongst other 
things the alternative approaches of operating the information infrastructures in case 
of disruption by using, for example, alternative practices which could incorporate 
alternate sites for operations and systems backup.  
J. Independent auditing on information infrastructures entails assessing the controls 
design, and operational effectiveness of the controls that are implemented to achieve 
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or meet the requirements of the cyber-security policy in pursuit of the cyber-security 
strategy and in turn the organisational strategy. This assessment is conducted by an 
independent function outside the assessed operational area. Independent assessments 
are conducted by the internal audit function, and the office of the Auditor General. 
Independent auditing is an indirect method to enforce compliance with cyber-security 
policies, legislation, and regulations. The aim of independent assessment of controls 
is to identify the weakness, if any, with the sole objective of strengthening the 
protection of information infrastructures in order to continue supporting the objectives 
and vision of the municipality. 
K. Operational risk management involves pre-empting possibilities that could 
adversely affect the technical operations of cyber-security. Identified eventualities are 
assessed by the line function/management in terms of impact and likelihood. 
Operational risk management results in an operational risk register. It entails the 
identification of the threat, followed by the assessment of the risk (impact and 
likelihood), analysing the risk control measures, and implementing the risk control 
measures. A plan is formulated to implement the controls that have been chosen, which 
include time, resources and personnel needed to implement these control measures. 
The results of analysing the risk control measures include accepting the risk, avoiding 
the risk, controlling the risk, and transferring the risk. Cyber-security operational risks 
include threats from a virus, worms, denial of service attacks, natural disasters, 
hackers, non-compliance, etc. 
L. Allocation of resources involves scheduling and assigning resources according to the 
operational requirements to operate a particular information infrastructure. Some 
information infrastructures require 24/7 availability. Personnel are required to ensure 
that 24/7 availability is attained and hence the scheduling of resources to achieve this 
requirement. Personnel may be required to work overtime, hence the criticality of 
allocating relevant resources including financial resources. Poor allocation of 
resources could result in unattended emergency situations with devastating 
consequences in the service delivery mandate of the municipality. Physical security of 
the information infrastructure also depends on the allocation of pertinent resources to 
achieve the required level of protection. Allocation of resources must be 
commensurate with the criticality of the information infrastructure. 
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M. Programme performance management involves setting targets and operational 
plans against which to measure performance. Achieving optimum security requires 
setting of targets and actions plans needed to achieve the same. Performance 
management entails assessing the programme performance against the set cyber-
security objectives. Performance management in the municipality environment is a 
legislative requirement, and has to be audited by an internal audit and the office of the 
Auditor General. Assessing programme performance management is a tool to identify 
areas that need improvement to achieve optimum protection of information 
infrastructures against cyber-risks. Therefore, programme performance management 
aims to attain effectiveness and efficiency in the provision of cyber-security across the 
organisation.  
6.2.4. Domain 3: Human issues in cyber-security 
A. Education and training relates to providing employees and consultants with the 
required skills and knowledge in relation to cyber-security policies and procedures as 
applicable to their job requirements. Employees can receive training through on-
boarding induction, and through continuous on-the-job training. Training can be in the 
form of formal education where employees are trained to obtain an educationa l 
qualification or professional certification. Training can also be informal, for example 
through attending seminars, conferences, breakfast sessions, etc. There are no formal 
examinations for informal training. Education and training in cyber-security ensures 
that employees have the right qualification and skills mix to perform their duties in 
pursuit of information infrastructure protection against cyber-threats. The first line of 
defence against cyber-attacks is a well-trained staff.  
B. Cyber-security user awareness relates to sensitising users of information 
infrastructures to the cyber-risks. It is essential to establish and maintain a cyber-
security awareness programme that is robust to ensure that information infrastruc ture 
users are alert and responsive to the importance of guarding sensitive information and 
related infrastructure against the cyber-risks. The institution can invest heavily in 
technical automated controls to protect information infrastructures; however, these 
technical controls can be rendered useless when staff lack cyber-security awareness. 
Cyber-security awareness assists in the reduction of cyber-security breaches and 
related possibilities by providing well-intentioned staff with the knowledge to avoid 
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becoming inadvertent attack vectors, for instance such as by unintentiona lly 
downloading malware. 
C. Cyber-security policy enforcement includes making users of the Internet and e-mail 
systems to sign acknowledgement and understanding of the acceptable usage of these 
applications. Further, it is to make users aware that their activities on information 
infrastructure are monitored by management. If users are aware that their actions are 
monitored, they conduct themselves and their activities in an acceptable way. Cyber-
security policy violations and breaches are properly reported to relevant structures and 
investigated as directed by the policies. Disciplinary processes are instituted to those 
found to have performed illicit activities on information infrastructures.  
D. Occupational certifications relate to writing a profession-related board examina tion 
in order to obtain occupation specific certification and or designation. For example , 
those personnel who work on the telecommunications network need to write 
examinations for a certified network engineer/professional designations. Those that 
specialise in information security need to write a board examination to become 
certified in information security and or cyber-security. Some network vulnerability 
assessment tools require specific qualifications in order to be able to utilise the tool. 
To conduct an audit on the information technology environment requires a certified 
information systems auditor designation. Occupational designations give comfort to 
management and other stakeholders that personnel have what it takes to protect 
information infrastructures against cyber-threats. Affiliation to professional institutes 
is a pre-requisite for writing board examinations.  
E. Affiliation to professional institutes  relates to joining occupational institutes or 
organisations that promote specific occupations. For example, internal auditors join or 
become members of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) which is the body that 
prescribes standards and principles to be followed when conducting an internal audit 
function. Generally, professional institutes are credible organisations that provide 
guidelines to be adopted by affiliated members. Professional institutes offer a body of 
knowledge where affiliates come together and share their experiences and possible 
solutions to challenges encountered by members when conducting their job 
responsibilities. Professional institutes have prescribed minimum ethical standards that 
all members needs to abide by. Membership can be revoked by the institute if the 
prescribed minimum standards and ethical behaviour requirements are breached or 
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compromised (bringing the profession into disrepute). Professional institutes convene 
and hold regional/national conferences where topical issues affecting the profession 
are discussed by the industry experts and other key stakeholders. Some affiliat ions 
require members to meet the minimum requirements annually in order to keep their 
membership active. They require continuous professional development (CPD) to take 
place in a financial year/annually. These CPD requirements promote the members to 
be on par with the current trends affecting the profession. 
F. Individual performance assessment relates to setting employee-based performance 
targets driven by the job description of the employee. Assessing individua l 
performance aids in determining the competency of an employee in achieving the 
requirements of the job occupied. Each employee signs a performance contract against 
which performance will be assessed. The intention of performance assessment is to 
determine if there are any areas in which an employee needs assistance to achieve the 
requirements of the job. If gaps have been identified, the supervisor and the employee 
concerned formulate an improvement plan which entails a personal performance 
improvement plan. Training and supervision are some of the activities that can be 
included in the personal performance improvement plan. In the cyber-security context, 
individual performance assessment aims to strengthen the protection of information 
infrastructures. If employees are assessed and found to be competent, they are 
rewarded and encouraged to maintain and enhance their performance. 
G. Ethical conduct and behaviour entail prescribing moral standards that clearly 
distinguish acceptable behaviour from unacceptable behaviour. The information 
infrastructure environment is a sensitive area where employees are expected at all 
times to demonstrate a high level of trustworthiness, and conduct themselves in a 
manner that will not compromise the protection of information infrastructures. For 
example employees are not allowed to divulge organisational sensitive information to 
the public or anyone else who is not supposed to have knowledge of such information. 
Depending on the criticality of the information infrastructure, security clearance is 
required from the state security agencies.  
6.3. PROPOSED MUNICIPAL CYBER-SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
The proposed cyber-security framework can be adopted by the metropolitan municipalit ies 
as a starting point to secure their information infrastructure against cyber-security threats. 
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This framework forms the basis for cyber-security controls to be implemented to secure the 
infrastructure against cyber threats. 
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Table 6.2: Proposed municipal cyber-security framework 
 
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY (ORGANISATION) 
INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT CYBER-SECURITY 
(Key Role players - Cyber-security Specialists) 
 Cyber-security Policy Development  
Cyber-security Strategy Development 
Centralised Cyber-security Coordination 
Cyber-security Research & Development 
Cyber-security Steering Committee 
Alignment with IDP 
 
 
PILLAR A PILLAR B PILLAR C 
CYBER-SECURITY 
GOVERNANCE 




(Key Role players – Business Units level) 
HUMAN ISSUES IN CYBER-SECURITY 
(Key Role players – employees level) 
Risk Management Cyber-security Programme Management Education and Training 
Cyber-security Sponsorship Cyber-security tools and technologies Cyber-security awareness 
Cyber-security Assurance Information Infrastructure Catalogues Policy enforcement 
Oversight Committees Information Infrastructure Asset Management Occupational certifications 
IT Governance Cyber-security monitoring and evaluation Affiliation to professional institutes 
Corporate governance International standards and best practices Individual performance assessment 
Legislative Framework Programme Performance Management Ethical conduct and behaviour 
 Cyber-security policy enforcement  
Contingency planning and procedures 
Cyber-security Auditing and Assurance 
Cyber-security Resource allocation 
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6.4. APPLYING THE MUNICIPAL CYBER-SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
Metropolitan municipalities exist to deliver basic services to the citizens as stipulated in the 
Municipal Systems Act. A centralised cyber-security portfolio is the foundation for 
successful implementation of the municipal cyber-security framework. Centralised cyber-
security is responsible for facilitating the creation of information infrastructure inventory 
across the organisation. An inventory of information infrastructure assists to identify various 
information infrastructure assets and their respective properties. A comprehens ive 
information infrastructure catalogue guides the development of cyber-security policy. This 
policy covers all business units in which information infrastructure assets exist. The policy 
provides guidance on the expected safeguarding methods, tools, techniques, and 
mechanisms to be adopted to implement minimum information infrastructure safeguard ing. 
Cyber-security policy must be approved at the highest level within the municipality in order 
to be effective.  
Cyber-security policy informs the development of cyber-security strategy, which must be 
annually approved at the right level of authority. The cyber-security strategy covers 
information infrastructure assets across the municipality and requires buy-in from the heads 
of the business units. The cyber-security strategy must be aligned to the municipal-wide 
business strategy which is the integrated development plan. This alignment can be achieved 
through the integrated approach to cyber-security. The integrated approach to cyber-security 
implementation strategy guides the allocation of a consolidated budget towards cyber-
security enactment. The cyber-security budget will be aligned to or be commensurate with 
the SDBIP as guided by the requirements of the MFMA. The centralised approach to cyber-
security implementation enhances research and development on cyber-security, and 
effective collaboration amongst the pertinent stakeholders at various levels within the 
municipality and across various spheres of governments in the country. A centralised 
approach to implement cyber-security encourages the formulation of a cyber-security 
steering committee whose intention amongst others is to drive the technical monitoring of 
the cyber-security strategy implementation.  
Executive management’s buy-in of the successful implementation of cyber-security in the 
municipality is essential. Their buy-in inculcates the culture of cyber-security and sets the 
right tone at the top to safeguard information infrastructure assets. As part of showing their 
buy-in, executive authority must approve the cyber-security policy, and related cyber-
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security implementation strategy. Management’s buy-in can be demonstrated through the 
appropriate allocation of an adequate budget in pursuit of cyber-security objectives.  Also, 
it can be shown through various means such as setting of pertinent oversight structures, such 
as the audit committee and portfolio committees, to establish a necessary regulatory 
framework that is relevant to securing organisational information infrastructure assets, 
commissioning necessary reporting mechanisms, and elevating cyber-security risks to the 
strategic risk register since cyber-security weaknesses affect municipal business continuity 
and have cascading and devastating consequences.  
Each business unit that operates an information infrastructure is responsible for deploying 
technologies and pertinent processes for cyber-security. Operating technologies and 
information technology require different processes and tools to safeguard their information 
infrastructure assets and hence respective business units driving their cyber-security 
implementation processes. The implementation of cyber-security processes must be guided 
by industry-specific best practices, and international and industry-specific standards.  
The implementation of cyber-security policy must be aligned to human resources policies 
and related procedures such as recruitment policy, performance management policy, and 
employees’ disciplinary policy. Employees are the first line of defence in cyber-security. 
Even if the appropriate technologies are implemented towards the protection of information 
infrastructure assets, they may not work or achieve the intended purpose if the human beings 
are not committed to securing such assets. Therefore, it is necessary that the centralised 
cyber-security implementation adopts a combined and comprehensive recognition of human 
issues in cyber-security. Human issues include processes such as cyber-security user 
awareness campaigns that are pertinent to the information infrastructure being operated. 
Cyber-security policy and other related policies must be communicated across the 
municipality. Proper communication of the relevant policies enhances situations to hold 
users accountable for their behaviour and actions regarding information infrastructures. 
Training and development of employees on cyber-security implementation is driven by the 
performance management processes of individual employees.  
6.5. BENEFITS OF MUNICIPAL CYBER-SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
A municipal cyber-security framework can provide guidelines to management in 
implementing the necessary information infrastructure safeguarding mechanisms across the 
organisation. The framework provides management with a holistic and comprehensive view 
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of cyber-security components (categories). The municipal cyber-security framework assists 
management at various levels to understand who is influenced by a specific category and the 
possible impact. The framework is industry specific and is compatible with any legisla t ion 
that is applicable to local governments in the country. Currently there is no known industry-
specific cyber-security framework. Municipalities are guided by international standards and 
pertinent industry best practices which are necessary but not sufficient to address the unique 
cyber-security challenges of the metropolitan municipalities. In adopting the current 
approaches, municipalities are required to adapt and apply these practices, and the adaption 
process requires a considerable amount of time which is a catalyst for failure.  
The municipal cyber-security framework will guide management in administering cyber-
security implementation and to promote the acceptable cyber-security level that is necessary 
in establishing a desirable cyber-security culture and the subsequent maintenance thereof. 
The framework can be used to monitor and improve the controls that management have 
implemented to minimise or eliminate cyber-security threats. With minimal adaptation, the 
framework can be adopted as reference to understand the posture of cyber-security at any 
given point in time. The framework serves a basis for developing a cyber-security 
assessment instrument as it enables such a tool to conform to content validity. The 
framework provides a basis for defining the items to be assessed in order to determine the 
status of cyber-security in a municipality.  
6.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The main purpose of this chapter was to present the municipal cyber-security framework 
developed in this study. The framework was developed from the ConGTM processes. The 
framework processes were defined in order to provide context for each category of the 
framework. Some processes overlapped amongst the categories; however, the intention of 
the framework is to guide the implementation of cyber-security controls to secure the 
information infrastructure against the cyber-security threats.  
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CHAPTER 7  
AN INSTRUMENT TO ASSESS CYBER-SECURITY 
7.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Based on the ConGTM study, a framework to implement cyber-security was developed. The 
researcher used the cyber-security framework to develop the assessment tool.  
7.2. THE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY CYBER-SECURITY 
ASSESSMENT TOOL 
7.2.1. The design of the questionnaire  
The statements for the questionnaire were developed from the cyber-security framework 
developed from ConGTM. The questionnaire was designed with the intention to be 
completed anonymously by the participants. The study employed a Likert-type scale 
structured questionnaire with closed-ended questions with five option answers to each 
question. The participants needed to choose the option that best described the situation of 
the question asked.  
Metropolitan Municipality Cyber-security Assessment Survey Questionnaire 
Legend: SA = Strongly Agree, A = Agree,  DK = Don’t Know, D = Disagree, SD = Strongly 
Disagree 
INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT CYBER-SECURITY DOMAIN 
 Please choose the statement that best describes your 
view 
 






1.  My organisation has a written cyber-security policy    
2.  My organisation has an overarching supply chain 
management policy that guides the acquisition of 
information infrastructure 
   
3.  My organisation has a documented cyber-security 
strategy 
   
4.  My organisation has an inventory of critical information 
infrastructure 
   
5.  My organisation has information infrastructures 
contingency plans 
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6.  The cyber-security policy is constantly reviewed to 
incorporate emerging trends in the protection of 
information infrastructures 
     
7.  The cyber-security policy contains sections that are 
relevant to my job 
     
8.  The cyber-security policy is aligned to the munic ipa l 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP) 
     
9.  I believe our cyber-security strategy is aligned to the 
municipal IDP 
     
10.  There is a structure or unit within my organisation that is 
responsible to implement the cyber-security strategy 
     
11.  I know what to do if I want to report breaches or 
violations of the cyber-security policy 
     
12.  I know who the custodian of the cyber-security policy is      
13.  My organisation conducts research and development with 
the aim to enhance protection of the information 
infrastructure 
     
14.  Protection of the information infrastructure in my 
organisation is guided by the industry best practices 
     
CYBER-SECURITY GOVERNANCE DOMAIN 






15.  My organisational strategic risk register contains cyber-
security risk  
   










16.  Management has allocated adequate budget  to implement 
a cyber-security policy 
     
17.  Risk management processes guide the implementation of 
cyber-security controls in my organisation 
     
18.  Management has provided guidance on the regulatory 
requirements pertaining to the information infrastruc ture 
that I work with 
     
19.  Management has allocated adequate people to protect the 
information infrastructures 
     
20.  Management enforces compliance to cyber-security      
21.  In my organisation there are oversight 
structures/committees that hold management to account 
for the protection of information infrastructure 
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22.  Internal audit operational plans incorporate audits or 
reviews on information infrastructures on an annual basis  
     
23.  Management has input in the internal audit operational 
plan before the plan is implemented 
     
24.  Audit committee approves the internal audit operational 
plan before the plan is implemented 
     
25.  Management has implemented clear asset management 
practices  
     
26.  Management understands the possible impact of cyber-
security threats to municipal service delivery  
     
CYBER-SECURITY TECHNICAL OPERATIONS DOMAIN 






27.  There are service level agreements between my 
municipality and the service providers working on 
information infrastructures 
   










28.  Management is monitoring the services provided by the 
service providers/consultants against the service level 
agreements 
     
29.  My organisation has deployed technologies to protect 
information infrastructures against cyber-threats 
     
30.  Access to information infrastructures is controlled 
through identification and authentication 
     
31.  Management has adopted industry best practices to 
protect information infrastructure against cyber-threats 
     
32.  Anti-virus software is installed on our laptops, desktops, 
and other devices 
     
33.  Audits are conducted to provide assurance on the 
adequacy and effectiveness of controls that have been 
implemented to protect information infrastructure 
     
34.  The incident management procedures are adequate to 
resolve cyber-security incidents 
     
35.  The building that I work in is adequately protected to 
secure the information infrastructure 
     
MANAGE HUMAN ISSUES IN CYBER-SECURITY DOMAIN 










36.  Employees’ activities in information infrastructure are 
monitored 
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37.  In my organisation, action is taken against employees 
who violate the cyber-security policy 
     
38.  Employees are made aware of the cyber-security policy 
contents  
     
39.  Employees know where to report suspicious illicit cyber-
security activities 
     
40.  Employees receive adequate training in the information 
infrastructure they operate 
     
41.  I am aware of cyber-security threats affecting the 
information assets I work with 
     
42.  I am aware that organisational internet and e-mail 
systems should be  used for business purposes 
     
43.  Employees accept responsibility for information 
infrastructure protection  
     
44.  My organisation constantly conducts cyber-security 
assessments to determine how employees are complying 
with the cyber-security policy 
     
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
45.  I have been in the employ of the 
municipality for  
 Less than 3 years = 1 
 3 years but less than 5 years = 2 
 5 years but less than 7 years = 3 
 7 years but less than 10 years = 4 
 10 years and over = 5 
46.  I belong to   Information and Communication Technology 
Category = 1 
 Operating Technology = 2 
 Administration Category = 3 
47.  My position is at   Management level = 1 
 Specialist level = 2 
 Clerical level = 3 
 
The statements in the assessment instrument are based on the cyber-security framework, 
specifically the processes that describe the four domains. All controls that are implemented 
to mitigate aspects of cyber-security must be evaluated to obtain assurance that they function 
the way they were intended to. The controls implemented include processes, procedures, 
technology and personnel. Assessments can be technical as well as non-technical.  
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7.3. RATIONALE BEHIND THE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 
The cyber-security instrument is as a result of the ConGTM where the research participants 
painted a picture of activities to be carried out in order to successfully implement the cyber-
security programme in the metropolitan municipality. The researcher applied a theoretical 
sensitivity and memoing process during the data collection and analysis stage of the research 
to construct the rationale behind each statement in the assessment instrument. 
Metropolitan Municipality Cyber-security Assessment  
INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT CYBER-SECURITY DOMAIN 
1.  My organisation has a written cyber-security policy 
(a) Why cyber-security policy is necessary 
Cyber-security policy gives authority to the implementation of cyber-security in the 
municipality. This policy must be signed by the municipal council or delegated 
authority. The signed cyber-security policy signals the position of the municipa l 
council on cyber-security. The signed cyber-security policy therefore becomes the 
benchmark against which to assess compliance with the protection of information 
assets from cyber threats. Cyber-security policy is a key socio-organisationa l 
resource that guides employees on how to ensure cyber-security when utilis ing 
information infrastructure assets while performing their duties. Cyber-security policy 
provides a baseline upon which to safeguard information infrastructure assets against 
cyber-related threats. 
(b) Risks associated with the lack of cyber-security policy 
Weakness in cyber-security could result in disturbance of the continuous provision 
of essential services, particularly those that whose delivery are dependent on the 
information infrastructure assets within the municipality. These essential services 
include delivery of water and electricity. Municipal administration processes could 
also be affected by the weakness in cyber-security due to the dependence on ICT. 
Cyber-security policy is one of the essential controls and is focused on the human 
domain in the protection of information infrastructure assets within the organisation. 
Lack of cyber-security policy could result in difficulty in measuring or assessing 
compliance with the organisational cyber-security position/expectation of cyber-
security. Consequence management in the cases related to cyber-security breaches 
could be difficult to achieve. 
(c) Recommended practice for cyber-security policy 
The policy must be documented and approved by the highest authority in the 
municipality. It must contain all the cyber-security expectations on organisationa l 
information infrastructure assets. The policy must be updated continuous ly, 
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preferably at least annually, and as dictated by the current trends in the cyber-security 
environment. Access to the cyber-security policy must be available to all employees. 
The owner of the cyber-security policy must ensure that users/employees are aware 
of the policy.  
2.  My organisation has an overarching supply chain management policy that 
guides the acquisition of information infrastructure 
(a) Why supply chain management policy is necessary 
Control over the acquisition of information infrastructure assets is essential for 
addressing cyber-security concerns. Information infrastructure assets must be 
procured from only trusted and properly vetted vendors and service providers. 
Vendors and service providers become key stakeholders in ensuring business 
continuity. Cyber-security weakness could impact business continuity. Role players 
in business continuity are required to uphold ethical conduct and trustworthiness  
beyond reproach. Supply management policy is a control measure to ensure that the 
municipality conducts business with only credible vendors and services providers.  
(b) Risks associated with the lack of supply chain management policy 
Without trusted partners in business continuity, there is a possibility of disruption to 
service delivery. Information infrastructure assets could be procured to dodgy 
vendors and service providers, thereby compromising protection of information 
assets, and subsequently municipal business continuity. Procurement of information 
infrastructure assets could be difficult to control and monitor. There could be 
manipulation of the procurement process to inspire fraud and corruption which could 
result in dependency on service providers, poor quality of the procured materials, 
and other weaknesses which could result in compromising the cyber-security in the 
municipality. 
(c) Recommended practice for supply chain management policy 
All types of procurement must be guided by an approved supply chain management 
policy. The policy must stipulate guidelines for each type of the materials/services 
to be procured, including emergency procurements. The policy must provide 
guidelines on the conditions for service providers and vendors to comply with in 
order to be accepted and recorded in the municipal suppliers’ database. An audit on 
the supply chain management policy incorporating the suppliers’ database must be 
conducted at least annually by an independent assessor of internal controls. Supply 
chain management policy must prescribe minimum requirements for the acquisit ion 
of information infrastructure assets/services and contract management. 
3.  My organisation has a documented cyber-security strategy 
(a) Why cyber-security strategy is important 
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Cyber-security strategy elevates the cyber-security agenda across the municipality. 
Cyber-security strategy is the business case for cyber-security in the organisation as 
it presents and prioritises cyber-security as an important area, assigns roles and 
responsibilities, and highlights all forms of required commitment from all key 
stakeholders. Cyber-security strategy that is properly aligned to municipal strategy 
permits the allocation of resources on the areas of highest priority based on the risk 
assessment exercise. Cyber-security strategy provides the framework against which 
to measure the cyber-security implementation progress.  
(b) Risks associated with the lack of cyber-security strategy 
Lack of cyber-security strategy presents difficulty in monitoring and controlling the 
implementation of cyber-security. Allocation of resources relating to cyber-security 
measures could be skewed, not aligned to the municipal business strategy and might 
not be based on high priority areas. There could be a lack of co-ordination when 
implementing cyber-security measures in the municipality. Lack of co-ordination 
could lead to costly duplication of efforts and wastage of valuable resources. The 
budget to implement cyber-security initiatives resides in each business unit without 
a distinct cyber-security budget line item.  
(c) Recommended practice for cyber-security strategy 
The municipality must document and approve the cyber-security strategy. The 
strategy must be approved by the highest decision-making body in the municipality. 
The strategy must be aligned to the municipal business strategy which is the 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP). Progress on the implementation of cyber-
security measures must be reported to the cyber-security committee or any equivalent 
or higher structure in the municipality. The cyber-security strategy must be reviewed 
at least annually. There must be continual reviewing and refinement of cyber-security 
strategy with the intention of adapting to changing a cyber-environment and threats 
landscape. There must be a single cyber-security strategy in the municipality that 
drives the cyber-security programme with a designated coordinating structure and 
mandate to drive cyber-security implementation across the organisation 
4.  My organisation has an inventory of critical information infrastructure  
(a) Why an inventory of critical information infrastructure is important 
Identification, location, and functionality are amongst the essential record properties 
to be kept on each critical information infrastructure in the municipality. An 
inventory of critical information infrastructure facilitates ensures the safeguarding of 
such assets. Critical information infrastructures are convolutedly interdependent and 
interrelated. An appropriate inventory of information infrastructure assets ensures 
that all critical infrastructures that are reliant on critical information infrastructures 
are covered and are afforded the necessary cyber-security. Auditing and monitor ing 
Page | 162 
of controls implemented by management to safeguard such information assets 
become easier. Asset management processes, including procurement and 
maintenance also become easier, thereby ensuring business continuity.  
(b) Risks associated with the lack of critical information infrastructure inventory 
Lack of a critical information infrastructure inventory could lead to inadequate 
protection of such assets. Appropriate planning of the necessary safeguard ing 
measures required to protect critical information assets could be compromised since 
some of such critical assets might not be covered due to deliberate or erroneous 
omission. Protection of all critical information infrastructures against cyber threats 
could not be ascertained.  
(c) Recommended practice for the critical information infrastructure inventory 
The municipality must formulate and maintain an inventory of critical information 
infrastructure assets. This inventory must be approved by the highest decision-
making body within the municipality. There must be a designated structure within 
the municipality that is responsible for the compilation of a critical information 
infrastructure inventory. Access to the critical information infrastructure invento ry 
must be controlled and only allowed to those that are permitted to have such access. 
There must be resources assigned to each critical information infrastructure asset for 
business continuity or emergency purposes.  
5.  My organisation has information infrastructure contingency plans 
(a) Why information infrastructure contingency plans are important 
Information infrastructure contingency plans guide the testing and implementat ion 
of business continuity plans in case there is disruption to the normal functioning of 
information infrastructure. The plans provide procedures to be followed after 
disruption to normal business in order to restore normal functioning of such assets. 
Roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and the role players are engaged 
accordingly. Key stakeholders know what to do in the case of emergency or 
disruption to normal functioning of these assets 
(b) Risks associated with the lack of critical information infrastructure contingency 
plans 
There could be delays in the recovery process due to untested and uncoordinated 
recovery processes. There could be costly duplication of efforts. Cyber-security, 
particularly information security could be compromised. Disruption to the service 
delivery mandate could be prolonged which could result in loss of human lives and 
civil society protests/unrest. 
(c) Recommended practice for the critical information infrastructure contingency 
plans 
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Critical information infrastructure contingency plans must be documented and 
regularly tested and signed off by the appropriate authority in the municipality. These 
contingency plans must be facilitated by a central designated structure with 
appropriate mandate and authority. Coordination of testing procedures must be 
centrally driven to ensure participation by all relevant key stakeholders. 
6.  The cyber-security policy is constantly reviewed to incorporate emerging trends  
in the protection of information infrastructures 
(a) Why constantly reviewing of cyber-security policy is important 
Cyber-security policy must be relevant to the existing circumstances impacting 
information infrastructure. The policy must address current cyber threats. As 
technology evolves, so does the cyber-security policy. Adoption of technology 
requires security evolution that is commensurate with the pace of change in the 
technology environment. Reviewing of cyber-security policy must be aligned to the 
pace of the changes impacting the technology currently used by the municipality. To 
remain relevant, the cyber-security policy must be constantly reviewed and updated 
accordingly. 
(b) Risks associated with the lack of cyber-security reviews 
There could be non-alignment of the cyber-security policy to the current technologies 
that are utilised by the municipality. The policy might not fully/adequately address 
the safeguarding of information infrastructure assets. There could be misalignment 
of municipal expectations and the current practices on the ground, and subsequently 
this could lead to difficulty in holding people accountable in cases of cyber-security 
breaches. Consequence management could be difficult to implement. 
(c) Recommended practice for continuous reviewing of cyber-security policy 
Cyber-security policy must be continuously reviewed and the changes resulting from 
such reviews must be appropriately approved. The structure that is responsible for 
cyber-security policy must conduct such continuous reviews. Relevant stakeholders 
must be properly consulted during the review process in order to ensure completeness 
of the review process and buy-in from all key role players. Changes to cyber-security 
policy must be appropriately communicated across the organisation in order to 
enhance compliance with such policy.   
7.  The cyber-security policy contains sections that are relevant to my job 
(a) Why cyber-security policy must contain job-related sections 
To be relevant, cyber-security policy must address job-related activities and 
management expectations from employees when performing their duties. 
Compliance with cyber-security policy must be aligned to individual performance 
assessment. Aligning cyber-security policy to employees’ duties provides guidelines 
on the protection of information assets while performing their individual duties. The 
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cyber-security policy assigns and confirms each employee’s responsibility in the 
safeguarding of information infrastructure assets.  
(b) Risks associated with non-alignment of cyber-security to employees’ duties 
Non-alignment could render cyber-security meaningless to the employees because 
they cannot relate to their duties. Management’s expectations from employees on the 
protection of information infrastructure might not be appropriately communicated to 
relevant employees. If not aligned to individual duties, the cyber-security policy 
cannot be enforceable and compliance with it could be a challenge to achieve. 
Consequence management in cases of cyber-security breaches could be difficult to 
implement. 
(c) Recommended practice for aligning cyber-security policy to individual duties 
In order to be enforceable, the cyber-security policy must be aligned to the duties of 
each employee who is working on the information infrastructure assets. Each 
employee working on information infrastructure must on an annual basis sign 
acknowledgement of understanding the contents of the cyber-security policy that is 
applicable to their working environment.  
8.  The cyber-security policy is aligned to the Municipal Integrated Development 
Plan (IDP) 
(a) Why aligning cyber-security policy to the municipal IDP is important 
Aligning cyber-security policy to the IDP gives authority to resource allocation in 
pursuit of information infrastructure protection. Buy-in from relevant key 
stakeholders could be accomplished as all forms of commitment are required from 
various stakeholders including top management. Attaching IDP to cyber-security 
initiatives could attract commitment and legitimacy of the whole cyber-security 
agenda across the municipality.  
(b) Risks associated with non-alignment of cyber-security policy to the municipa l 
IDP  
Non-alignment to the IDP could render cyber-security policy a cosmetic exercise, 
and subsequently have no commitment and sponsorship from key stakeholders. 
Return on cyber-security investment could be difficult to ascertain. Allocation of 
cyber-security resources could be misdirected, thereby compromising the protection 
of information infrastructure assets. The basis for resources allocation could be 
difficult to substantiate, thereby distancing commitment to and sponsorship of cyber-
security investment. 
(c) Recommended practice for aligning cyber-security policy to the municipal IDP  
Cyber-security policy must be aligned to the municipal IDP in order to attract 
commitment and sponsorship from management and other relevant stakeholders. 
When the municipal IDP has been reviewed, the cyber-security policy alignment 
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must be re-visited in order to incorporate the changes, if any. Aligning cyber-security 
policy to IDP elevates the cyber-security agenda across the organisation. Breaches 
of cyber-security policy must be linked to the possible impact in order to determine 
the level of disciplinary action. 
9.  I believe our cyber-security strategy is aligned to the municipal IDP 
(a) Why aligning cyber-security strategy to the municipal IDP is important 
The municipality is in the business of service delivery to the citizens. Therefore 
aligning the strategy to the IDP could enhance sponsorship opportunities. Everyone 
in the municipality performs to achieve the service delivery mandate of the 
municipality. Linking cyber-security initiatives to municipal service delivery 
enhances the elevation of the cyber-security agenda. An appropriately linked cyber-
security strategy is a gateway to other spheres of government’s involvement.  
(b) Risks associated with non-alignment of cyber-security strategy to the municipa l 
IDP  
Non-alignment could lead to disregard of cyber-security initiatives, thereby 
compromising the protection of information infrastructure. There could be lack of 
commitment to and sponsorship of cyber-security initiatives. There could be 
inappropriately protected information infrastructure assets. Misalignment of cyber-
security strategy could render the strategy meaningless which could lead to wasteful 
and fruitless expenditure. Allocation of resources could be difficult to substantiate.  
(c) Recommended practice for aligning cyber-security strategy to the municipal IDP 
Cyber-security strategy must be aligned to the municipal IDP in order to attract 
sponsorship and elevate the cyber-security agenda. After municipal IDP review, 
cyber-security strategy must be reviewed in order to ensure and enhance alignment. 
This alignment could enhance the safeguarding of information infrastructure because 
cyber-security initiatives will be commensurate with the essential services that ought 
to be provided, as outlined in the IDP document.   
10.  There is a structure or unit within my organisation that is responsible to 
implement the cyber-security strategy 
(a) Why a designated cyber-security structure is important 
A designated cyber-security structure facilitates and coordinates the efforts to protect 
information infrastructure against cyber-related threats. Assigning cyber-security 
responsibilities to a designated structure enforces accountability towards cyber-
security implementation initiatives. A designated structure could enhance research 
and development in the cyber-security environment in the municipality. Reporting 
on the progress of cyber-security implementation is centralised and enhanced.  
(b) Risks associated with disjointed implementation of cyber-security strategy 
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There could be disjointed reporting, monitoring, and control of cyber-security 
activities. This disjointed situation could lead to inconclusive information for 
appropriate decision making on cybersecurity initiatives and investments. 
Appropriate metrics, data, monitoring processes and trends could be difficult to 
obtain and maintain to inform decision making to enhance the protection of 
information infrastructure assets.  
(c) Recommended practice for assigning a designated structure that is responsible to 
implement cyber-security strategy 
A designated cyber-security structure must be established. This structure has the 
responsibility to write and revise cyber-security policy and strategy. The designated 
structure will have the authority to implement and monitor progress against the 
cyber-security strategy. The designated structure is the first port of call when 
users/employees experience or want to report a cyber-security breach. The cyber-
security structure must run the cyber-security programme and report progress to the 
appropriate authority in the municipality. The designated structure must be provided 
with an adequate budget to implement cyber-security risk mitigation strategies across 
the municipality. 
11.  I know what to do if I want to report breaches or violations against the cyber-
security policy 
(a) Why it is important to have a cyber-security call centre/helpdesk 
Users/employees must know where to report suspected cyber-security breaches or 
cyber-security policy violations. A central cyber-security reporting centre assists 
with collecting comprehensive statistics on the types of cyber risks that the 
municipality is exposed to. Cyber-security call-logging assists with the prioritisat ion 
of the reported issue and tracks it down to its resolution. With appropriate skills, 
helpdesk centre staff provide necessary guidance on how to respond to a cyber-
security incident and this helps to contain the possible spreading of the reported 
cyber-security incident. 
(b) Risks associated with the absence of a cyber-security call centre/helpdesk  
Absence of a cyber-security call centre leads to confusion about where to report 
suspected cyber-related incidents. Absence of a cyber-security helpdesk is a 
motivating factor for employees not to report cyber incidents, hence it becomes 
difficult to manage cyber-security incidents at an early stage before the 
issue/situation can spread across the entire organisation or to certain critica l 
information infrastructure assets. Absence of a cyber-security call centre makes it 
difficult to keep trends and analyse reported incidents for future planning and 
informed decision making on enhancing cyber-security in the municipality. 
(c) Recommended practice for cyber-security call centre/helpdesk 
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There must be a cyber-security call centre that operates 24/7 as some information 
infrastructures need to be kept operating all the time. The call centre must have 
appropriately skilled resources. The call centre must have a bird’s eye view of all 
critical information infrastructure assets to ensure business continuity of such critica l 
assets. The call centre must keep and maintain records pertaining to reported issues 
and incidents.  
12.  I know who the custodian of the cyber-security policy is 
(a) Why it is important to have a designated custodian of the cyber-security policy 
The cyber-security policy needs to be continuously reviewed in order to remain 
relevant in the fast paced technology advancement environment in which the 
municipality is participating. Custodianship ensures that cyber-security is reviewed 
and approved by the appropriate authority. Knowing who is responsible for cyber-
security enhances the level of contribution to improve the contents of the policy. The 
custodian of the cyber-security policy is the structure that must be responsible for 
cyber-security awareness initiatives. The custodian must ensure that the policy is 
well communicated to the employees, and employees must acknowledge and declare 
their understanding of the cyber-security policy. 
(b) Risks associated with not knowing who the custodian of cyber-security policy 
is?  
There could be minimal contribution from the key stakeholders on the contents of 
the policy. There could be lack of ownership and accountability regarding the cyber-
security policy. The cyber-security policy could be dormant and hence not 
contributing to advancing the cyber-security agenda in the municipality.  
(c) Recommended practice from the custodianship of the cyber-security policy 
There must be a custodian of the cyber-security policy. The custodian is responsible 
for continuously updating the policy document. The custodian is responsible for 
communicating the contents of the policy across the organisation and also for 
monitoring compliance with the policy.  
13.  My organisation conducts research and development with the aim to enhance 
protection of the information infrastructure 
(a) Why research and development is important in the advancement of information 
infrastructure protection 
Co-ordinated management of research and development on cyber-security and 
information infrastructure protection promotes the advancement of protecting the 
information infrastructure against cyber risks. Research and development promotes 
cyber-security alignment to current trends in the cyberspace. Outdated protection 
mechanisms compromise cyber-security and hence protection of critical information 
infrastructures.  
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(b) Risks associated with the lack of cyber-security research and development  
There could be a heavy/extensive dependency on external institutions to provide 
insight and advice on the advancement of cyber-security initiatives in the 
municipality. This dependency might be very costly to the municipality. This 
dependency can be exploited for business gains and become a fertile environment 
for fraud and corruption, thereby compromising information infrastructure 
dependency. 
(c) Recommended practice for the research and development towards the 
advancement of information infrastructure protection 
A budget must be allocated for research and development in pursuit of safeguard ing 
the information infrastructure. Cyber-security implementation must be informed by 
research and development in the municipality. There must be collaboration with 
appropriate stakeholders, including other spheres of government, vendors, and 
tertiary education institutions. Employees must be allowed to join professiona l 
institutes and to attend relevant conferences, workshop, and seminars.  
14.  Protection of information infrastructure in my organisation is guided by the 
industry best practices 
(a) Why industry best practices are important in protecting information 
infrastructures against cyber-threats 
Adoption of industry best practices promotes appropriate safeguarding of 
information infrastructure assets, particularly critical information infrastructures, 
against cyber threats. Protection mechanisms that are recommended by the industry 
standards have been tested and proved to be working in general. Industry good 
practices provide/offer guidance on how to implement effective controls to secure 
the critical assets. The industry practices include Cobit, and various ISO standards 
that are applicable to cyber-security, and critical information infrastructure such as 
ICT. There are also standards that are applicable to PCS.  
(b) Risks associated with non-adoption of industry best practices in safeguard ing 
information infrastructure 
Protection of information infrastructure could be compromised due to the use of 
unverified/untested cyber-security mechanisms. There could be a lack of direction in 
pursuit of protecting information infrastructure assets. It could be difficult to involve 
vendors and service providers because they might not be familiar with the adopted 
practices if they are not in line with industry best practices. Systems downtown could 
be prolonged due to limited exposure to organisational specific practices which 
might be against the known and well adopted industry practices. There could be a 
risk of depending on a few individuals within the organisation who are the only 
people who know the organisational practices. These few individuals might hold the 
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municipality to ransom. There could be duplication of efforts and costly processes to 
protect the information infrastructure. 
(c)  Recommended practice for the adoption of industry best practices in pursuit of 
information infrastructure protection 
There must be co-ordinated efforts to adopt industry best practices to protect 
information infrastructure assets against cyber risks. A budget allocated to advance 
the adoption of industry practices is necessary. If required, relevant resources must 
be trained in adopting/implementing international/best industry standards. There 
must be standardised adoption of such industry practices. For all ICT-related 
activities or functions, there must be an adoption of specific best practices 
consistently across the organisation. For PCS processes, it is necessary to 
consistently adopt best practices. There must be uniformity in the adoption of best 
practices within the Municipality. Compliance to industry best practices must be 
monitored and audited frequently, at least once a month.  
CYBER-SECURITY GOVERNANCE DOMAIN 
15.  My organisational strategic risk register contains cyber-security risk  
(a) Why it is important to include cyber-security risks in the strategic risk register 
An approved strategic risk register is an important tool used by management amongst 
other things to allocate funding/budget for the implementation of risk mitigat ion 
strategies. If cyber-security risk forms part of strategic risk, it becomes easier for 
management to allocate the necessary resources. Strategic risks receive appropriate 
management consideration and priority.  
(b) Risks associated with exclusion of cyber-security from the strategic risk register 
There could be lack of executive support. The cyber-security agenda could not be 
elevated to strategic level. The Cyber-security strategy could be misaligned with the 
municipal IDP. There could be lack of sponsorship on cyber-security initiatives. 
Could not be audited as audits are risk based. 
(c) Recommended practice for the inclusion of cyber-security in the strategic risk 
register 
Cyber-security risk must be included in the strategic risk register. Due to the possible 
impact of cyber-security breaches of municipal operations and mandate, cyber-
security risk must be elevated to the strategic level. Including cyber-security in the 
strategic risk register ensures that cyber-security will be audited as internal audit 
plans are risk based.  
16.  Management has allocated adequate budget  to implement the cyber-security 
policy 
(a) Why allocating budget to implement the cyber-security policy is important 
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The cyber-security policy must be of high quality in order to properly articulate the 
municipal position on cyber-security. The policy must cover all information 
infrastructure assets within the organisation and therefore must be a comprehensive 
and well researched document. In order to cover all the necessary areas, the policy 
must be developed by skilled people. Therefore, necessary funding must be made 
available to drive the advancement of the cyber-security policy. The cyber-security 
policy must be marketed and communicated across the municipality – all these 
activities require some form of sponsorship and hence the need for allocating budget 
for this item.  
(b) Risks associated with non-allocation of budget in implementing the cyber-
security policy 
The cyber-security policy could not serve its purpose if it does not address all key 
areas in the protection of information infrastructure. Protection of critica l 
information infrastructure could be compromised because activities that are 
embedded in the successful implementation of the policy might not be funded and 
not executed/actioned. The cyber-security policy could be dormant due to lack of 
sponsorship to assist with the support necessary for continuously updating, 
reviewing, and communicating the policy across the municipality. Lack of budget 
could frustrate the implementation of the cyber-security strategy. 
(c) Recommended practice for the allocation of adequate budget to advance cyber-
security policy implementation 
Management must allocate adequate budget in order to implement the cyber-security 
policy across the municipality. To implement the cyber-security policy, there must 
be a proper cyber-security strategy. Therefore, funding the implementation of the 
cyber-security policy promotes the safeguarding of information infrastructure assets. 
Allocation of a cyber-security policy implementation budget must be commensurate 
with the protection expected for critical information infrastructure assets 
17.  Risk management processes guide the implementation of cyber-security 
controls in my organisation 
(a) Why risk management processes are essential in implementing cyber-security 
controls 
Cyber-security risks must be appropriately mitigated in order to ascertain that 
organisational objectives and mandates are achieved. The rationale for resource 
allocation could be difficult to justify if cyber-security does not incorporate or is not 
covered in the risk management processes in the municipality. Risk management 
processes elevate the agenda of cyber-security and justify the provision of a budget 
and other forms of resources allocation. 
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(b) Risks associated with cyber-security that is not aligned to risk management 
processes 
There could be lack of management buy-in and to provide the much needed 
sponsorship. Cyber-security implementation could prove difficult to justify its 
existence. It could also be difficult to raise the cyber-security agenda to executive 
management level. Cyber-security risks have the potential to halt delivery of 
essential services. This could lead to loss of life and other forms of loss and or 
devastating consequences. 
(c) Recommended practice for aligning cyber-security to risk management processes 
Cyber-security must be aligned to risk management processes in the municipality. 
Implemented cyber-security controls must be continuously tested/evaluated to 
provide assurance that they mitigate the risks that they were implemented to mitigate. 
Risk assessment must be conducted on cyber-security, and on information 
infrastructure.  
18.  Management has provided guidance on the regulatory requirements pertaining 
to the information infrastructure that I work with 
(a) Why management must provide guidance on information infrastructure 
regulatory requirements 
There are regulatory requirements that the municipality must abide by in pursuit of 
their constitutional mandate of service delivery. These regulatory requirements 
prescribe minimum requirements on operating information infrastructure. These 
regulatory requirements include various ICT Acts. 
(b) Risks associated with non-conformance with applicable regulations 
There could be information security compromise leading to cyber-security 
breach/violation. There could be exposure to litigations due to breaches of various 
laws. 
(c) Recommended practice for regulatory requirement pertaining to information 
infrastructure 
The municipality must compile a list of all applicable Acts and subsequently check 
compliance with those laws continuously. There must be user awareness campaigns 
for all the identified Acts. 
19.  Management has allocated adequate people to protection information 
infrastructures 
(a) Why allocating adequate people to safeguard information infrastructure is 
important 
People are the most important assets in the organisation. It is essential to allocate 
sufficient people to strengthen the cyber-security protection of the information 
infrastructure. People operate technology and information infrastructure to advance 
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the organisational mandate. Allocating adequately means having enough people to 
work on the cyber-security policy, and monitoring the implementation of the policy. 
Having enough people means there are sufficient people working on cyber-security 
user awareness, working at the cyber-security call centre or helpdesk, to ensure 
cyber-security strategy implementation as a whole. 
(b) Risks associated with inadequate people allocated to information infrastructure 
protection 
Without enough people to execute the required activities for protection of 
information infrastructure, safeguarding of these assets could be compromised. 
There could be serious issues with people working overtime and could result in 
disgruntled employees, with low morale. 
(c) Recommended practice for the allocation of adequate people to safeguard 
information infrastructure assets. 
Management must allocate adequate people to the activities that must protect the 
municipal information infrastructure. Allocation of people must be commensurate 
with the level of protection required/expected. The number of people allocated must 
be continuously reviewed in order to be aligned with the evolution in the protection 
of information infrastructure.  
20.  Management enforces compliance with cyber-security 
(a) Why enforcing cyber-security compliance is important 
Enforcing compliance is a form of monitoring and controlling the cyber-security 
activities. Enforcing compliance assists management in ensuring that 
people/employees comply with applicable policies, and it reassures them that 
organisational objectives could be achieved and sustained. Enforcing cyber-security 
compliance inculcates the culture of cyber-security in the municipality, thereby 
advancing the safeguarding of critical information infrastructure. 
(b) Risks associated with non-enforcement of compliance to cyber-security 
People are the weakest link in protecting information infrastructure. They need to be 
reminded all the time of what the organisation expects with regard to their role in 
cyber-security activities. Without compliance there could be no safeguarding of 
information infrastructure. Areas that need management attention would be difficult 
to identify early enough when it might be cheaper to address. It could be difficult to 
run a successful cyber-security programme without compliance. 
(c) Recommended practice for enforcing compliance to cyber-security 
Management must plan and schedule time to conduct testing of compliance with the 
cyber-security policy on information infrastructure. There must be a budget allocated 
to testing and enforcing cyber-security compliance. After compliance testing, there 
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must be a report to senior management detailing the outcome of the compliance 
testing exercise. 
21.  In my organisation there are oversight structures/committees that hold 
management to account for the protection of information infrastructure  
(a) Why oversight committees are important in safeguarding information 
infrastructure 
The oversight committee holds management to account for the internal controls that 
have been implemented to mitigate the risks that have been identified in the 
municipality. These committees enhance the cyber-security, and the identification of 
areas that require management attention. If working properly, these committees 
enforce/promote consequence management on breaches and non-performance. 
Oversight reports also provide authority to allocate necessary resources to achieving 
organisation objectives. 
(b) Risks associated with the lack of oversight committees 
Consequence management could be compromised. There could be no checks and 
balances implemented to determine if management are working or not. There could 
be no accountability on the side of management, which might have a negative ripple 
effect on achieving municipal objectives.  
(c) Recommended practice for oversight committees on safeguarding of information 
infrastructure 
There must be oversight committee(s) for the information infrastructure. These 
committees must meet at least quarterly to discuss the affairs of their portfolio s. 
These committees include the audit and risk committees, the infrastructure 
committee and Exco. Because cyber-security is in the strategic risk register, there 
must be close monitoring of the mitigation controls that management has 
implemented to deal with the associated risks. 
22.  Internal audit operational plans incorporate audits or reviews on information 
infrastructures on an annual basis 
(a) Why it is important for the audit plan to incorporate audits on information 
infrastructure 
Independent and objective assurance in appraising the design and effectiveness of 
controls implemented by management is essential in ensuring that the municipal ity 
achieves and sustains its mandate. Therefore these objective and independent 
appraisals must include information infrastructures. Since internal audit plans are 
risks based, it becomes easier to include information infrastructure if cyber-security 
is covered in the risk management processes and included in the strategic risk 
register.  
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(b) Risks associated with the exclusion of information infrastructure in the interna l 
audit plan 
There could be assurance that internal controls around the protection of information 
infrastructure are working as intended by management. The audit and risk 
committees would not provide the necessary oversight on information infrastructure. 
Control deficiencies might not be properly interrogated and subsequently hold 
management to account for and committed to correcting those control deficiencies. 
Control deficiencies in information infrastructures could have devastating 
consequences in the function of the municipality as a whole.  
(c) Recommended practice for including information infrastructure in the interna l 
audit annual operational plan 
Auditing information infrastructure must be a line item in the internal audit annual 
operational plan. The time allocated to conduct the audit on information 
infrastructure must be aligned to the complexity of the assets to be audited.  
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23.  Management has input in the internal audit operational plan before the plan is 
implemented 
(a) Why it is important for management to have input in the internal audit operational 
plan 
Management is responsible for implementing systems of control in the municipality. 
Management knows how controls ought to be designed and implemented. Therefore 
it is essential for management to have input in the internal audit plan in order to offer 
the necessary advice on the completeness of areas to be tested during the audit 
process. Engaging management improves cooperation during the audit processes, 
and also prepares management for the audit. 
(b) Risks associated with exclusion of management involvement before the audit 
operational plan is implemented 
There could be a lack of the much needed support to be provided to the audit team 
(there could be no buy-in by management). Lack of management involvement in 
preparing the annual audit plan could frustrate the execution of the audit process. 
Audit efforts could be directed at less important areas. There could be wastage of 
resources if management believes that the audit was focusing on irrelevant areas.  
(c) Recommended practice for management involvement in preparation of the 
annual audit plan 
Management must be consulted before the internal audit plan can be put into 
operation. Co-operation of management is essential when auditing the controls in the 
organisation. Management must have input on the timing of the audit process and 
they must have input in the scope of the audit. 
24.  Audit committee approves the internal audit operational plans before the plan 
is implemented 
(a) Why it is important that the audit committee approves the audit operational plan 
before being implemented 
Internal audit reports functionally to the audit committee. The audit committee 
ensures the independency of the internal audit committee. Members of the audit 
committee are not employees of the municipality and hence the independence of the 
internal audit function. By approving the internal plan, the audit committee confirms 
that the audit coverage is comprehensive and covers most of the high priority areas 
and high risk areas. The audit committee monitors the implementation of the plan it 
has approved. 
(b) Risks associated with non-approval of the audit plan by the audit committee 
The focus of the audit plan might not be comprehensive and directed at priority areas. 
The committee might not provide the required oversight on the implementation of 
the plan. Independence of the internal audit function could be compromised.  
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(c) Recommended practice for the approval of the internal audit operation by the 
audit committee 
The internal audit operational plan must be approved by the audit committee to 
enhance and sustain the internal audit’s independence and objectivity. Once 
approved, the internal audit function must report at least quarterly to the audit 
committee on the progress of operational implementation.  
25.  Management has implemented clear asset management practices  
(a) Why it is important for management to implement asset management practices 
Some of the information infrastructure assets in the municipality support the 
provision of essential services and other types of critical infrastructure. Therefore it 
becomes essential that proper asset management principles are adopted to ensure that 
continuous provision of essential services is not compromised/disturbed. Asset 
management practices ensure that there is proper acquisition of information assets, 
there is a proper maintenance plan for critical infrastructure assets, and there is proper 
disposal of old or unwanted assets. 
(b) Risks associated with the lack of clear asset management practices 
There could be delays in the acquisition of critical information infrastructure assets 
which could negatively impact business continuity. There could be no proper 
maintenance plan for critical information infrastructure which could result in 
challenges to sustain business continuity. Information infrastructure assets could be 
disposed inappropriately, thereby exposing the municipality to information security 
risks.  
(c) Recommended practice for implementing asset management practices 
Municipality must implement asset management practices to guide the management 
of information infrastructure assets. At least an inventory of critical information 
infrastructure must be at the core of such asset management practices. There must be 
a designated structure to ensure that critical information infrastructure assets are 
appropriately managed through the adoption of appropriate asset management 
practices. 
26.  Management understands the possible impact of cyber-security threats to 
municipal service delivery  
(a) Why it is important for management to understand the possible consequences of 
cyber threats to municipal operations? 
Understanding of the possible impact of cyber-security breach or violation is 
essential for management because their effort to safeguard information infrastructure 
would be commensurate to such possible impact. Management understanding of 
possible impact serves as a motivating factor to acquire their buy-in, sponsorship, 
and other various forms of support.  
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(b) Risks associated with management not understanding possible consequences of 
cyber-security breach/violation 
There could be inadequate allocation of resources to support the cyber-security 
agenda. Cyber-security can be left in the hands of an individual, thereby 
compromising its functionality. There could be sponsorship for the cyber-security 
programme. The cyber-security programme may not align with the municipal IDP. 
Management could view cyber-security as an ‘add on’ or nice to have as opposed to 
it being viewed as an investment, and critical tool to ensure continuity of the 
municipal business. 
(c) Recommended practice for management understanding of possible consequences 
of cyber-security breach/violation 
Management must be informed of the possible consequences of cyber-security 
breaches so that they can commit and provide the necessary support to implement 
appropriate risk mitigating controls. A cyber-security designated structure must 
ensure that management is made aware of possible consequences through user 
awareness sessions. Audit reports must also alert management to the possible 
consequences that could results from deficiencies in the systems of internal controls.  
CYBER-SECURITY TECHNICAL OPERATIONS DOMAIN 
27.  There are service level agreements between my municipality and the service 
providers working on information infrastructures 
(a) Why it is important that there are service level agreements between the service 
providers and the municipality 
Working on information infrastructure requires 24/7 available of support due to the 
dependency of the Municipal business process on such infrastructures. Therefore 
there must be a working relationship that ensures that necessary support will be 
available as and when required by the Municipality. Also working on information 
infrastructure requires high degree of confidential and trustworthiness. Therefore it 
is essential that there are service level agreements in place for all service providers 
that are working on information infrastructure assets. 
(b) Risks associated with the lack of service level agreements 
Municipal business continuity could be compromised as some of the critical services 
are provided by services providers who are not controlled by the municipal policies. 
It could be a challenging or daunting task to hold service providers accountable in 
case of non-performance and or cyber-security violation on their part without service 
level agreements.  
(c) Recommended practice for the service level agreement 
There must be an appropriate service level agreement for each outsourced service on 
information infrastructure. The service level agreement must be appropriately 
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compiled by management with the involvement of the municipal legal services unit. 
In order to be enforced, a service level agreement must be signed by both parties, 
which in this case are the municipality and the service provider. 
28.  Management is monitoring the services provided by the service 
providers/consultants against the service level agreements 
(a) Why it is important to monitor service providers’ performance against the service 
level agreement 
Service level agreements serve as a motivation to service providers to perform 
according to the municipal expectations. Monitoring service level agreements 
enforces the service provider to deliver their services as required by the municipality. 
Monitoring service level agreements also advances business continuity of the 
outsourced services.  
(b) Risks associated with the lack of service level agreement monitoring 
Outsourced services might not be delivered as expected by the municipality, and 
subsequently business continuity could be compromised. Service providers can 
charge for services that they have not performed, leading to financial loss by the 
municipality. Poorly performing service providers can continue to conduct business 
with the municipality despite their poor performances.  
(c) Recommended practice for monitoring service level agreements 
Management must monitor service level agreements on all outsourced services on 
information infrastructure. Service level agreements must contain punitive clauses in 
case of non-performance and or breach of trust by the service provider. The reports 
on service level agreements must be shared with/communicated to the supply chain 
management function in order to be officially communicated with the service 
provider, and for future reference purposes. 
29.  My organisation has deployed technologies to protect information 
infrastructures against cyber threats 
(a) Why it is important to deploy automated technologies to safeguard information 
infrastructure 
Appropriate automated technologies are effective and efficient in detecting cyber 
threats, prevent threats to access information infrastructure, and monitor activities on 
information infrastructure. These automated technologies perform activities that 
human beings cannot perform. By their very nature, information infrastructure assets 
require automated technologies to be protected. Physical security is also important. 
If appropriately implemented, automated technologies offer 24/7 protection, and 
monitoring of information infrastructure assets. 
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(b) Risks associated with lack of automated technologies to safeguard information 
infrastructure 
Besides physical security, information infrastructure requires only automated 
technologies in order to be protected. Without automated technologies, infrastructure 
assets would not be protected and would be exposed to cyber threats. 
(c) Recommended practice for automated technologies to protect information 
infrastructure 
The designated cyber-security function must implement current and applicable 
automated technologies to safeguard information infrastructures. This goes hand to 
hand with asset management practices. Automated security technologies must be 
deployed and implemented for all critical information infrastructure assets within the 
municipality. The designated cyber-security structure must keep an inventory of all 
automated technologies implemented in each information infrastructure asset.  
30.  Access to information infrastructures is controlled through identification and 
authentication 
(a) Why it is important to control access through identification and authentication 
Keeping track of and records on the activities on information infrastructure is 
important because it provides evidence of who accessed the resource, and 
furthermore in other cases, it aligns the actions performed on the resources by the 
individuals, thereby confirming accountability behind those actions that have been 
performed. User identification ensures that the municipality knows who the 
individual is that accessed the infrastructure asset. Knowing who the individual is, is 
not sufficient. That individual must confirm whether they are the person. They must 
prove that they are indeed the one purported to be them.  
(b) Risks associated with lack of identification and authentication of users when 
accessing information infrastructure 
There could be uncontrolled access to information infrastructure, thereby 
compromising the protection of such assets. Uncontrolled access could lead to 
unauthorised modification of information assets, and also could lead to lack of 
accountability. If you cannot identify who performed certain activities on 
information infrastructure, it also means that you cannot hold anyone accountable 
for such activities. 
(c) Recommended practice for user identification and authentication when accessing 
information infrastructure assets 
There must be proper identification and authentication mechanisms for all users who 
access information infrastructure assets. There must be a unique identification for 
each user in order to enforce accountability.  
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31.  Management has adopted industry best practices to protect information 
infrastructure against cyber-threats 
(a) Why it is important to adopt industry standards to secure information 
infrastructure 
At an operational level, industry standards are widely known and used by various 
institutions, and if the municipality adopts these widely known standards, support of 
information infrastructure that uses those standards becomes easily available. The 
standards are universal tools that achieve consistency in the application of 
information infrastructures. Service providers who are known and understand these 
universal standards have an advantage when providing support to informatio n 
infrastructure assets. Industry standards offer credibility for the work done on the 
information infrastructure, only if they have been used to such work. Industry 
standards offer critical and credible guidelines to be adopted by the municipal ity 
when safeguarding the information infrastructure 
(b) Risks associated with non-adoption of industry best practices/standards 
Organisational siloed processes could be adopted to protect the information 
infrastructure which could prove to be costly and unreliable. Organisational siloed 
processes could be difficult to outsource and or to be supported by service providers. 
It could be difficult for management to rely on the effectiveness of controls 
implemented without reference to industry best practices or standards. There could 
be lack of direction and insight without the guidance of industry best practices 
(c) Recommended practice for the adoption of industry best practices 
The cyber-security designated structure must develop an inventory of industry 
standards that can be adopted by the municipality for each type and use of 
information infrastructure. The rationale for a selected standard must be clear and 
communicated to relevant management. Once a specific industry best practice has 
been adopted, compliance to such a standard must be monitored and enforced.   
32.  Anti-virus software is installed on our laptops, desktops, and other devices 
(a) Why it is important to use anti-virus software for the applicable information 
infrastructure 
 Prevention is better than cure because it is much cheaper to implement than fighting 
fires trying to contain the spread of the virus in the information infrastructure system. 
Anti-virus software is used as a proactive mechanism to prevent known viruses from 
infecting the information infrastructure. Implementing anti-virus software is a risk 
mitigating mechanism, and it limits the possibility of the information infrastructure 
becoming infected with viruses.  
(b) Risks associated with not implementing anti-virus software 
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The information infrastructure could be infected by viruses, thereby compromis ing 
information security. It could be costly to fix the information infrastructure once 
infected by viruses. There is also a possibility of disturbance/disruption to service 
delivery. 
(c) Recommended practice for the implementation of anti-virus software 
The cyber-security designated structure must ensure that applicable information 
infrastructure assets are uploaded with the current anti-virus software. Management 
of anti-virus software must follow appropriate asset management practices. Where 
applicable, there must be licences for each type and copy of anti-virus software that 
is used by the municipality. 
33.  Audits are conducted to provide assurance of the adequacy and effectiveness of 
controls that have been implemented to protect information infrastructure  
(a) Why it is important to conduct audits on information infrastructure controls 
Management must ensure that the business objective is achieved through, amongst 
others, implementing appropriate risk mitigating controls. Management needs to get 
assurance on the adequacy and effectiveness of such implemented controls. Auditing 
these controls is the appropriate mechanism for management to determine if the 
controls are working as intended. Auditing of controls assists management to identify 
control deficiencies and offer the opportunity to fix those gaps. Auditing can be 
conducted by various structures including management themselves, external auditors 
(Auditor General), internal audit, and the information infrastructure vendors. 
(b) Risks associated with not conducting the necessary audits 
Weakness in the implemented controls may not be detected early enough to correct 
them before being exploited. Auditing is a motivating tool to get all relevant 
stakeholders to be on their toes when it comes to the effectiveness of controls, and 
therefore without an audit, monitoring of controls could be compromised and 
weakening the protection of information infrastructure against cyber risks. 
(c) Recommended practice for auditing information infrastructure controls 
Because cyber-security is in the strategic risk register, management must ensure that 
audits are continuously conducted to test the adequacy and effectiveness of 
implemented controls in order to identify areas that require management’s urgent 
attention. The results of the audits must be communicated to applicable stakeholders 
and structures such as the audit and risk committees. Where controls have been 
violated, consequence management must be implemented, and must be constantly 
applied.  
34.  The incident management procedures are adequate to resolve cyber-security 
incidents 
(a) Why it is important to have cyber-security incident management procedures 
Page | 182 
Cyber-security incident procedures provide guidelines to be followed in cases of 
emergency or after declaration of a cyber-security incident. Incident management 
must be continuously tested and various stakeholders must be involved in such 
testing processes. Incident management procedures make it possible to contain the 
cyber incident, and get the information infrastructure up and running again in the 
shortest possible time. Relevant people know what to do in the case of a cyber-
incident, and this minimises the information infrastructure down time. 
(b) Risks associated with the absence of cyber-security incident management 
procedures 
There could be confusion about the roles and responsibilities when a cyber-security 
incident has been declared, and this could prolong the information infrastructure 
downtime, and also may compromise information security. Containment of the 
cyber-incident could be difficult to achieve and the situation could escalate if not 
dealt with in a proper manner as it should be documented in the incident management 
procedures. 
(c) Recommended practice for the implementation of cyber-security incident 
management 
Cyber-security incident management procedures must be documented and 
continuously tested by the cyber-security designated structure. Incident management 
procedures must be audited at least annually in order to be assured that they are 
continuously relevant to the prevailing conditions of information infrastructures. All 
critical information infrastructures must be linked or covered by cyber-security 
incident management procedures. 
35.  The building that I work in is adequately protected to secure the information 
infrastructure 
(a) Why it is important to safeguard the building that houses the information 
infrastructure? 
Physical access to the building that contains the information infrastructure must be 
adequately controlled. Uncontrolled access to the building could compromise 
information infrastructure protection. There could be theft of information 
infrastructure which could expose the municipality to information security risks. 
Spying devices could be implanted in the building, thereby compromising the safety 
of the information infrastructure. It is therefore essential that the cyber-security 
designated structure implements measures to advance the safety of the buildings that 
house information infrastructures. 
(b) Risks associated with the unsafe building that houses information infrastructure 
There could be theft of information infrastructure, thereby compromising business 
continuity, and exposing the municipality to information security risks. Uncontrolled 
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access could expose the municipality to various threats including implanting spying 
software, and hijacking of employees with the intention of getting access to 
information infrastructures. 
(c) Recommended practice for securing the buildings that house information 
infrastructure 
All the buildings that house information infrastructure must be properly secured in 
order to limit uncontrolled access to those buildings. The cyber-security designated 
structure must create an inventory of all the buildings that house critical information 
infrastructure, and ensure that access to such buildings is controlled. Depending on 
the housed information infrastructure, the type of security to be implemented must 
be aligned to the importance of the information infrastructure in the building. 
MANAGE HUMAN ISSUES IN CYBER-SECURITY DOMAIN 
36.  Employees’ activities on the information infrastructure are monitored 
(a) Why it is important to monitor employees’ activities on the information 
infrastructure 
Municipal information infrastructures must be used only to advance the business 
interests of the municipality. Due to the susceptibility of the information 
infrastructure, the cyber-security designated structure must monitor the activities of 
employees on information infrastructure. Some of the employees’ activities could 
motivate or invite unwanted attention to harmful outsiders. Some employees’ 
activities on information infrastructure can expose the municipality and its resources 
to cyber ills and risks and hence the control and monitoring is essential. 
(b) Risks associated with uncontrolled and or unmonitored employees’ activities on 
information infrastructure 
 There could be unauthorised usage of municipal bandwidth which could impact the 
performance of the information infrastructure. Some activities could expose 
organisational assets to information security risks. Employees’ access and activit ie s 
on social media and related platforms must be appropriately controlled because they 
can divulge sensitive organisational resources and information. Accessing a rogue 
harmful website can introduce dangerous viruses and other cyber-ills to the 
municipal information infrastructure. 
(c) Recommended practice on monitoring employees’ activities on information 
infrastructure 
Cyber-security policy must be clear on the acceptable use of information 
infrastructure. The cyber-security designated structure/function must deploy 
automated tools to monitor and control employees’ activities on the information 
infrastructure. 
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37.  In my organisation action is taken against employees who violate cyber-security 
policy 
(a) Why it is important to take action against employees who violate cyber-security 
policy 
The consequences associated with breach of cyber-security could be devastating and 
therefore management must take a decisive position on addressing violations to 
cyber-security policy. The action taken against the culprit employees must be aligned 
to the consequence and or possible consequence of the exposure due to the security 
breach. Taking action inculcates the culture of cyber-security in the municipality. 
Action to be taken is not only limited to punitive measures but it can also include 
training and awareness. 
(b) Risks associated with not taking action against the employees who violate cyber-
security policy 
There could be no consequence management on the employees that violate cyber-
security policy. If action is not taken, other employees could be motivated to do 
similar acts in the future and it will be difficult to hold them accountable as the 
precedence had already been set. It could prove to be difficult to instil the required 
culture of cyber-security. 
(c) Recommended practice for taking appropriate actions against employees who 
violate cyber-security policy. 
Management must ensure that employees are aware of what is expected of them 
when working on information infrastructure. Management must satisfy themselves 
that employees are aware of the cyber-security policy. Breaches to cyber-security 
policy must be properly investigated by a competent structure. If it is confirmed that 
the cyber-security policy has been breached, then management must take appropriate 
disciplinary actions against the involved employee. The results of the disciplina ry 
action must be shared with relevant employees in order to serve as a motivation not 
to commit similar acts. 
38.  Employees are made aware of the cyber-security policy contents  
(a) Why it is important to educate employees on the cyber-security policy contents 
The cyber-security policy states the position of the municipality in securing the 
information infrastructure. The designated cyber-security function must educate 
employees on cyber-security content to make them aware of and to understand what 
is expected from them when working on the information infrastructure. If the cyber-
security policy has not been properly communicated to employees, enforcement to 
comply with such a policy can be a challenging task if not a futile exercise.  
(b) Risks associated with not educating employees on the contents of cyber-security 
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Normally employees are busy with their duties as detailed in their job descriptions. 
If employees are not trained in the contents of cyber-security that are essential and 
relevant to the type and nature of information infrastructure that they are operating, 
they are prone to make honest mistakes and be negligent when performing their 
duties. If employees have not been educated on the contents of cyber-security, it 
would be difficult to enforce compliance with such a policy. It could also be difficult 
to hold employees accountable and take action against them in case of cyber-security 
violation. 
(c) Recommended practice for educating employees on the contents of cyber-
security policy. 
The designated cyber-security structure must educate employees on the contents of 
the cyber-security policy that are relevant to the types and nature of information 
infrastructure being operated or used by the employees. After conducting such an 
education exercise, employees must be required to acknowledge receipt of such 
education/training and must be required to sign the attendance register after those 
training sessions. Changes to cyber-security policy must be appropriately 
communicated to the affected employees 
39.  Employees know where to report suspicious illicit cyber-security activities 
(a) Why it is important for employees to know where to report suspicious illic it 
cyber-security activities 
Employees are the eyes and ears of the municipality. Therefore it is important to 
report suspicious activity that could disturb or interrupt the normal function of the 
municipal business processes including information infrastructure. If the employees 
know where to report the cyber illicit activities, they are motivated to report such 
activities. They are also motivated to report such activities as soon as possible, 
thereby minimising the possible impact of such illicit activity. 
(b) Risks associated with employees not knowing where to report suspicious illic it 
cyber activities 
There could be delays in reporting dangerous and harmful activities that could harm 
and or destruct the normal operation of the information infrastructure. The delays in 
reporting could lead to escalation of the harmful activity. Normally delays are 
proportionately associated with costs. Not knowing where to report incidents could 
be very costly to the municipality.  
(c) Recommended practice for making employees aware of where to report 
suspicious illicit cyber activities 
The designated cyber-security structure must invest in making users/employees 
aware of what to do and where to report suspicious illicit cyber activities. Employees 
must be encouraged to report such activities as soon as possible after identifying 
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them. Employees must be made aware that they can also report such activit ie s 
anonymously if they are uncomfortable to disclose their identities.  
40.  Employees receive adequate training in the information infrastructure they 
operate 
(a) Why it is important for employees to be trained in the information infrastructure 
that they operate 
It is essential that employees are trained in how to operate the information 
infrastructure because they can make costly errors that could expose the municipal ity 
to information security risks. Therefore, training is a control that eliminates or limits 
the number of honest errors that could be committed by employees. Inappropriate 
use of the information infrastructure could also expose the municipality to cyber 
threats.  
(b) Risks that are associated with not training employees in the information 
infrastructure that they operate 
Information infrastructure could be exposed to cyber ills such as unknowingly 
disclosing the IT system’s access credentials to strangers or unauthorised personnel. 
Lack of training can also compromise information security where employees 
unknowingly protect their system credentials with weak passwords or even sharing 
their credentials with their colleagues. Also, system administrators may not perform 
hardening of hardware and operating systems before implementation. Network 
administrators must be trained to conduct vulnerability assessment in order to 
identify network exposures to cyber threats. 
(c) Recommended practice for training employees in the information infrastructure 
that they operate 
Management must continuously train employees in the information infrastructure 
that they operate or are exposed to. Employees must be allowed to attend 
conferences, workshops, seminars and other training-related activities that are 
pertinent to the information infrastructure that they operate. Attending such training 
activities will keep them updated with the current trends impacting on those 
infrastructures. 
41.  I am aware of cyber-security threats affecting the information assets I work 
with 
(a) Why it is important that the employees are aware of cyber-security threats 
affecting the information assets that they operate 
It is essential that each employee is aware of possible cyber threats that could affect 
the information assets because they can determine the early warning of such threats 
or the employee can act accordingly to minimise exposure to such threats. It becomes  
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easier for employees to protect something because they know to prevent it in the first 
place.  
(b) Risks associated with employees not knowing of the cyber-security threats that 
may affect the information assets they work with 
Employees are the weakest link in information infrastructure protection. Employees’ 
behaviour can encourage some cyber-security threats to exploit the vulnerability if 
they are not aware of those threats. Employees’ behaviour and attitude can perpetuate 
some cyber-security threats. Not knowing the threats is fertile environment for the 
threats to exploit the vulnerabilities. If employees are not aware of threats, there is a 
large possibility that the exposure or vulnerabilities that can be exploited are not 
known as well, thereby compromising the security of information and related 
infrastructure. Employees could be inadequately prepared to behave in a manner that 
would limit the likelihood or impact of such threats.  
(c) Recommended practice for employees to know the current trends in cyber-
security threats that could impact on the information infrastructure that they work 
with 
 The designated cyber-security structure must conduct research continuously and or 
collaborate with relevant stakeholders in order to enhance knowledge on the current 
trends in the threats that could affect the municipal information infrastructure. The 
current trends must be properly communicated with all relevant employees in order 
to make them aware of the risks. Information on the threats must be continuous ly 
disseminated to relevant employees in order to sensitise them to act and behave in a 
manner that would limit the risk exposure. 
42.  I am aware that organisational internet and e-mail systems should be  used for 
business purposes 
(a) Why it is important that employees are aware that the organisational information 
infrastructure must be used for business purposes 
Municipal information infrastructure such as the internet and e-mail systems must 
only be used for conducting municipal business. Any other use besides the offic ia l 
use could invite dodgy characters to interact with the employee. People using the 
Internet and e-mail can hide their characters and activities that could later be harmful 
to business operations of the municipality.  
(b) Risks associated with not utilising municipal internet and e-mail systems for 
official business only 
Other activities besides the official ones can be a fertile environment to engage with 
criminals which could exploit information security vulnerabilities. Internet and e-
mail systems are the major sources of cyber ills/threats. 
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(c)  Recommended practice for use of municipal internet and e-mail systems by 
employees 
The designated cyber-security structure must ensure that users are educated on the 
acceptable use of the municipal internet and e-mail systems. There must be a 
compulsory awareness/training session on the acceptable use of these systems, 
facilitated by the designated cyber-security structure.  
43.  Employees accept responsibility for information infrastructure protection  
(a) Why it is important that employees accept responsibility to safeguard 
information infrastructure 
Employees must take ownership of protecting the information infrastructure because 
they are the ones who are operating these assets. If they take ownership, they will 
possibly be committed to protect these assets. Accepting responsibility implies that 
they will go an extra mile to equip themselves to protect information infrastructures. 
They can even propose training that is relevant to advance the securing of the 
information infrastructure.  
(b) Risks associated with lack of employees’ responsibility to safeguard the 
information infrastructure  
Lack of responsibility from employees could compromise information security in the 
municipality. The cyber-security culture may be compromised. There could be lack 
of commitment to protect the information infrastructure. User awareness campaigns 
and related training and education could be a challenge to implement. Employees 
may not attend such educational efforts. 
(c) Recommended practice for employees to accept responsibility towards securing 
information infrastructure 
Protecting information infrastructure must be part of the performance assessment 
system. Employee duties must explicitly require them to protect the information 
infrastructure from cyber threats. Performance assessments must be conducted 
continuously in order to identify areas that require improvement. If gaps are 
identified in performing duties, appropriate training must be provided to the 
employee. 
44.  My organisation constantly conducts cyber-security assessment to determine  
how employees are complying with the cyber-security policy 
(a) Why it is important to continuously perform cyber-security assessments 
The municipality must continuously conduct cyber-security assessment in order to 
strengthen the controls that are implemented to address the cyber-security 
challenges. These assessments must be driven by the designated cyber-security 
structure to test employees’ commitment and understanding of the cyber-security 
policy. Assessing cyber-security is a tool to determine the as is with the intention of 
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enhancing the posture of cyber-security. Assessing cyber-security is a form of 
management communication and commitment to cyber-security 
(b) Risks associated with not constantly performing cyber-security assessment 
The level of user understanding and commitment to cyber-security could not be 
determined.  Control weakness may not be identified until it is exploited by the 
threats. A comprehensive view of cyber-security controls that have been 
implemented may be difficult to accomplish. 
(c) Recommended practice for continuously assessing cyber-security 
Cyber-security assessment must be continuously conducted by the cyber-security 
designated function. Cyber-security assessment must be conducted on all critica l 
information infrastructure, and the assessment results must communicated to all 
relevant stakeholders. Cyber-security assessments must be based on or align to 
cyber-security policy, industry best practices that are relevant to the infrastructure 
being assessed, and the cyber-security implementation strategy. 
 
7.4. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The cyber-security research instrument was discussed in detail. The rationale behind each 
statement in the assessment was explained in detailed. The comprehensive details that have 
been provided in this chapter will provide guidance to the metropolitan municipalities when 
conducting the cyber-security status assessment to understand the assessment results and 
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CHAPTER 8  
PROCESS FOR ASSESSING CYBER-SECURITY STATUS 
8.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The main question that this enquiry sought to address was, what is the cyber-security status 
in the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa? An assessment tool to assess the cyber-
security status was developed and was presented in in Chapter 7. The researcher developed 
a survey questionnaire that was used as an assessment tool to assess cyber-security status. A 
survey questionnaire was particularly attractive to the researcher because the costs are 
relatively low and such a questionnaire can reach a large number of participants. 
8.2. STUDY SITES 
The focus of the research was on the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa, of which 
there are currently eight in the country. The researcher was able to receive permission to 
conduct this study at only three metropolitan municipalities, namely eThekwini, Tshwane, 
and Nelson Mandela Bay. 
8.2.1. Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality background 
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality is a category A Municipality. The city of Tshwane is 
located in Pretoria, the capital City of the Republic of South Africa. This metropolitan 
municipality covers 6345km² and is reported to be the third largest city in the entire world 
behind New York, and Tokyo/Yokohama (City of Tshwane, 2017). Tshwane Municipa lity 
is located in the Gauteng Province, which is one of the nine provinces in South Africa. This 
metropolitan municipality is one of the three metropolitan municipalities that are located in 
Gauteng Province. Tshwane Municipality occupy 30% of 19055 km² land of the Gauteng 
province.  
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Figure 8.1: Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality in Gauteng Province 
 
Tshwane Municipality is the administrative seat of the South African Government, and hosts 
a number of embassies. This city has various industrial sites, education and research 
facilities, and office space. Approximately 90% of all research and development in the 
country is conducted in Tshwane Municipality (City of Tshwane, 2017). According to the 
2017/21 IDP of the City of Tshwane Municipality, the population was reported to be 3 
161 809 in 2015.  
8.2.2. Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality background 
The Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (NMBMM) is located in the Eastern 
Cape Province of the republic of South Africa. The NMBMM is located in the city of Port 
Elizabeth. It is one of the two metropolitan municipalities in the province of Eastern Cape. 
It has administrative offices in Port Elizabeth. The municipality spans an area of 1959, 02 
km². The Municipality is the sea port and manufacturing centre for automotive industry 
(NMBM, 2017). Creating the vibrant and marine sector are the two ports in the city, which 
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are Port Elizabeth harbour and Ngqura. According to the 2017 municipal IDP, the 
municipality has a population of 1 271 776. The Municipality is reported to be the economy 
driver of the Eastern Cape province, contributing provincial gross geographic product of 
41,81% (NMBM, 2017).  
 
Figure 8.2: NMBM location 
Source: Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM). 2016. Integrated Development Plan 
(IDP) 2016-17–2020/21. [Online]. Available WWW: 
http://www.nelsonmandelabay.gov.za/datarepository/documents/adopted-2016-2021-
golden-five-years- idp-june-2016-web.pdf. 
8.3. THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
The intention of the survey questionnaire was to collect data from a larger sample, to confirm 
or dispute what the data uncovered in the ConGTM study. A questionnaire collects data in a 
survey and it contains questions that require respondents to answer directly on the form 
without the assistance of the interviewer. The questionnaire was accompanied with a 
covering letter for the participants which explained the objectives of the enquiry, and 
contained important information necessary for the completion of the questionnaire. The first 
part of the survey questionnaire contained biographic details that were used to fragment the 
data and draw comparisons within the population.  
For this enquiry, the researcher opted to adopt e-mail as the tool for delivering the survey 
questionnaires. An e-mail survey allowed for a larger sample and unlimited geographic 
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coverage. Before the survey questionnaire was deployed to the participants, second ethical 
clearance was obtained from research office in the University of KwaZulu-Natal.  
8.4. SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
In some research instances it would be impractical to investigate all targeted populations and 
hence samples are drawn. Purposive sampling, also known as judgemental sampling, was 
employed for this enquiry. The study utilised the strategy developed by Onwuegbuzie and 
Collins (2007) to decide on the enquiry’s sample size.  
Table 8.1: Minimum sample size recommendations for most common quantitative 
and qualitative research designs 
Study design/method Suggested smallest sample  
Correlational “64 Interviewees for one-tailed hypotheses; 82 
Interviewees for two-tailed hypotheses”  
Causal-Comparative “51 Interviewees per group for one-tailed hypotheses; 
64 Interviewees for two-tailed hypotheses” 
Experimental “21 Interviewees per group for one-tailed hypotheses” 
Case study “3-5 Interviewees” 
Phenomenological “≤ 10 interviews; ≥ 6” 
Grounded theory “15-20, 20-30” 
Ethnography “1 cultural group; 30-50 interviews” 
Ethological “100-200 units of observation” 
Source: Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Collins, K. M. (2007). A typology of mixed methods 
sampling designs in social science research. The Qualitative Report, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 289. 
The method formulated by Krejcie and Daryle (1970) was adopted to determine the required 
sample size in each metropolitan municipality. The relevant business units were grouped 
into three categories, namely Information and Communication Technology, Operation 
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 EThekwini Municipality sample size 
Category Total number 
of employees 
Required sample based 
on Krejcie and Daryle  
Actual responses 
ICT 40 36 38 
Operating Technology 30 28 29 
Administration 60 52 53 
 
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality sample size 
Category Total number 
of employees 
Required sample based 
on Krejcie and Daryle  
Actual responses 
ICT 35 32 34 
Operating Technology 40 36 38 
Administration 55 48 49 
Tshwane Municipality sample size 
Category Total number 
of employees 
Required sample based 
on Krejcie and Daryle  
Actual responses 
ICT 35 32 34 
Operating Technology 50 44 44 
Administration 25 24 24 
8.5. THE PILOT STUDY 
The researcher pre-tested the survey questionnaire on a small sample. A group of 14 
employees were purposively selected, and e-mailed the survey questionnaire. This group 
represented characteristics of the research target population. The pilot study aimed to 
understand the reactions of the participants and to make revisions on some questions as 
guided by the participants’ reactions. It is also important to mention that the other aim for 
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the execution of the pilot study was to experiment the cyber-security assessment tool. The 
researcher wanted to get a feel from the participants whether the survey questionnaire was 
assessing what it ought to assess. The participants of the pilot study were different from those 
that participated in the ConGTM. In the actual assessment study, the participants from both 
the ConGTM study and the pilot study were excluded. The gaps that were identified in the 
pilot study were addressed by the researcher before the actual deployment of the survey 
questionnaire to the research population. 
8.6. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The results of the surveys were analysed using a pre-set indicator for acceptable/good, and 
unacceptable/bad responses. The good or bad response percentage indicator was pre-agreed 
with the information management unit and the operating technology team in each 
participating municipality. Given the low maturity level of cyber-security in the country, a 
percentage of 55% was a cut-off indicator for good a response. Anything below 55% was 
regarded as bad for the responses to each question in the questionnaire. It is always necessary 
to achieve 100% when it comes to implementing risk mitigating actions concerning cyber-
security threats. However, as a starting point, it was considered appropriate to pitch the 
acceptable responses to just over the 50% mark.  
This section contains the results of the cyber-security status of the metropolitan 
municipalities that participated in the study.  The demographic profile of the sample is 
discussed first, followed by the frequencies per question.  The reliability of subscales is 
reported on next, followed by descriptive statistics per subscale. Differences in knowledge 
and attitudes between municipalities are reported using the one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and Chi-square test.  Lastly, the relationship between demographic variables and 
the subscales is discussed. These were investigated using the one-way ANOVA and non-
parametric correlations.   
8.6.1. Demographic frequencies 
The demographic profile of the sample is described below. 
Tenure 
There was a fairly even spread between the categories of tenure, with roughly 20% of 
respondents in each of the first three categories. A further 13.4% had between seven and ten 
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years of service, while almost a quarter of the respondents (24.8%) had more than ten years 
of service. Overall, it appears to be quite an established workforce. Details are illustrated in 
the table and figure below. 
Table 8.2: Tenure 
 Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative percent 
Valid <3 years 71 20.7 20.7 20.7 
3-5 years 71 20.7 20.7 41.4 
5-7 years 70 20.4 20.4 61.8 
7-10 years 46 13.4 13.4 75.2 
10+ years 85 24.8 24.8 100.0 
Total 343 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Figure 8.3: Tenure 
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Category 
Respondents were represented in one of three work categories, with a fairly evenly spread 
between these, as listed in the table and figure below. Roughly a third of the group fell in 
each category.  
Table 8.3: Category 
 Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative percent 
Valid Information and 
Communication 
106 30.9 30.9 30.9 
Operating 112 32.7 32.7 63.6 
Administration 125 36.4 36.4 100.0 
Total 343 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Figure 8.4: Category 
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Level 
Just less than half of the respondents (46.4%) were at the specialist level. About one in every 
four respondents (25.4%) was at a clerical level, while the remainder (28.3%) formed part 
of management (see table and figure below).   
 
Table 8.4: Level 
 Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative percent 
Valid Management 97 28.3 28.3 28.3 
Specialist 159 46.4 46.4 74.6 
Clerical 87 25.4 25.4 100.0 
Total 343 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Figure 8.5: Level 
Page | 199 
Municipality 
As shown in the table and figure below, in terms of Municipality, the largest single group 
(39.9%) was from Tshwane, while 33.2% were from NMBM. The smallest group of 
respondents (26.8%) were from Durban municipality. 
 
Table 8.5: Municipality 
 Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative percent 
Valid Durban 92 26.8 26.8 26.8 
NMBM 114 33.2 33.2 60.1 
Tshwane 137 39.9 39.9 100.0 
Total 343 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Figure 8.6: Municipality 
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8.6.2. Descriptive statistics per question 
There were essentially two types of questions in the questionnaire. Some questions were 
primarily knowledge questions, which were answered using the options Yes, No and don’t 
know.  The remainder of the questions were more related to attitudes, and a 5-point scale 
from strongly agree to strongly disagree was used. The middle option was a “don’t know” 
option. While this option is reflected in the frequencies, it was removed for the sake of 
calculating the mean score per item and constructing a scale. The descriptive statistics per 
item are reported for the knowledge questions first, and then for the attitude questions.  
The “don’t know” option was chosen by the participants in each question, and across the 
three pertinent municipalities. With the intention of creating a positive cyber-security culture 
in the organisation, the “don’t know” response was considered a negative viewpoint.  All 
employees in an organisation must know or have knowledge of applicable cyber-security 
risk mitigating controls. Overall 20.4% of respondents indicated they don’t know if their 
organisation has a written cyber-security policy. The “don’t know” response statistics in 
each question, per municipality, and across all the three municipalities are presented in the 
following sections. 
8.6.2.1. Knowledge questions 
The frequencies per item for the knowledge questions are reported and briefly discussed 
below.  Since it is possible that the de facto situation could differ from one municipality to 
the next, the results are presented per municipality. In each case, cross tabulations are 
presented and are followed by a Chi-square analysis and a figure (graph). These all indicate 
whether the differences between municipalities are significant.  
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Table 8.6: My organisation has a written cyber-security policy 
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Figure 8.7: My organisation has written a cyber-security policy 
 
There was a significant difference between municipalities in terms of respondents’ 
knowledge of a written cyber-security (p<0.05). Based on these cross-tabulations, it is clear 
that more than half of the Tshwane respondents (54.7%) indicated that they do not have a 
cyber-security policy in place. Almost the opposite was the case in Durban, where just under 
half of the respondents (48.9%) indicated that there is a policy in place. However, 23.9% of 
the respondents from Durban did not know whether there was a policy in place. The 
ignorance was less in Pretoria, where 17.5% of respondents were uncertain.  In NMBM, 
42.1% indicated that there is a policy in place, while 36.8% said that there is not.  Overall, 
however, it would appear that there is not much clarity amongst municipal employees about 
this issue. Clearly, more work is required on the implementation of cyber-security policy 
throughout the municipalities.  
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Table 8.7: My organisation has an overarching supply chain management policy that 
guides the acquisition of information infrastructure 
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Figure 8.8: My organisation has an overarching supply chain management policy that 
guides the acquisition of information infrastructure 
 
With regard to the overarching supply chain management policy, there were no significant 
differences between municipalities. Between 62.0% and 67.9% of respondents in all 
municipalities indicated that there is indeed a policy, while between 21.2% and 23.9% 
disagreed with the statement. The levels of uncertainty ranged from 10.9% to 14.1%. 
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Figure 8.9: My organisation has a documented cyber-security strategy 
 
Municipalities differed significantly from one another with regard to this question. Patterns 
were similar to the first question, with 59.1% of respondents from Tshwane indicating that 
this is not the case, and 56.5% of respondents from Durban indicating that it is the case. In 
the case of NMBM, 34.2% of respondents answered affirmatively, and 43% in the negative. 
A total of 22.8% in this municipality were uncertain. 
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Table 8.9: My organisation has an inventory of critical information infrastructure 
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Figure 8.10: My organisation has an inventory of critical information infrastructure  
 
Responses to this question showed a significant pattern in relation to each municipality. In 
NMBM, almost equal percentages answered “yes” (43.9%) and “no” (45.6%) respectively.  
In Durban, opinions were also somewhat divided, with almost one in five respondents 
indicating that they did not know.  The majority of respondents from Tshwane (62.8%), 
however, confirmed that such an inventory does not exist.  
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Table 8.10: My organisation has information infrastructure contingency plans 
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Figure 8.11: My organisation has information infrastructure contingency plans 
 
With regard to contingency plans, there were no significant differences between the 
responses from the municipalities. In all municipalities, the majority of respondents 
indicated that such plans are indeed in place. 
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Table 8.11: My organisational strategic risk register contains cyber-security risk 
 
Chi-Square Tests 




Pearson Chi-Square 8.599a 4 .072 
Likelihood Ratio 8.798 4 .066 
Linear-by-Linear Association .091 1 .762 
N of Valid Cases 343   
a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
15,29. 
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Figure 8.12: My organisational strategic risk register contains cyber-security risk 
 
There were no statistically significant differences between municipalities concerning the 
strategic risk register. In Durban and NMBM, just over half of the respondents indicated that 
this is indeed the case, while 68.6% of respondents from Tshwane confirmed this.  
Page | 213 
Table 8.12: There are service level agreements between my municipality and the 
service providers working on information infrastructures  
 
 
There were no statistically significant differences between municipalities concerning service 
level agreements. In all three municipalities, around two thirds of respondents confirmed 
that this is in place.  In Tshwane, one in four respondents indicated that this is not the case. 
In Durban, there was the largest degree of uncertainty (17.4%).  
8.6.2.2. Attitude questions 
Attitude questions were initially measured on a 5-point scale. For the sake of brevity, a 
summary is provided in Table 8.13 below, showing the frequencies and percentages per 
option, as well as the mean score per question. These results are for the sample as a whole. 
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f 35 76 203 11 18
% 10,20 22,16 59,18 3,21 5,25
f 21 95 191 0 36
% 6,12 27,70 55,69 0,00 10,50
f 14 75 174 51 29
% 4,08 21,87 50,73 14,87 8,45
f 20 75 157 53 38
% 5,83 21,87 45,77 15,45 11,08
f 46 117 157 17 6
% 13,41 34,11 45,77 4,96 1,75
f 37 86 120 48 52
% 10,79 25,07 34,99 13,99 15,16
f 35 148 120 22 18
% 10,20 43,15 34,99 6,41 5,25
f 23 62 184 44 30
% 6,71 18,08 53,64 12,83 8,75
f 55 63 132 56 28
% 16,03 18,37 38,48 16,33 8,16
f 36 57 163 62 25
% 10,50 16,62 47,52 18,08 7,29
f 19 74 175 52 23
% 5,54 21,57 51,02 15,16 6,71
f 74 97 125 16 31
% 21,57 28,28 36,44 4,66 9,04
f 27 67 145 62 42
% 7,87 19,53 42,27 18,08 12,24
f 30 97 137 42 37
% 8,75 28,28 39,94 12,24 10,79
f 29 90 175 29 20
% 8,45 26,24 51,02 8,45 5,83
f 28 78 164 48 25
% 8,16 22,74 47,81 13,99 7,29
f 46 73 135 62 27
% 13,41 21,28 39,36 18,08 7,87
f 33 66 154 44 46
% 9,62 19,24 44,90 12,83 13,41
f 42 61 151 43 46
% 12,24 17,78 44,02 12,54 13,41
f 35 44 189 48 27
% 10,20 12,83 55,10 13,99 7,87
f 39 48 151 77 28
% 11,37 13,99 44,02 22,45 8,16
f 39 52 166 53 33
% 11,37 15,16 48,40 15,45 9,62
f 25 55 176 59 28
% 7,29 16,03 51,31 17,20 8,16
f 33 76 90 104 40
% 9,62 22,16 26,24 30,32 11,66
f 46 95 128 40 34
% 13,41 27,70 37,32 11,66 9,91
f 48 86 103 76 30
% 13,99 25,07 30,03 22,16 8,75
f 47 75 154 47 20
% 13,70 21,87 44,90 13,70 5,83
f 42 82 159 37 23
% 12,24 23,91 46,36 10,79 6,71
f 61 38 159 51 34
% 17,78 11,08 46,36 14,87 9,91
f 15 129 135 34 30
% 4,37 37,61 39,36 9,91 8,75
f 72 73 134 48 16
% 20,99 21,28 39,07 13,99 4,66
f 32 74 160 60 17
% 9,33 21,57 46,65 17,49 4,96
f 51 70 136 59 27
% 14,87 20,41 39,65 17,20 7,87
f 43 58 150 68 24
% 12,54 16,91 43,73 19,83 7,00
f 40 76 163 30 34
% 11,66 22,16 47,52 8,75 9,91
f 72 142 74 13 42
% 20,99 41,40 21,57 3,79 12,24
   The cyber-security policy is aligned to the Municipal Integrated Development 
Plan (IDP)
   I believe our Cyber-security strategy is aligned to the Municipal IDP
   There is a structure or unit within my organisation that is responsible to 
implement the cyber-security strategy
   I know what to do if I want to report breaches or violations against cyber-
security policy
   I know who the custodian of 
the cyber-security policy is
   Management has implemented clear asset management practices
   My organisation conducts research 
and development with the aim to enhance protection of information 
infrastructure
   Protection of information infrastructure in my organisation is guided by the 
industry best practises
   Management has allocated adequate budget  to implement cyber-security policy
   Risk Management processes guide the
 implementation of cyber-security controls in my organisation
   Management has provided guidance on the regulatory requirements pertaining 
to information infrastructure that I work with
   Management has allocated adequate people to protection information 
infrastructures
   Employees accept responsibility towards  information infrastructure protection
   My organisation constantly conducts cyber-security assessment to determine 
how employees are complying with the cyber-security policy
   Audits are conducted to provide assurance on the adequacy and effectiveness of 
controls that have been implemented to protect information infrastructure
   The incident management procedures are adequate to resolve cyber-security 
incidents
   The building that I work in is adequately 
protected to secure the information infrastructure
   Employees’ activities on information infrastructure 
are monitored
   In my organisation action is taken against employees who violate cyber-security 
policy
   Employees are made aware of the cyber-security policy contents
2,58
   Employees know where to report suspicious illicit cyber-security activities
   Employees receive adequate training on the information infrastructure they 
operate
   I am aware of cyber-security 
threats affecting the information assets I work with
   I am aware that organisational Internet and e-mail systems should be  used for 
business purposes
   Management understands the possible impact of cyber-security threats to 
Municipal service delivery
   Management is monitoring the services provided by the service providers / 
consultants against the service level agreements
   My organisation has deployed technologies to protect information 
infrastructures against cyber threats
   Access to information infrastructures is controlled through identification and 
authentication
   Management has adopted industry best practises  to protect information 
infrastructure against cyber-threats
   Anti-virus software are installed 
into our laptops, desktops, and other devices
   Management enforces compliance 
to cyber-security
   In my organisation there are oversight structures /  committees that make 
management to account for the protection of information infrastructure
   Internal Audit operational plans incorporate  audits or reviews on information 
infrastructures on an annual basis
   Management have input in the 
Internal Audit operational plans before the plan is implemented
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Inspection of the table above shows that opinion was relative ly divided for most questions, 
leading to mean scores which all lie in the mid-range of the scale, with a slight slant towards 
the positive side. It is possible that differences between municipalities can account for the 
moderate spread, with some municipalities being more inclined to agree and others more 
inclined to disagree.  For this reason, a one-way ANOVA was conducted on the item scores 
to compare municipalities.  
The questions for which there were significant differences are summarised below. 
Descriptive statistics per group are also reported. For the sake of brevity, only questions 
which reached a significance level of 0.01 are reported.   
Table 8.14: Questions with significance level 0.01 and post hoc results  
 
 
Table 8.15: Descriptives 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
   The cyber-security policy is constantly 
reviewed to incorporate emerging trends in the 
protection of information infrastructures 
Durban 84 2.88 .701 
NMBM 106 2.58 .893 
Tshwane 134 2.54 .732 
Total 324 2.64 .792 
   Management enforces compliance  
to cyber-security 
Durban 79 3.05 .766 
NMBM 101 2.85 .921 
Tshwane 121 2.60 .841 
Total 301 2.80 .867 
   Audit committee approves the internal audit 
operational plans before the plan is implemented 
Durban 85 2.95 .937 
NMBM 107 2.59 1.009 
Tshwane 124 2.56 .877 
Item Sig F Post hoc result
   The cyber-security policy is constantly reviewed 
to incorporate emerging trends in the protection of 
information infrastructures 0,005 Durban significantly higher than both Tshwane and NMBM
   Management enforces compliance 
to cyber-security 0,001 Durban significantly higher than Tshwane
   Audit Committee approves the internal audit 
operational plans before the plan is implemented 0,006 Durban significantly higher than both Tshwane and NMBM
   Management has implemented clear asset 
management practices 0,001 Durban significantly higher than both Tshwane and NMBM
   In my organisation action is taken against 
employees who violate cyber-security policy 0,003 Durban significantly higher than both Tshwane and NMBM
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Total 316 2.67 .952 
   Management has implemented clear asset 
management practices 
Durban 74 3.00 .682 
NMBM 100 2.54 .937 
Tshwane 123 2.66 .838 
Total 297 2.70 .854 
   In my organisation, action is taken against 
employees who violate cyber-security policy 
Durban 82 2.96 .922 
NMBM 104 2.55 1.042 
Tshwane 123 2.52 .917 
Total 309 2.65 .978 
   I am aware of cyber-security  
threats affecting the information assets I work 
with 
Durban 83 2.93 .894 
NMBM 107 2.54 .984 
Tshwane 126 2.54 .960 
Total 316 2.64 .964 
 
There is a clear pattern for the Durban municipality which has higher scores (more positive 
attitude) than the other two municipalities. Tshwane and NMBM do not differ significantly 
from one another.   
8.6.3. Reliability  
The questionnaire was intended to measure attitudes towards four domains of cybersecurity, 
namely: 
 integrated development  
 governance 
 technical operations  
 human issues. 
The reliability of these scales was investigated by means of a Cronbach alpha in order to 
establish whether they show internal consistency and can thus be used as scales. Reliability 
statistics are summarised below.  
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Integrated development  0,361 0,067 
Governance 0,817 0,295 
Technical operations  0,713 0,232 
Human issues 0,743 0,233 
 
According to Bryman and Bell (2007, p. 164), Cronbach alpha values of 0.70 and above are 
typically employed as a rule of thumb to denote a good level of internal reliability, while 
Clark and Watson (1995) suggested that the average inter-item correlation of items should 
be between 0.1 and 0,5. 
Using these guidelines, results showed that the first scale did not show adequate reliability. 
Inspection of the questions revealed that this may be due to questions which pertain more to 
knowledge being included as attitude questions. The remainder of the scales were found to 
possess adequate internal consistency, and were used in subsequent analyses.  
8.6.4. Descriptive statistics per subscale  
Mean scores per subscale were calculated and are reported below. Mean scores could 
theoretically range from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 4 (Strongly agree). (The don’t know option 
was removed for the sake of scale construction as it is not equal to a “neutral” attitude). A 
higher mean score is thus associated with a more positive attitude towards the particular 
aspect. 
It is clear from the table and graph below that the mean scores on the three scales are very 
similar, and range from 2.57 – 2.74. On the 4-point scale, this falls just above the midpoint 
of the scale (2.5).  Overall it would appear that respondents had fairly moderate opinions 
towards these aspects, with a very slight tendency towards the more positive side of the scale.  
Further nuances will most probably appear when delving deeper into subgroup differences.  
Page | 218 
Table 8.17: Descriptive statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Governance domain 343 1.45 3.82 2.6564 .44765 
Technical operations 
domain 
343 1.50 3.75 2.7431 .51199 
Human issues 343 1.22 3.63 2.5792 .48357 
Valid N (listwise) 343     
 
 
Figure 8.13: Descriptive statistics 
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8.6.5. Comparison of municipalities 
One of the objectives of this study was to investigate the differences in perceptions between 
municipalities. A one-way ANOVA was performed in order to investigate mean differences 
between the municipalities on the three subscales.  The 5% level of significance was used. 
Results are reported below. 
Table 8.18: Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
Governance domain Durban 92 2.8002 .43734 .04560 
NMBM 114 2.6191 .49691 .04654 
Tshwane 137 2.5908 .38897 .03323 
Total 343 2.6564 .44765 .02417 
Technical operations 
domain 
Durban 92 2.9051 .49365 .05147 
NMBM 114 2.7462 .50739 .04752 
Tshwane 137 2.6318 .50196 .04288 
Total 343 2.7431 .51199 .02764 
Human issues Durban 92 2.7430 .38988 .04065 
NMBM 114 2.5003 .52916 .04956 
Tshwane 137 2.5348 .47784 .04083 











2.649 2 1.325 6.836 .001 
Within 
Groups 
65.883 340 .194 
  






4.115 2 2.057 8.178 .000 
Within 
Groups 
85.533 340 .252 
  
Total 89.648 342    
Human issues Between 
Groups 
3.447 2 1.723 7.656 .001 
Within 
Groups 
76.527 340 .225 
  
Total 79.974 342    
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The ANOVA table above shows that there are significant mean differences between the 
municipalities on all three scales (p<0.05). The nature of these differences were investigated 
further by means of post hoc tests.  
Table 8.19: Multiple comparisons 












Durban NMBM .18104* .06169 .014 
Tshwane .20936* .05933 .002 
NMBM Durban -.18104* .06169 .014 
Tshwane .02832 .05580 .879 
Tshwane Durban -.20936* .05933 .002 
NMBM -.02832 .05580 .879 
Technical 
operations domain 
Durban NMBM .15896 .07029 .079 
Tshwane .27337* .06761 .000 
NMBM Durban -.15896 .07029 .079 
Tshwane .11441 .06358 .200 
Tshwane Durban -.27337* .06761 .000 
NMBM -.11441 .06358 .200 
Human issues Durban NMBM .24262* .06649 .001 
Tshwane .20819* .06395 .005 
NMBM Durban -.24262* .06649 .001 
Tshwane -.03443 .06014 .849 
Tshwane Durban -.20819* .06395 .005 
NMBM .03443 .06014 .849 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
With regard to the governance domain, post hoc tests show that there was a significant 
difference between Durban and NMBM (p=0.014), as well as between Durban and Tshwane 
(p=0.002). There was not a significant difference between NMBM and Tshwane (p=0.879).  
Inspection of the mean scores show that Durban municipality had a higher scores than the 
other two municipalities (i.e. a more positive attitude).  
Regarding the Technical operations, the only significant difference was found between 
Durban and Tshwane (p=0.000). Durban had the higher mean score of the 2. None of the 
other pairwise differences were significant.  
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Lastly, on Human issues, the same pattern as in the case of the government domain was 
found.  There was a significant difference between Durban and NMBM (p=0.001), as well 
as between Durban and Tshwane (p=0.005). There was not a significant difference between 
NMBM and Tshwane (p=0.849).  Once again, Durban had a higher score than the other two 
entities. The graphical presentation below illustrates the nature of these differences.   
It should be kept mind that all scores still fall within a fairly small range from one another, 
and are just slightly higher than the midpoint of the scale.  Nevertheless, it does appear that 
employees from Durban have a slightly more positive attitude towards the aspects measured.  
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Figure 8.14: Multiple comparisons 
8.6.6. Relationship between demographic variables and subscales 
The relationship between demographic variables and the subscales was investigated by 
means of a one-way ANOVA.  Results are reported below. Note that post hoc tests are only 
reported for those scales where significant overall differences were found.  
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Level 
Respondents represented management, specialist and clerical levels.  Their scores are 
compared below.  
Table 8.20: Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
Government domain Management 97 2.5710 .42851 .04351 
Specialist 159 2.7423 .43639 .03461 
Clerical 87 2.5944 .46507 .04986 
Total 343 2.6564 .44765 .02417 
Technical operations 
domain 
Management 97 2.6070 .40594 .04122 
Specialist 159 2.8964 .50722 .04023 
Clerical 87 2.6147 .55207 .05919 
Total 343 2.7431 .51199 .02764 
Human issues Management 97 2.5723 .45627 .04633 
Specialist 159 2.6264 .49254 .03906 
Clerical 87 2.5005 .49134 .05268 









2.215 2 1.107 5.677 .004 
Within Groups 66.318 340 .195   






6.968 2 3.484 14.327 .000 
Within Groups 82.680 340 .243   
Total 89.648 342    
Human issues Between 
Groups 
.897 2 .448 1.928 .147 
Within Groups 79.077 340 .233   
Total 79.974 342    
 
From the ANOVA table it appears that the levels differed significantly with regard to their 
perceptions of the governance domain and technical operations (p<0.05). No significant 
differences were found with regard to Human Issues (p>0.05).  Further investigation by 
means of post hoc tests show that, with regard to the Government domain, the only 
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significant difference was between management and specialist staff, with the latter showing 
a significantly higher mean score than the former. 
In the technical operations domain, specialists showed a significantly higher score than both 
management and clerical staff.   
It would thus appear that, with regard to the governance domain, specialists tended to have 
slightly more positive attitudes than management staff.  In terms of technical operations, 
specialists were slightly more positive than both management and clerical staff. 
Table 8.21: Multiple comparisons 
Scheffe   
Dependent 
variable (I) Level (J) Level 
Mean difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
Government 
domain 
Management Specialist -.17127* .05690 .011 
Clerical -.02339 .06521 .938 
Specialist Management .17127* .05690 .011 
Clerical .14789* .05890 .044 
Clerical Management .02339 .06521 .938 




Management Specialist -.28938* .06353 .000 
Clerical -.00765 .07282 .994 
Specialist Management .28938* .06353 .000 
Clerical .28173* .06576 .000 
Clerical Management .00765 .07282 .994 
Specialist -.28173* .06576 .000 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Results are portrayed graphically below. 
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Figure 8.15: Multiple comparisons 
Category 
Respondents came predominantly from three categories, namely Information and 
communication, Operating, and Administration.  The comparison of these groups by means 
of a one-way ANOVA is reported below. 
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Table 8.22: Descriptives 





106 2.6630 .55366 .05378 
Operating 112 2.7210 .31418 .02969 
Administration 125 2.5928 .44369 .03969 





106 2.7751 .54676 .05311 
Operating 112 2.9789 .38767 .03663 
Administration 125 2.5048 .47637 .04261 
Total 343 2.7431 .51199 .02764 
Human issues Information and 
Communication 
106 2.4817 .56774 .05514 
Operating 112 2.7559 .31803 .03005 
Administration 125 2.5035 .48923 .04376 











.978 2 .489 2.460 .087 
Within Groups 67.554 340 .199   






13.438 2 6.719 29.976 .000 
Within Groups 76.210 340 .224   
Total 89.648 342    
Human issues Between 
Groups 
5.224 2 2.612 11.880 .000 
Within Groups 74.750 340 .220   
Total 79.974 342    
 
The ANOVA table shows that there were significant differences between the categories with 
regard to Technical operations (p < 0.05) and Human issues (p<0.05). These differences 
were explored further by means of post hoc tests.  
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Table 8.23: Multiple comparisons 
Scheffe   
Dependent 











Operating -.20387* .06416 .007 
Administration .27030* .06251 .000 
Operating Information and 
Communication 
.20387* .06416 .007 
Administration .47417* .06160 .000 
Administration Information and 
Communication 
-.27030* .06251 .000 
Operating -.47417* .06160 .000 
Human issues Information and 
Communication 
Operating -.27428* .06354 .000 
Administration -.02182 .06191 .940 
Operating Information and 
Communication 
.27428* .06354 .000 
Administration .25246* .06101 .000 
Administration Information and 
Communication 
.02182 .06191 .940 
Operating -.25246* .06101 .000 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
The post hoc tests show that, with regard to the technical operations domain there were 
significant differences between all three categories.  Inspection of the mean scores reveals 
that respondents in the Operating category had the highest mean followed by those from 
Information and Communication. Administration had the lowest mean of the groups.  
As far as human issues were concerned, the Operating category differed significantly from 
both the Information and communication (p<0.05) and Administration (p<0.05) categories.  
The latter two categories did not differ from one another though.  Respondents in the 
Operating category had a significantly higher mean score than those in Administration, and 
Information and Communication Technology.  
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Figure 8.16: Multiple comparisons 
Tenure 
Tenure was measured in terms of five categories as indicated in the demographic frequency 
results. As such, it was treated as an ordinal variable, and a non-parametric Spearman’s rho 
correlation was calculated between tenure and the subscales. Results are reported below and 
show that tenure showed statistically significant correlations with the Government domain 
(p<0.05) and Technical operations domain (p<0.05) scores. A correlation of -0.180 was 
found with the Government domain, suggesting a small negative association between the 
two variables. An even smaller correlation of -0,150 was found with the technical operations 
domain.  Both suggest that the longer respondents were with the municipality, the more 
negative their perceptions were, but the trend is objectively very small. This is illustrated in 
the graph, where all mean values can be rounded off to 3.  
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Table 8.24: Correlations 
 Tenure 
Government domain Pearson 
Correlation 
-.180 







Sig. (2-tailed) .005 
N 343 
Human issues Pearson 
Correlation 
-.079 




Figure 8.17: Correlations 
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8.7. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the results of the study were presented. The demographic profile of the 
sample was discussed, followed by descriptive statistics per question. Municipalities were 
also compared per question. The reliability of subscales was reported, followed by 
descriptive statistics per subscale. Differences in knowledge and attitudes between 
municipalities were investigated and the relationship between demographic variables and 
the subscales was reported on.  
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CHAPTER 9  
CONCLUSION 
9.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The principal research question that this study endeavoured to address is: What is the cyber-
security status in South African metropolitan municipalities? This chapter revisits the 
research question and presents solutions for the research question. The study sub-questions 
are also revisited and solutions presented. The researcher contribution, study limitations, and 
future research are discussed.   
9.2. REVISITING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In order to answer the fundamental research question, the researcher formulated the 
following five sub-questions, which then assisted to explore various situations with the aim 
of providing the solution to the research question. The researcher first answered each sub-
question before answering the core question. The following are the sub-questions together 
with solutions for each.  
a. How are metropolitan municipalities in South Africa protecting their information 
infrastructures against cyber-security threats? 
The researcher used ConGTM at eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality to explore how 
information infrastructures are protected against cyber-security threats. The grounded theory 
study resulted in a framework that indicated what activities are conducted to protect the 
information infrastructure against cyber-threats. The framework highlighted that four 
domains are at the centre of cyber-security in the municipality. These domains are integrated 
development cyber-security, cyber-security governance, cyber-security technical operations, 
and human issues in cyber-security. 
The integrated development cyber-security is the core category which coordinates activit ies 
within each category. As the core category, the integrated development cyber-security 
category ensures that the following activities take place: development of cyber-security 
policy, procurement of information infrastructure is aligned with supply chain management 
policy, development of cyber-security strategy, formulation of critical information 
infrastructure catalogue, formulation of information infrastructure contingency plans, 
continuous reviewing and aligning the cyber-security policy to the municipal IDP,  
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monitoring compliance to the cyber-security policy, conducting research and development 
on cyber-security, and introducing and sustaining the adoption of cyber-security industry 
best practices. The activities in the integrated development cyber-security domain are the 
responsibility of a designated cyber-security structure or function 
The activities of the cyber-security governance category are a responsibility of executive 
management in the municipality. Cyber-security governance activities include: formula t ing 
a strategic risk register that includes cyber-security risk; formulating a regulatory and 
legislation framework that impacts on information infrastructure; allocating resources for 
cyber-security; setting the tone at the top by enforcing compliance to cyber-security policy, 
related regulation and legislation; implementing cyber-security oversight committees; 
implementing an internal audit programme to audit cyber-security controls; and driving the 
implementation of asset management practices. 
The cyber-security technical operations category deals with ensuring that automated tools 
and people are deployed to implement the cyber-security policy. The activities in this 
category are mainly executed within various business units. The activities performed 
include: implementing and monitoring the service level agreements; deploying appropriate 
technologies to detect cyber threats; monitoring computer network activities; preventing 
unauthorised access to the computer network system (these technologies include anti-virus 
software, intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems); implementing user 
identification and authentication mechanisms; adopting industry best practices on cyber-
security; conducting audits and compliance testing on cyber-security; preparing and testing 
information infrastructure contingency procedures; and physically protecting the 
information infrastructure.  
Human issues in cyber-security deal with ensuring that the first line of cyber-security 
defence, which comprises human beings, is addressed separately from other cyber-security 
activities. Cyber-security in the organisation is as good as people who are implementing it. 
The cyber-security human issues category has activities which include monitoring individua l 
activities on information infrastructures; taking appropriate actions against individuals who 
violate the cyber-security policy; educating individual employees on the contents of the 
cyber-security policy and for employees to acknowledge understanding of the cyber-security 
policy; making employees aware where to report suspicious illicit activities on information 
infrastructure; training individual employees on the information infrastructure that they 
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operate; educating users on the acceptable use of municipal internet and e-mail systems; and 
continuously assessing the cyber-security status in order to ensure that individual employees 
take responsibility for safeguarding the municipal information infrastructure.  
The study objective for this sub-question was to explore the practices that metropolitan 
municipalities in South Africa have implemented to protect their information infrastructures 
against cyber-security threats. The ConGTM study as presented in Part I, specifically in 
Chapter 4, was conducted to achieve this research objective. 
b. What methodologies are currently available to assess the cyber-security status in 
the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa? 
Cyber-security assessment is conducted with the aim to cultivate cyber-security, and 
subsequently the protection of information infrastructure assets. Due to the infancy level of 
cyber-security in the country, there has been no known tools or methodologies that have 
been adopted to assess the cyber-security status in the South African metropolitan 
municipalities. Various studies have been conducted on cyber-security in the country; 
however, none has been designed to address the assessment of cyber-security status in 
metropolitan municipalities.  
It has been highlighted that metropolitan municipalities in the country are largely dependent 
on information infrastructures. The grounded theory study has revealed that certain activit ies 
are performed to protect the information infrastructure against the cyber threats, and also 
that assurance services are conducted to assure management whether the cyber-security 
controls that they have been implemented are adequate and effective. Industry best practices 
have been adopted to safeguard municipal information infrastructures.  
No tool has been tested to comprehensively assess the cyber-security posture of a 
metropolitan municipality. However, the grounded theory study has highlighted a number 
of controls that have been implemented to secure information infrastructure against cyber  
threats. These controls include: adoption of industry best practices such as the King IV report 
on corporate governance and Cobit, risk management processes, oversight by the audit 
committee, assurance by the office of the Auditor General of South Africa, cyber-security 
policy, management monitoring reports, information infrastructure acquisition, cyber-
security sponsorship, asset management, user awareness and education, service level 
agreements, computer network monitoring, network vulnerability assessment, network 
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protection (intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, and anti-virus software), user 
identification and authentication, compliance testing, asset disposal, contingency planning, 
performance management, segregation of duties, conduct of research and development, 
defence in depth, change management, and physical security of information infrastructure. 
Adoption of these controls has been audited but in a siloed fashion, thereby not proving a 
comprehensive view of the cyber-security status in the municipality. Assessing cyber-
security requires a holistic/comprehensive view of the cyber-security controls that have been 
implemented to mitigate cyber-related risks.  
Internal audit is one of the controls that have been implemented to advance the securing of 
information infrastructures in the municipalities. Assessing the status of cyber-security in 
the municipality requires considering to evaluate all the essential controls. Therefore, 
internal audit reports on their own do not provide conclusive reports on the status of cyber-
security. This study therefore combined all the cyber-security-related controls, and grouped 
them into four domains and discussed them when answering sub-question (a) above. These 
controls assisted in developing the cyber-security assessment tool that was used to assess the 
cyber-security status in the three metropolitan municipalities, as discussed in Part II of this 
enquiry. 
For this sub-question, the researcher wanted to explore the methodologies currently 
employed to assess the cyber-security status in the metropolitan municipalities in South 
Africa. The enquiry sought to discover the practices that metropolitan municipalit ies 
currently have adopted with the intention of assessing the cyber-security status. The reasons 
for assessing the status of cyber-security posture include:  
(i) understanding the “as is” situation in order to draft the road map of getting into the 
desired destination to successfully protect the information infrastructure assets; 
(ii) changing or enhancing the existing culture of cyber-security within the institution; 
(iii) maintaining the current practices employed to protect information infrastruc ture 
against cyber-threats. 
The practices that the study has uncovered are relevant in addressing the intentions of 
assessing the posture of cyber-security in the municipality. 
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c. How are metropolitan municipalities in South Africa inculcating the culture of 
cyber-security? 
Cyber-security culture is one of the important components that provides and sustains an 
enabling environment for the protection of information infrastructure assets. The grounded 
theory study that was performed in this study also assisted in addressing this sub-question. 
The cyber-security controls that were highlighted by the participants indicate that a culture 
of cyber-security can be inculcated at various levels which are executive level, business unit  
level, and individual level. The research has highlighted that the executive level drives 
corporate governance within the municipality. Executive level management sets the tone for 
all other layers in pursuit of the municipal mandate. The employees that are participating on 
the executive layer are custodians of the municipal IDP processes. At the executive level, 
cyber-security culture in the municipality is mainly influenced by the way things are done at 
a strategic level in the municipality. The controls that are implemented at cyber-security 
governance domain of the municipal cyber-security framework are the ones that inculcate 
the culture of cyber-security. The cyber-security governance domain drives the 
implementation of an integrated development cyber-security domain, which is the essential 
domain that drives the cyber-security programme in the municipality. There is a cyclic 
relationship between the cyber-security governance domain and the integrated development 
cyber-security domain. The integrated development domain is responsible for co-ordinating 
and facilitating the activities of the cyber-security programme, which in turn must be 
sponsored at the executive level.  
At business unit level, cyber-security is influenced by the controls that are executed by both 
the integrated development cyber-security domain and the cyber-security technica l 
operations domain of the municipal cyber-security framework. The integrated development 
cyber-security domain prevents the siloed treatment of the cyber-security. The integrated 
development domain combines the ICT and PCS categories, and combines the efforts of all 
the units within the municipality that operate these categories. Technical implementation of 
automated tools and technologies to protect information infrastructure was also identified as 
an area that has an influence on the culture of cyber-security in the municipality. Technology 
and related tools are deployed and programmed, and they perform consistently as per the set 
configurations. Therefore, employees are forced to apply and comply as per the information 
infrastructure configurations. The cyber-security technical operations domain sets and 
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maintains the security requirements as per the security policy and hence the inculcation of 
the cyber-security culture. At business unit level, the cyber-security culture is mainly 
influenced by the nature of the business/operations that the unit conducts, the nature of 
information infrastructure being operated (employees in a business unit are influenced by 
nature of monitoring and auditing in the unit), and the nature of leadership of the various 
business units to guide business units to comply with municipal policies and in making the 
right decisions about cyber-security.   
At an individual level, the cyber-security culture is influenced by how cyber-security human 
issues are considered. Research participants indicated that the cyber-security controls in this 
domain include user training, ethical behaviour and attitude towards cyber-security, change 
management and cyber-security awareness.  
The cyber-security assessment instrument that this study developed incorporates the culture 
element of cyber-security in the municipality. There is no specific domain that is called 
cyber-security culture, but all the four domains address the culture of cyber-security. The 
rating level of each item that is assessed in the assessment instrument indicates the level of 
cyber-security culture in that specific line item within a domain. When the control is rated 
as good that translates to good cyber-security culture; likewise, when the control rating is 
unsatisfactory, that translates to unsatisfactory cyber-security culture.   
The researcher wanted to understand the processes that are employed to provide an enabling 
environment to develop, implement, and sustain a cyber-security culture in a metropolitan 
municipality. Identifying the processes employed to make the environment conducive for 
the information infrastructure protection is important to drive the agenda of cyber-security 
in the municipality. 
d. What theoretical framework supports cyber-security implementation in the 
metropolitan municipalities in South Africa? 
Part I of the study was designed to answer this question. One aspect of the ConGTM is to 
develop a theory. Due to the criticality of cyber-security, the researcher considered it 
imperative to seek explanations about cyber-security implementation in the metropolitan 
municipalities. The researcher wanted to determine what metropolitan municipalities do to 
implement cyber-security, and why do they do what they do to safeguard the information 
infrastructures against cyber risks.  
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The ConGTM study concluded with the formulation of the municipal cyber-security 
framework. The municipal cyber-security framework highlighted that there are four core 
categories that are considered when implementing cyber-security in the metropolitan 
municipality environment. These core categories are the following: 
 Integrated development cyber-security which is the glue holding together all other 
categories. Mainly, this category is responsible for facilitating and coordinating the 
activities of the cyber-security programme within the municipality. This category is 
the gateway to communicating with other spheres of government such as the 
Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services which is responsible for the 
Cyber-security Hub in the country. The integrated development cyber-security 
category amongst other activities is responsible for cyber-security policy development, 
cyber-security strategy formulation, formulating an inventory of critical information 
infrastructure (these are more susceptible to cyber threats), and spearheading the 
cyber-security research and development within the municipality. The key role players 
in this domain are the people with specialist skills in the safeguarding of information 
assets/information infrastructure. This is the designated structure or function 
responsible for driving the functioning of the cyber-security programme in the 
municipality 
 Cyber-security governance is responsible for setting the cyber-security tone in the 
municipality through sponsoring the cyber-security programme. The amount of budget 
allocation to fulfil information infrastructure protection determines the commitment of 
executive management to cyber-security. The core activities executed in the category 
include: setting up of the oversight structures that hold management to account for the 
cyber-security control deficiencies, approving cyber-security policy and strategy, 
formulating the applicable regulatory and legislation framework that the cyber-
security programme must consider, and setting the asset management and supply chain 
management policies that the cyber-security programme must also consider. The role 
players in the category are the executive management team who are the custodians of 
municipal IDP processes. 
 Cyber-security technical operations is responsible for commissioning the deployment 
of automated tools and technologies to secure information infrastructure. Activities of 
this category are conducted at a business unit level. Activities executed are geared 
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towards specific business units; however, these activities are guided by the type and 
nature of information infrastructure being operated in the unit/department. Business 
units are responsible for their departmental mission, vision, and objectives. Therefore , 
various business units are responsible for ensuring that the support that they receive 
from information infrastructures is maintained and enhanced. Business units are 
responsible for implementing the controls in pursuit of business unit objectives. It is 
therefore the business units’ responsibility to implement and monitor the cyber-
security controls that support the business unit to achieve its objectives.  
 Cyber-security human issues are responsible for the social component of cyber-
security and the focus is on an individual level in the organisation. Cyber-security 
technologies and tools can be implemented to secure information infrastructures, but 
without human beings to operate such technologies, those technologies can be 
rendered useless. Human issues in cyber-security mainly pay attention to the needs of 
the individual employees in order to protect information infrastructures. Activities in 
this category include educating employees in the information infrastructure that they 
work with, making employees aware of the threats that are facing the information 
infrastructure that they operate, making employees take ownership of and 
responsibility for their activities when using municipal information infrastructures, 
encouraging acceptable and ethical behaviour, and assessing how employees are 
complying with the cyber-security policy. 
The researcher wanted to develop a theory that explains cyber-security implementation in 
the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. Chapter 5 presented how a substantive 
theory was developed. This substantive theory integrated ideas and hypotheses that account 
for cyber-security implementation in the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. 
e. How can metropolitan municipalities in South Africa successfully assess their 
cyber-security status? 
An instrument or tool is required to conduct an assessment of cyber-security status. The 
assessment tool must produce assessment results that guide management in the decision-
making process. Chapter 6 dealt with how the researcher developed a municipal cyber-
security conceptual framework from the ConGTM. Chapter 7 dealt with how, from the 
conceptual framework, the researcher developed an instrument to assess cyber-security. 
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Chapter 8 explained the detailed process of how to assess the cyber-security status in a 
metropolitan municipality.  
The process to successfully assess the status of cyber-security in the municipality entailed 
the following:  
 Proper communication with key stakeholders, including executive management, of 
business units that operate or are the custodians of critical information infrastructures. 
In cases where there is a cyber-security structure of function, the gateway to assess 
cyber-security status would be this structure as it facilitates and coordinates cyber-
security activities. This is the structure that drives the agenda of the cyber-security 
programme within the municipality.  
 Identification of participants that will participate in the assessment exercise. The 
participants needed to represent all relevant units that operate the information 
infrastructure, and moreover those that operate the critical information infrastructure. 
The participants needed to represent all occupational levels within those applicable 
participating business units.  
 Deployment of cyber-security assessment tool. The tool was statistically validated, and 
produced credible results. Metropolitan municipalities have adopted electronic mail 
systems, hence the deployment of the assessment tool became easier. Also, the intranet 
application could be used for disseminating the cyber-security assessment instrument.  
 Monitoring of the responses during the duration of the assessment. This monitor ing 
assisted in having a holistic picture of the responses being received in terms of the 
numbers of participants and the participating business units. If the responses were not 
representative of the target population, reminders and motivating actions were 
considered.  
 Analysing the data that was collected through the cyber-security assessment survey 
questionnaire instrument.  
 Writing the assessment report after statistically analysing the data. The report had to 
be presented to pertinent management. The report had to present the as is status of 
cyber-security. If there were areas that required management attention, the possible 
risk impact associated with those control deficiencies had to be highlighted in the 
report, including the recommended practices to address the identified weaknesses.  
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The researcher developed the cyber-security assessment instrument, and statistica l ly 
validated the tool in order to rely on the results that the tool generates. The research objective 
for this sub-question was achieved. 
The study’s core objective was particularly to determine the cyber-security status in South 
African metropolitan municipalities. Chapter 8 covered how the cyber-security assessment 
tool was deployed in three metropolitan municipalities in the country. Had it not been for 
time constraints, the cyber-security assessment instrument would have been deployed to all 
eight metropolitan municipalities. The assessment results were presented in Chapter 8. Each 
municipality that participated in the study was assessed separately and the assessment report, 
which contained control deficiencies, the possible risk impact for those deficiencies, and 
recommended corrective actions was presented to relevant management within the 
municipality. A consolidated report with all the three participating municipalities was also 
generated and was presented in Chapter 8. 
9.3. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
The contribution of this study is twofold. The first contribution is to the body of knowledge 
in local government cyber-security. As highlighted in the NCPF, the national government 
acknowledges that in this information age cyber-security is one of the challenging areas for 
government at all levels. The NCPF also recognises the severe damage that cyber-security 
threats can cause to some government critical infrastructures, which in turn can lead to 
widespread disruption to government services, and or even the loss of human lives. An 
uncoordinated approach and siloed view of cyber-security is another important aspect that 
the NCPF is highlighting. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this research, the current research 
focus in cyber-security has not been directed on local government where there are a sizeable 
number of critical infrastructures that could be severely affected by weakness in cyber-
security. Therefore, this research has made the following contribution: 
(a) A substantive theory has been developed, which aids the understanding of what 
activities are conducted to advance the protection of municipal information 
infrastructure against cyber-security threats. The integrated development cyber-
security theory is anticipated to go a long way in assisting the local sphere of 
government in addressing the challenge of cyber-security. 
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(b) A conceptual framework has been established which guides the processes to be 
implemented to secure the information infrastructure in a metropolitan municipa lity 
environment. Currently there is no known framework that municipal authorities can 
adopt to successfully implement cyber-security in the municipality. Metropolitan 
municipalities are the areas where there is high population density, and high economic 
activities. Therefore, the impact of cyber-security deficiencies could affect quite a high 
number of the population and the industrial activities. If appropriately applied, the 
developed conceptual framework could assist to minimise exposure of critical 
information infrastructure to cyber-security threats 
(c) A statistically tested, cyber-security status assessment tool has been formulated to 
assist the metropolitan municipalities to evaluate their posture on cyber-security. This 
assessment instrument can assist the municipalities to determine the as is status of 
cyber-security with the intention of identifying cyber-security-related control areas 
that require urgent management attention in pursuit of safeguarding information 
infrastructure. 
The second contribution of this study is made to the practitioners in the local government 
sphere.  
 Through the emerged cyber-security conceptual framework, this study provides 
practical processes to be executed when implementing a cyber-security programme in 
the metropolitan municipality environment.  
 The researcher has compiled an inventory of cyber-security controls that practitioners 
can adopt to protect information infrastructure against cyber threats. The key cyber-
security controls that this study has suggested to be considered by practitioners 
include: creating an inventory of critical information infrastructure to be protected 
against cyber-related risks, formulating a cyber-security structure or function that will 
drive the agenda of cyber-security across the municipality, creating a cyber-security 
policy that is aligned to the municipal IDP, and continuous assessment of the cyber-
security status with the aim of keeping all the role players on their toes in security 
information infrastructures.   
 Practitioners in the metropolitan municipalities can adopt the cyber-security status 
assessment tool to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the implemented 
controls to protect information infrastructure against cyber risks. The assessment 
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results could assist the practitioners to motivate for resource allocation (money and 
human resources) in addressing the identified weakness. Executive management in the 
metropolitan municipalities can base their decisions on the assessment report that has 
been created through the adoption of the credible cyber-security status assessment 
instrument that this research has developed. It is anticipated that the continuous 
assessment of the status of cyber-security will advance the culture of cyber-security in 
the metropolitan municipalities.  
9.4. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 The cyber-security assessment tool that this study has developed does not cater for 
different occupational levels in the municipality. A question in the survey could be 
relevant to the head of the unit and senior management team but not important to 
operational staff on the ground. 
 The cyber-security assessment tool does not cater for qualitative methods of data 
collection. Only the quantitative data collection method is used in the assessment tool. 
The assessment instrument does not for example cater for focused groups and 
interviews. 
9.5. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The cyber-security assessment tool can be improved by means of qualitative data 
collection methods. 
 The assessment tool can be tested further in other metropolitan municipalities with the 
intention of confirming or disputing its validity.  
 The municipal cyber-security conceptual framework can be revisited to align with the 
current trends in information infrastructure, changes in the country’s regulations and 
legislation, or any other new developments that could impact the framework. 
 The framework and the assessment tool can be tested on other types of municipalit ies 
in the country. 
 The statements in the cyber-security status assessment instrument can be improved or 
adapted to align with the level of the audience in the municipality being assessed  
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APPENDIX G: 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Metropolitan Municipality Cyber-security Assessment Survey Questionnaire 
Legend:  SA = Strongly Agree, A = Agree,  DK = Don’t Know, D = Disagree, SD = Strongly Disagree  
INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT CYBER-S ECURITY DOMAIN 
 Please chose the statement that best describe your view  






1. My organisation has a written cyber-security policy    
2. My organisation has an overarching supply chain management  
policy that guide the acquisition of information infrastructure 
   
3. My organisation has a documented cyber-security strategy    
4. My organisation has an inventory of critical information  
infrastructure 
   
5. My organisation has information infrastructures contingency 
plans 
   










6. The cyber-security policy is constantly reviewed to incorporate 
emerging trends in the protection of information infrastructures  
     
7. The cyber-security policy contains sections that are relevant to 
my job 
     
8. The cyber-security policy is aligned to the Municipal Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP) 
     
9. I believe our Cyber-security strategy is aligned to the Municipal 
IDP 
     
10. There is a structure or unit within my organisation that is 
responsible to implement the cyber-security strategy 
     
11. I know what to do if I want to report breaches or violations 
against cyber-security policy 
     
12. I know who the custodian of the cyber-security policy is      
13. My organisation conducts research and development with the 
aim to enhance protection of information infrastructure 
     
14. Protection of information infrastructure in my organisation is 
guided by the industry best practices 
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CYBER-S ECURITY GOVERNANCE DOMAIN 






15. My organisational strategic risk register contains cyber-security 
risk  
   










16. Management has allocated adequate budget  to implement cyber-
security policy 
     
17. Risk Management processes guide the implementation of cyber-
security controls in my organisation 
     
18. Management has provided guidance on the regulatory 
requirements pertaining to information infrastructure that I work 
with 
     
19. Management has allocated adequate people to protection 
information infrastructures  
     
20. Management enforces compliance to cyber-security      
21. In my organisation there are oversight structures / committees  
that hold management to account for the protection of 
information infrastructure 
     
22. Internal Audit operational plans incorporate audits or reviews on 
information infrastructures on an annual basis  
     
23. Management have input in the Internal Audit operational plans 
before the plan is implemented 
     
24. Audit Committee approves  the internal audit operational plans 
before the plan is implemented 
     
25. Management has implemented clear asset management practices.       
26. Management understands  the possible impact of cyber-security 
threats to Municipal service delivery  
     
CYBER-S ECURITY TECHNICAL OPERATIONS DOMAIN 






27. There are service level agreements between my Municipality and 
the service providers working on information infrastructures  
   










28. Management is monitoring the services provided by the service 
providers / consultants against the service level agreements  
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29. My organisation has deployed technologies to protect 
information infrastructures against cyber threats  
     
30. Access to information infrastructures is controlled through 
identification and authentication 
     
31. Management has adopted industry best practices to protect 
information infrastructure against cyber-threats 
     
32. Anti-virus software are installed into our laptops, desktops, and 
other devices 
     
33. Audits are conducted to provide assurance on the adequacy and 
effectiveness of controls that have been implemented to protect 
information infrastructure 
     
34. The incident management procedures are adequate to resolve 
cyber-security incidents 
     
35. The building that I work in is adequately protected to secure the 
information infrastructure 
     
MANAGE HUMAN ISSUES IN CYBER-S ECURITY DOMAIN 










36. Employees’ activities on information infrastructure are 
monitored 
     
37. In my organisation action is taken against employees who violate 
cyber-security policy 
     
38. Employees are made aware of the cyber-security policy contents       
39. Employees know where to report suspicious illicit cyber-security 
activities 
     
40. Employees receive adequate training in the information  
infrastructure they operate 
     
41. I am aware of cyber-security threats affecting the information  
assets I work with 
     
42. I am aware that organisational Internet and e-mail systems should 
be  used for business purposes  
     
43. Employees accept responsibility towards information  
infrastructure protection  
     
44. My organisation constantly conducts cyber-security assessment 
to determine how employees are complying with the cyber-
security policy 
     
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
45. I have been in the employ of the 
Municipality for  
 Less than 3 years = 1 
 3 years but less than 5 years = 2 
 5 years but less than 7 years = 3 
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 7 years but less than 10 years = 4 
 10 years and over = 5 
46. I belong to   Information and Communication Technology 
Category = 1 
 Operating Technology = 2 
 Administration Category = 3 
47. My position is at   Management level = 1 
 Specialist level = 2 
 Clerical level = 3 
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